Month: July 2025

A few years ago, the estate of Dr. Seuss decided to pull six books from publication because the works include illustrations that “portray people in ways that are hurtful and wrong.” This was taken by some on the right as an example of “cancel culture” and it became a battleground in the culture war designed to distract from real problems. There was speculation on the motives of the decision makers. They might have been motivated by sincere moral concerns, they might have been motivated by woke marketing (sales did increase after the announcement), or they might have (as the right suggests) yielded to the threat of “cancel culture.” While questions of motives are interesting, my main concern is with the philosophical matter of re-assessing works of the past in the context of current values.

This is not a new problem in philosophy and David Hume addressed the matter long ago. As Hume sees it, we can and should make allowances for some differences between current and past customs. He says, “The poet’s monument more durable than brass, must fall to the ground like common brick or clay, were men to make no allowance for the continual revolutions of manners and customs, and would admit of nothing but what was suitable to the prevailing fashion. Must we throw aside the pictures of our ancestors, because of their ruffs and fardingales?” Hume is right to note that elements of past art will be out of tune with our time and that some of these differences should be tolerated as being the natural and blameless result of shifting customs. Such works can and should still be enjoyed.

As an example, movies made and set in the 1960s will feature different styles of clothing, different lingo, different styles of filming, and so on. But it would be unreasonable to look down on or reject a work simply because of these differences. Hume does, however, note that a work can cross over from having blameless differences in customs to being morally problematic:

 

But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition. The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous in the characters drawn by several of the ancient poets, even sometimes by Homer and the Greek tragedians, diminishes considerably the merit of their noble performances, and gives modern authors an advantage over them. We are not interested in the fortunes and sentiments of such rough heroes: We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blamable.

 

Hume thus provides a rough guide to the moral assessment of past works: when a work’s content violates contemporary ethics, this is a significant flaw in the work. Hume does note that such works can still have artistic merit, and one can understand that the artist was operating within the context of the values of their time but these flaws are blameworthy and diminish our ability to enjoy the work. Put in marketing terms, the work loses its appeal to the audience. Hume’s view can easily be applied to the Dr. Seuss situation.

When Dr. Seuss created these works, the general customs, and ethics of America (and the world) were different. While there were people who held moral views that condemned racist stereotypes in art, there was a general acceptance of such things. In fact, many people would not even recognize them as being racist at the time they were created. Since I hold to an objective view of morality, I think that racist images have always been wrong, but I do recognize the impact of culture on moral assessment. There are, of course, ethical relativists who hold that morality depends on the culture: so, what was right in the earlier culture that accepted racism would be wrong now in a culture that is more critical of racism.

There are also theories that consider the role of cultural context in terms of what can be reasonably expected of people and that shapes how people and works are assessed. That is, that while morality is not relative, it can be harder or easier to be good in different times and places. So, a person trying to be a decent human being in the 1930s faced different challenges than a person trying to be a decent person in 2025. Harms also need to be taken in context: while racist stereotypes in drawings are seen as very harmful today, in the context of the racism of the past, these drawings would pale in comparison to the harms caused by racist violence and laws. This is not to deny the existence of racist violence today; it is just to put matters in context: things are bad, but not as bad as the past (though the future might be worse).

Whether we think that morality has changed or that more people are moral, these racist stereotypes are now broadly rejected by people who are not racists. As such, it made both moral and practical sense for the estate to take these books out of print. From a practical standpoint, racism can taint a business’ reputation and unless one focuses on marketing to racists (which could be a profitable option) purging racist content makes sense. In terms of ethics, racist images are wrong. One could advance a utilitarian argument here about harm, a Kantian argument about treating people as ends and not means, or many other sorts of arguments depending on what ethical theory you favor. As such, removing the products from sale makes sense, especially since they are books for children. We generally accept that children need more protection than adults. While adults can (sometimes) make informed decision about possible harms from content, children generally have not learned how to do this. So just as we would not allow children access to firearms, alcohol, or pornography, it is ethical for a company to decide to protect them from racism.

While it is tempting to see children’s books as just amusements, children can be profoundly shaped by the content of such works. This is, perhaps, why many parents and groups have been instrumental in making Captain Underpants the most banned (cancelled?) book in America. Just as they are shaped by all their experiences. Children will generally pick up on racist stereotypes and can internalize them. Even if they do not become overt racists, these stereotypes will impact how they think and act throughout their life. As Plato argued, “true education is being trained from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things.” Our good dead friend Aristotle developed this notion in his Nicomachean Ethics and he makes an excellent case for how people become habituated. Assuming Aristotle got it right, the estate made the right choice in discontinuing these works.

In closing, it is worth wondering why the right was so concerned about these works. If they were consistent defenders of freedom of expression and freedom of choice, then they could argue that they are merely applying their principles of freedom. However, they are not consistent defenders of these freedoms and one must suspect that they are fighting for racism rather than freedom.

“Bathroom bill” is the popular term for legislative efforts to restrict access to public bathrooms based on gender identity. These bills typically define who can and cannot access these facilities based on how the bill defines sex or Examples include defining sex by assigned sex at birth, sex listed on the person’s birth certificate, or sex based on gender identity. Some states have passed or are considering bathroom bills and this matter is part of the ongoing culture war against transpeople. As Trump himself noted, this front of the culture war is new. As to why it was opened up, the reasonable answer is that the right mostly lost the same-sex marriage culture war, and they needed a new victim to attack for political gain. Transgender people, unfortunately, were the chosen target.

People tend to take a stance on bathroom bills based on how they feel rather than based on a theory of law. This is usually because most people, even politicians, don’t have a theory of law. While my focus in this essay is on bathroom bills, I am using this context to develop my theory of law in more detail. I want to have a principled and consistent method of assessing laws and good faith argumentation involves making this methodology clear.

Good faith also requires me to note that I am operating within a framework of political philosophy based on Mill and Locke. I accept that people have rights, that the purpose of government is the good of the people, and that rights can only be infringed upon based on the principle of harm. I also favor small government: the laws and the state’s use of coercive force should be kept at a minimum. I have other assumptions but laying out my entire political philosophy would require at least one book. Good faith also requires that I make it clear that I generally oppose bathroom bills and my reasons will be advanced in this essay.

My first consideration in assessing a (potential) law is determining whether the subject is fit for law, and this requires determining whether the matter falls under the legitimate use of the power of the state. What counts as legitimate use is a matter of debate and people are rarely consistent beyond thinking that if the state is doing what they want, it is legitimate. Fortunately, the issue of legitimate use can be narrowed down. In the case of the bathroom bill, the issue is whether controlling who can access bathrooms is a legitimate use of the coercive power of the state. In the context of laws that restrict liberty and rights, I generally follow Mill’s approach: liberty can only be justly restricted to prevent harm to another. On this principle, proponents of a bathroom bill would need to identify the harm the bill is intended to prevent: if there is no harm, then there is no justification for restricting liberty. But even if a law is supposed to prevent harm, this does not settle the issue of whether it should be law.

A second consideration is the issue of whether the significance and nature of the alleged harm warrants expending public resources to pass and enforce a law. Harms vary in significance and even significant harm might not be the right sort of harm that justifies the use of the coercive power of the state. Consider, if you will, some harm that can occur in a bathroom.

Like many other men, I feel uncomfortable when other men try to engage me in conversation while I am urinating. I am also a bit offended when people try to make eye contact during these conversations. While I am experiencing some harm (discomfort and feeling offended) these harms are not significant enough to warrant a law against them. They are also not the right sort of harm: the state does not seem obliged to protect us from discomfort or offense. But a person could escalate matters in the bathroom: if the chatty urinator started making threats of violence or tried to touch someone, then the harm becomes both significant enough to and the right sort to warrant state intervention. That is, laws against threatening people and assault fall within the state’s legitimate use of coercive force.

While those advocating bathroom bills might feel uncomfortable around or offended by the people whose bathroom access they wish to control, they generally understand that these reasons do not warrant passing a law. As such, the bills are typically presented as intending to keep women and girls safe in the bathroom. Some proponents of these bills do admit that transgender people are rarely sexual predators. Instead, they express worry that non-transgender sexual predators will exploit laws allowing transgender access to bathrooms to attack women and girls. This does allege harm that would be both significant and the right sort. But is the allegation true? After all, if the harm is make-believe, it cannot justify a law.

Several states and large cities have allowed transgender people to access bathrooms based on their identity for years, thus providing a wealth of empirical data . The evidence is that this access is not exploited by predators. That is, allowing trans people access to bathrooms of their choice does not decrease the safety of women and girls in bathrooms. If it did, there would be evidence. This is not to deny that a sexual predator could dress up as a woman to get into a bathroom, just that it does not seem to be something that occurs with any statistical significance. There is also the obvious fact that  a predator could dress up as a women whether there are bathroom laws in place. A sexual predator could also disguise themselves as a trash can to launch an ambush in a bathroom, but we do not need a law to address this. It is not something that happens enough to warrant creating a law and mandating trash can inspections.

Somewhat ironically, bathroom bills require that transgender men use women’s bathrooms. As such, a sexual predator keen on exploiting the law could simply claim to be a transgender male and freely enter bathrooms. No need to wear a dress or makeup. As such, the fear argument is self-defeating: if a law is needed to keep transgender people out of bathrooms because male sexual predators will put on dresses to pretend to be transwomen, then the law would not work because sexual predators would simply claim to be transmen and have easy access to the bathrooms because the law defines them as women. This could be addressed by employing bathroom police and requiring people to present birth certificates before accessing bathrooms. But this would require a disproportionate expenditure of resources and impose inconveniences not warranted by the alleged harm. In response, one could contend that something must be done to address even the possibility of harm: theoretical transgender predators must be prevented from attacking women and girls in bathrooms no matter how unlikely this is to happen.

My third consideration is the issue of whether the harm is adequately addressed by existing laws or factors other than laws. If the harm is already addressed adequately, there is no need for a new law. Going back to my chatty urinator discussion, we do not need a law banning chatty people from bathrooms because someone might make verbal threats in the bathroom. We also do not need a law banning people who make eye contact in bathrooms because someone might touch someone else in the bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: making threats is illegal and assault is illegal. Likewise, while knowing a trans person is in the bathroom with them might make a person uncomfortable or feel offended, we do not need a law banning trans people because someone might assault or rape someone in a bathroom. The existing laws already handle this: assault and rape are illegal and allowing trans people to use bathrooms as they wish does not change that. As such, there is no need for bathroom bills and on their own grounds of justification they are unjustified.

The United States recently saw another outbreak of the measles with most victims being unvaccinated. Critics of the anti-vaccination movement present incidents like these as proof the movement is not just misinformed but dangerous.  Not surprisingly, anti-vaccination folks are often derided as stupid. After all, the anti-vaccination arguments usually rest on untrue and often debunked claims. For example, the claim that vaccines cause autism is clearly untrue. Vaccination, in general,  has been conclusively shown to safely prevent diseases, although there are some risks.

It is tempting for those who disagree with the anti-vaccination people to dismiss them as to stupid to understand science. This, however, is a mistake.  One reason is purely pragmatic: those who are pro-vaccination want the anti-vaccination people to change their minds and calling them stupid, mocking and insulting them will only cause them to entrench. Another reason is that the anti-vaccination people are not, in general, stupid. There are good grounds for people to be skeptical towards claims about health and science. To show this, I will briefly present some points of concern.

One rational concern is the fact that scientific research has been plagued with a disturbing amount of corruption, fraud and errors. For example, the percentage of scientific articles retracted for fraud is ten times what it was in 1975. Once lauded studies and theories, such as those behind the pushing of antioxidants and omega-3, have proven riddled with inaccuracies. As such, it is not stupid to worry that scientific research might not be accurate. Somewhat ironically, the study that started the belief that vaccines cause autism is a paradigm example of bad science. However, it is not stupid to consider that the studies that show vaccines are safe might have flaws as well.

Another matter of concern is the influence of corporate lobbyists. For example, the dietary guidelines and recommendations set forth by the United States Government should be set based on the best science. However, guidelines are influenced by industry lobbyists, such as the dairy industry. Given the influence of corporate lobbyists, it is not foolish to think the recommendations and guidelines given by the state might not be correct.

A third point of concern is that dietary and health guidelines and recommendations undergo what often seem to be relentless and unwarranted change. For example, the government warned us of the dangers of cholesterol for decades, but this recommendation is being changed. It would, of course, be one thing if the changes were the result of steady improvements in knowledge. However, the recommendations often seem to lack a proper foundation. John P.A. Ioannidis, a professor of medicine and statistics at Stanford, has noted “Almost every single nutrient imaginable has peer reviewed publications associating it with almost any outcome. In this literature of epidemic proportions, how many results are correct?” Given such criticism from experts in the field, it hardly seems stupid of people to have doubts and concerns.

There is also the fact that people do suffer adverse drug reactions that can lead to serious medical issues and even death. While the reported numbers vary (one FDA page puts the number of deaths at 100,000 per year) this is a matter of rational concern.  In an interesting coincidence, I was thinking about this essay while watching the Daily Show and one of my “ad experiences” was for Januvia, a diabetes drug. As required by law, the ad mentioned all the side effects of the drug and these include serious things, including death. Given that the FDA has approved drugs with dangerous side effects, it is hardly stupid to be concerned about possible side effects from any medicine or vaccine.

Given the above, it is not stupid to be concerned about vaccines. At this point, the reader might suspect that I am about to defend an anti-vaccine position. I will not. In fact, I am a pro-vaccination person. This might seem surprising given the points I just made. However, I can rationally reconcile these points with my position on vaccines.

The above points do show that there are rational grounds for taking a general critical and skeptical approach to health, medicine and science. However, this general skepticism needs to be rational and consistent. That is, it should not be a rejection of science but rather the adoption of a critical approach in which one considers the best available evidence, assesses experts by the proper standards (those of a good argument from authority), and so on. Also, it is important to note that general skepticism does not automatically justify accepting or rejecting specific claims. For example, the fact that there have been flawed studies does not prove any specific study about a vaccine is flawed. As another example, the fact that lobbyists influence the dietary recommendations does not prove that vaccines are harmful drugs being pushed on Americans by greedy corporations. As a final example, the fact that some medicines have serious and dangerous side effects does not prove that the measles vaccine is dangerous or causes autism. Just as one should be rationally skeptical about pro-vaccination claims one should also be rationally skeptical about ant-vaccination claims.

To use an obvious analogy, it is rational to have a general skepticism about the honesty and goodness of people. After all, people do lie and there are bad people. However, this general skepticism does not automatically prove that a specific person is dishonest or evil. That is a matter that must be addressed on the individual level.

To use another analogy, it is rational to have a general concern about engineering. After all, there have been many engineering disasters. However, this general concern does not warrant believing that a specific engineering project is defective or that engineering itself is defective. The specific project would need to be examined, and engineering is, in general, the most rational approach to building stuff.

So, the people who are anti-vaccine are not, in general, stupid. However, they seem to be making the mistake of not rationally considering specific vaccines and the evidence for their safety and efficacy. It is rational to be concerned about medicine in general, just as it is rational to be concerned about the honesty of people in general. However, just as one should not infer that a friend is a liar because there are people who lie, one should not infer that a vaccine must be bad because there is bad science and bad medicine.

Convincing anti-vaccination people to accept vaccination is challenging. One reason is that the issue has become politicized into a battle of values and identity. This is partially due to the fact that the anti-vaccine people have been mocked and attacked, thus leading them to entrench and double down. Another reason is that, as argued above, they do have well-founded concerns about the trustworthiness of the state, the accuracy of scientific studies, and the goodness of corporations. A third reason is that people tend to give more weight to the negative and tend to weigh potential loss more than potential gain. As such, people would tend to give more weight to negative reasons against vaccines and fear the alleged dangers of vaccines more than they would value their benefits.

Given the importance of vaccinations, it is critical that the anti-vaccination movement be addressed in a way that respects their legitimate worries and concerns. Calling people stupid, mocking them and attacking them are not effective ways of convincing people that vaccines are generally safe and effective. A more rational and hopefully more effective approach is to address their legitimate concerns and consider their fears. After all, the goal should be the health of people and not scoring political points or feeling smug superiority.

Thanks to Jean Garnett’s New York Times article, the concept of heterofatalism has gone viral in some circles. The theoretical foundation for heterofatalism is heteropessimism, a concept developed by Professor Ara Seresin. Heteropessimism describes the disillusionment with heterosexual dating alleged to inflict many women. Heterofatalism transforms pessimism into fatalism about heterosexual relationships. On this view, men are disappointing, relationships are inevitably doomed, but the afflicted women are still attracted to men. Negative views of heterosexual relationships are nothing new, so what is the difference between older criticisms and the new fatalism?

Being an older philosopher, I am most familiar with the “classic” feminist criticisms of heterosexual relationships. While there are many historical versions of feminism and it would be a mistake to treat them all the same, the classic criticisms tend to be based on the negative aspects of patriarchy, broadly construed. Most criticisms focus on how men are constructed by society in ways that incline them to be oppressive, exploitive and abusive in heterosexual relationships. This is bad for the men and worse for the women, leading to some feminists to advocate varying degrees of rejecting heterosexual relationships. Other feminists argued for changing gender roles to improve things for everyone.

While there are still classic feminist criticisms of heterosexual relationships, the new heterofatalism (which I am sure the cool kids call neo-HF) seems to be exemplified by the anecdotes of Jean Garnett and other women. Their disappointment with men is not based on men being domineering, oppressive, abusive or exploitative. Instead, their tales speak of men who are emotionally avoidant, fearful of commitment, and inconsistent. But haven’t women been saying that about us men since we developed language? The answer is “yes.” So, the big change is that while men are criticized for disappointing, they are not being criticized for manifesting the patriarchy. It could be argued that this is an improvement: while we men still have the old disappointing qualities, at least women like Garnett are not lamenting about being oppressed or exploited by the men they are in a relationship with. At the current rate of “progress” men should be good relationship material in a few centuries. But is there actually a significant problem of the sort described by Garnett?

When it comes to inferences about populations, we philosophers worry about the dangers of hasty generalizations, biased generalization, anecdotal evidence, and the spotlight fallacy. A hasty generalization occurs when an inference is drawn from a sample that is too small to warrant the conclusion. For example, before going to college in Ohio I was biking in my hometown. I was struck by a car from Ohio and inferred that Ohio would be dangerous place based on that sample of one. While I was right about Ohio drivers, my inference was unwarranted at the time. So, there is the question of the sample size used to support the claim that heterofatalism is widespread.

A biased generalization occurs when the sample is not representative. While the sample can also be too small (making it as hasty generalization as well) it can also be large. The problem is that an inference drawn from a biased sample will be unreliable. For example, a survey of 10,000 churchgoers about the existence of God would be a biased sample, since people who go to church would tend to believe in God. So, there is also the question of whether samples used to establish claims about hetereofatalism are biased in some manner.

An appeal to anecdotal evidence is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a very few cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. To be fair and balanced, Garnett does not seem to claim that her article is a rigorous analysis of heterofatalism but people do, as always, seem to be drawing inferences from her anecdotes. While I do not doubt that she and her small circle of friends are suffering dating woes, drawing a conclusion about American women in general from their anecdotes would be fallacious. But, as always, to infer that they must not be representative because they are mere anecdotal would be to commit the fallacy fallacy. This is the fallacy that a fallacy must have a false conclusion because it is a fallacy.

Thanks to Garnett, heterofatalism is enjoying a moment in the media spotlight (complete with backlash from the right). While the anecdotes of heterofatalism are likely to resonate with every woman who has had a bad relationship experience (that is, all women) it is wise to be aware of the spotlight fallacy. This fallacy rests on the availability heuristic cognitive bias. We tend to infer that something is widespread or frequent just because we hear about it often. So, the more something is in the media spotlight, the more inclined we are to think that it happens often or is a widespread occurrence. This can be intentionally used, as politicians often do. For example, an anti-immigrant politician might turn the anecdote of a murderer who is a migrant into a talking point in the right-wing media to create the impression that such murderers are common. When something goes viral, it can have the same effect. So, it is reasonable to wonder whether heterofatalism is widespread or just in the spotlight for now. That said, I think that Garnett is sincere in her article and honestly reports the disappointment of her and her friends.

While feminism is not one of my specialties, I do have moral concerns about relationships and how people are being treated. Like many “classic” feminists, I have argued the obvious: being abusive, oppressive and exploitative in a relationship is bad. But are the men Garnett is complaining about bad people and are they to blame for their alleged failures?

Based on the descriptions offered by Garnett, they are not bad. Just disappointing in that they fail to do what she wants. She does not report any cases of them being abusive or oppressive, or trying to exploit her. Ironically, one of her biggest complaints is that they seem unwilling to leave their house to come have sex with her. Many classic criticisms of men are that “all we care about” is sex. The worst that can be said of these men is that they fail to match her conception of what a man should be, which is (ironically) a criticism feminists have often made of men in terms of their expectation that women should match their expectations (such as being caregivers or having a certain appearance).

My last long-term relationship started in 2016, became a long-distance relationship in 2020 and ended in May, 2024. The ending was amicable, and she broke up with me in person. Like Garnett, I tried dating again and like her I have settled into my own version of heterofatalism. But, obviously, for different reasons.

In my own case, I take the obvious move of applying causal reasoning to assess why my relationships have ended. As a philosopher, I use the obvious approach of Mill’s Method of Agreement. This method requires considering at least two cases in which the effect is present. In this method, these cases are examined to find a common thread. The one indisputable common thread in all my relationships is me; so it makes sense to infer that I am the problem. But to be fair and balanced, I also need to consider common threads in the women I date, and I definitely have a type: ambitious, smart, and professional women whose careers will take them far away. As such, it makes sense why my relationships would end as they do: the woman breaking up with me (amicably) when the challenges of long distance love become too much. I must note that I went into these relationships with my eyes open: the women always made it clear that their career came first and that I would always be, at best, second in importance. Probably third, because dogs.

Garnett reveals much about herself in her article and her qualities and the qualities she seeks in men do provide an explanation for her disappointment. She notes that she recently ended her open marriage because she was in love with a man who later seemed unable to commit. She says she has gone after similar men who also seemed unable to commit. In discussions with her friends, they ripped apart the men they had been dating with obvious contempt for these pathetic creatures who failed them. Using common thread reasoning, one might suspect that while the men include a common thread, the women do as well. While we men are often criticized for being emotionally retarded, we do have feelings, and we can be surprisingly good at noticing how women feel about us (we can also be shockingly or willfully blind). Anecdotally, if I felt that a woman was contemptuous of me and mocking me with her friends, I would certainly not text her back or want to have anything to do with her. Also, if I was looking for a committed and loyal relationship, I would be wary of a woman who had an open marriage yet still divorced her husband because of what she thought she saw in some other man. While I know that this is anecdotal evidence, reading about Garnett and her friend’s contempt for men made me feel even more pessimistic. As such, it is worth considering that part of the problem in any relationship is you. And in my case, me.

A fundamental ethical concern in sports is creating fair categories of competition. Age is a non-controversial example of this: elementary school teams do not compete against high school teams. Size is also a relatively non-controversial example in boxing. A heavyweight fighter will generally have a significant advantage over a smaller fighter. But there is a challenge in developing principles of category fairness. After all, there are many factors that can provide one category of athletes an advantage over others that intuitively should not be the basis of categorizing athletes for fair competition.

As an obvious example, some have anatomies and physiologies that give them an advantage. To illustrate, a runner with an ideal body type for running and excellent genetics for speed and endurance will have an advantage over someone with a body that is biomechanically terrible for running and whose genes lack those advantages. One could also consider psychological factors (such as determination) and even economic factors (which can affect diet, coaching, and available training time). While trying to adjust for these factors would make competition fairer, it does lead to a reductio ad absurdum: the ultimate in fairness would be for each person to be in their own category, competing against only themselves. That is, there would be no competition.

The other extreme would be to have no categories: everyone competes with everyone regardless of such factors as age, gender, or weight. This could even be seen as fair: everyone is competing without distinction and the best will win. But this would also be absurd (and dangerous): imagine elementary school students playing tackle football against the Patriots. It can also be argued that this would be unfair: professional football players enjoy far too many advantages over elementary school football players. As Aristotle would say, the right approach lies in a mean between these two extremes: neither too many nor too few categories for fair competition.

One category that seems reasonable in most sports is sex. Males generally enjoy significant physical advantages relative to females and genderless competition would tend to result in males dominating sports. As an example, if the Olympic marathon had no gender categories, all the competing athletes would almost certainly be males. There would, of course, be exceptions at individual competitions as a female runner might beat all the males at a specific marathon. As such, a case can be made that gender categories in sports are fair. While this might seem like a simple matter, it is complicated.

There are world class women athletes, such as Caster Semenya, who have XY chromosomes. While there are many bad faith arguments made about this issue, one can have a good faith debate about the fairness of allowing women with XY chromosomes to compete with XX women since there are some reasons to think XY chromosomes can provide an advantage that XX women lack. It must be noted that the performance of elite XY women athletes does not match that of elite male athletes and XX women athletes can outperform XY women athletes in competition.

The easy and obvious reply to concerns about XY women is to point out that this seems to be almost the only case where people are worried about genetic advantages in sports. Athletes do not get tested to see if they have advantageous genes (or anatomy and physiology) to determine if they can compete. For example, very tall basketball players have an edge over shorter players, and this has a genetic component, but they do not get banned because of that genetic feature. In fact, elite athletes probably enjoy a range of genetic advantages over other athletes, but they do not get banned from the sport even when they greatly exceed even other athletes in their performance.

It can be countered that there are grounds for concern about allowing XY women to compete as women. We have accepted the categories of male and female in sports as a division needed to ensure fair competition. It can be argued that XY women should be excluded from the female category in sports on the grounds that they do not qualify for inclusion. This, one might argue, is based on fairness: XY males are excluded from competing against XX females based on fairness because they do not belong in the female category and would have an unfair advantage. This reasoning can also be backed up by an analogy.

Imagine that Sam has been adopted and is just young enough to be able to play one year of little league baseball before aging out. When he tries out for the little league team, he finds that his somewhat unusual size and strength give him an edge over the other kids and people notice that he seems to be the size of kids a year older. Now imagine that the parents of another child think that something is up, so they hire an investigator to check Sam’s background. The investigator finds out that there seems to have been a mistake in Sam’s records, and he might be a year older than what the official documents say. While Sam and his parents have done nothing wrong intentionally, it would be unfair for Sam to compete against kids a year younger than him. As such, Sam should not be allowed to finish the season because he exceeds the age limit. While this argument does have some appeal, it does raise important concerns.

While I do agree that dividing athletes into the male and female categories can be warranted on the grounds of fairness, to simply assume that XY women are not females would be unwarranted. What is needed is a well-developed and defended set of principles for sorting athletes into these categories. These principles would also need to be consistent and consistently applied.

Going back to the analogy with Sam, he appears to be a large person of his claimed age. But the parents of the other child believe the evidence provided by their investigator and by their standard, Sam is too old to compete in little league and must be excluded on the grounds of fairness. While age is clearly an objective matter, this lack of certainty is intentional to make the analogy fit: while some believe that XY women are not women, this is a matter of what standards one accepts. Just as one would need to argue for which documentation to accept about Sam’s age, one must argue for the standards used to exclude or include people in the male/female categories in sports.

If it is decided that the distinction is based on genetics (which it seems to be) and that XY women must be excluded from the female category because they have an unfair advantage, then consistency would seem to require doing a genetic analysis of all athletes to discern if there are genes that yield similar unfair advantages. If such genes do exist, then allowing people with them to compete with those without would be unfair. If we should exclude XY women based on their alleged advantage, then the same would apply to these other athletes and they would need to be excluded as well. If one says that this should be limited solely to XY and XX, then they would need to provide a principled argument for making this the only genetic distinction that matters. While one could make a practical appeal to the cost of testing; the same would also apply to the XY/XX cases as one must test a person to determine if a woman is XX or XY.  And if there is a need to test for that, then there would seem to be a need to test for other genetic advantages.

One can also argue that the genetic advantages of top athletes are too diverse to identify and categorize and the XX/XY distinction is a simple one that allows the preservation of existing sports competition categories. There would also be degrees of advantage and sorting this all out would be needlessly complicated. But one could reply that we could create broad genetic categories analogous to age groups in sports. This could be countered by arguing that the distinctions and advantages are fuzzy and unclear, so why not let people compete without genetic testing and categorization? This would, of course, seem to also apply to XY women and while they might have some possible advantage over some XX women in sports, this does not seem to warrant creating a special category that excludes them from competing against other women. This does require accepting that the sharp and absolute male/female distinction that some people crave does not exist, that the boundaries are fluid and fuzzy and this reflects reality. While some might want “pure” Platonic concepts of male and female, we do not find them instantiated perfectly in this world. As such, XY women should be permitted to compete as women.

While the wealthy did very well in the pandemic, businesses and employees were eager to get back to normal economic activity. While the vaccines were not perfect, they helped re-open the economy. As another pandemic is certainly on the way, it is worth considering the issue of vaccine mandates again.

While there are various moral issues involving vaccines, one is whether employers have the right to require employees to get vaccinated. While this situation is somewhat unusual, it falls under the broader issue of employee rights.

In the United States employers hold vast power over their employees. This power stems from the doctrine of employment at will: an employer can fire an employee for almost any reason or no reason at all. Employees can, of course, quit for almost any reason at all or no reason at all. But employers generally hold an advantage: it is usually much easier for an employer to replace an employee than for an employee to find an equal or better job.

This doctrine allows employers to exert broad control over the lives of their employees within and beyond the workplace. For example, an employer can fire an employee for holding political views they dislike and even for social drinking or smoking outside of work. Employers also have a very broad right to surveil their employees at work or when using work equipment. While the government would need a warrant to read your work email or listen to your calls made at work, your employer can do that at will. In some cases, they can legally put cameras in bathrooms to monitor employees.

While some see this degree of employer power as wrong and even on par with tyranny, it is the default moral view in practice. That is, employers have the moral right to fire their employees at will with only very few exceptions. Under this doctrine, an employer would be within their rights to offer an employee the choice between being vaccinated and being fired just as they can do the same thing with almost anything else. Obviously, if this doctrine is rejected, then the ethics must be addressed in a different manner.

One reasonable approach is utilitarianism. This is the view that the morality of an action is determined by its positive and negative consequences for those who count morally. Actions whose negative consequences are greater than their positive consequences are wrong. Good actions are those whose positive consequences outweigh the negative. I, like many others, use this approach when addressing large-scale ethical matters such as public policy.

Assuming mandated vaccines are safe and effective, they would present little risk (though there are always risks). They also provide benefits during this next pandemic. Because of this, an employer could make the moral argument that employees must be vaccinated based on the positive consequences of reducing the likelihood and severity of their illness (which would impact the employer). There is also the fact that vaccination of employees would help protect co-workers and customers. An unvaccinated employee would be a health risk to themselves and others and thus it would be right for employers to mandate vaccination in most cases. Employees who would be harmed by the vaccine or who do not interact with other workers or customers could, of course, opt out.

One could make a broad moral argument against employer power and use this to argue that employers should not have the power to force employees to vaccinate (naturally, employees always have the right to quit to avoid doing anything they do not want to do). I do find this appealing because I think employers have too much power and workers too few rights in terms of how employers can coerce employees. That said, vaccination seems morally on par with safety mandates of other kinds that are aimed at protecting workers and customers from harms and these seem warranted on utilitarian grounds. A business could be morally responsible for not requiring vaccines if employees infect each other or customers.

One way to counter this argument is to argue that requiring vaccination is different from other safety requirements. To illustrate, an employee who is required to wear a hair net while preparing food can take that off at the end of their shift and it has no lasting impact. A vaccination is different as it is not something that could be removed at the end of the workday. Even safe vaccines come with risks that make them different from hair nets and gloves (though a person could be allergic to latex gloves). As such, these might be relevant differences that break the analogy.

This can, of course, be countered by the fact that vaccination is usually required to attend K-12 schools and college so there is a moral precedent to requiring vaccination. One could argue that school and work are different; the challenge would be showing how the differences break the analogy. Or one could also argue that schools should not require vaccination either, but the challenge is proving this rather than just assuming it. But it is worth considering that an employer could be morally responsible if an employee were harmed because they were required to get vaccinated to keep their job.

One can also make an appeal to rights, that people have the right to refuse medical procedures. I do agree that people have this right; but it is distinct from the right to be allowed to be unvaccinated if one is around people at work or school. By analogy, I agree that people have the right to use drugs, but this is distinct from the right to use drugs at work, such as while flying a plane.

One argument against raising the minimum wage is based on the claim that doing so would hurt small businesses. This argument has some merit, at least for small businesses with narrow profit margins or low income. While companies like Amazon could increase wages while still making massive profits for upper management and shareholders, a small business that is barely making a profit could be hard pressed to increase wages.

 To use an imaginary example, suppose Larry owns Larry’s Lawn Care and pays his workers $10 an hour. He charges his customers $20 an hour for labor and has expenses of about $5 an hour, so Larry makes a profit of $5 for every hour an employee works. He also draws a salary for his work running the business and working on lawns and this is worked in the billing on top of the $20 per hour charged for labor.

But if the minimum wage were increased to $15 an hour, then Larry would make no profit unless he cut expenses or charged more. Charging more, some would argue, could make him lose customers which would lead to fewer hours of work for his employees. This could cause a loss of income or force him to fire people.

It could be countered that if Larry’s business breaks even while Larry is earning a wage for his own labor, then everything is good. Larry and his workers seem to be getting what they deserve within the context of what customers are willing to pay for the services. But if the business was experiencing a loss and could not make full payroll because the wages and cost of operating the business exceeded what customers would pay, then it can be claimed that the increase in wages hurt the business and employees. This is the sort of scenario used in making the small business argument against minimum wage. The reasoning is that because of the harms of increasing wages, they should not be increased.

But it must be noted operating costs (and such) are also a factor. In the lawn care example, if gas and equipment costs were lower, the lawn care business would have more income.  But it is usually not argued that these costs should be kept low by the government to aid small businesses and the burden of keeping small businesses profitable is usually put on the employees. One could argue that the state keeping operating costs low would hurt other businesses and thus hurt other employees, but this is a choice about who is harmed and how. Increasing what the customers pay would also shift the harm, which is also a choice. But one would need to sort out the impact of increasing prices in terms of how it would impact available hours and jobs. Interestingly, those who argue against minimum wage tend to accept that companies can raise prices to increase profits even when doing so could result in employees losing hours or jobs—in fact, companies are often rewarded financially for firing people.

To be consistent, someone who argues that increasing minimum wage is wrong because it would hurt employees by reducing hours or costing jobs must also argue that profitable policies that result in workers losing hours or jobs would be wrong. Otherwise, it would be evident that the argument has nothing to do with protecting employees and everything to do with protecting profit. An honest argument from such folk would be refreshing, which would be that wages should not be increased because owners would make less profit.

It is also often argued that the increase in wages would hurt small businesses because larger companies can afford to pay these wages while still being profitable. A reply is that if this is true, then small business could have an exception if they prove they would be unfairly harmed.

A second reply is that those who argue against increasing the minimum wage on this ground would also need to argue that small businesses should be protected from larger businesses in other ways. After all, if the minimum wage should not be increased because smaller businesses cannot compete with large businesses, then the state should also see to it that larger businesses do not enjoy other advantages over small businesses. If one is not willing to accept this view, then it is likely that one does not care about small businesses, one just does not want wages increased. At third reply is the harsh free market reply: if small businesses cannot compete, then they will go out of business just as they would if they cannot compete in other ways.

A final response to the small business argument is to point out that the argument can also be seen as making the case that minimum wage should not be increased because doing so would decrease the income of small business owners. This seems to assume that the owners are entitled to their profits. But employees can point out that not increasing the minimum wage (even if only to match inflation) reduces their income as inflation reduces the value of their wages. So, if reducing income is wrong, then not increasing the minimum wage to at least account for inflation would be wrong. After all the owners would still me making the same profit they were before (adjusted for inflation). As such, those who oppose increasing the minimum wage to at least account for inflation cannot consistently use the small business argument unless they are willing to be clear that what they are concerned with is the profits of the owners rather than alleged harm that might be caused to employees.

While some would be angry if student loans were forgiven and might believe their anger proves this would be unfair, this sort of “reasoning” has it backwards. While people should be angry at unfairness, anger does not prove that something is unfair. People can be angry about things that are fair and even things that are unfair in ways advantageous to them yet not as unfair in their favor as they might wish. As such, as was discussed in the previous essay, it is no surprise that arguments from anger against student loan cancellation are flawed.

People also use the concepts of fair and unfair when engaged in moral masking. This is a rhetorical technique in which a person uses moral language to create the appearance that they are making moral claims or arguments when they are not. In most cases, those using this technique are concealing their own self-interest, desires, or feelings about the matter behind a mask of morality. The rhetorical advantage is that the person seems to have more laudable motivations or reasons than their wants and feelings. To illustrate, saying “I would resent it if other people had their student loans cancelled” is probably less persuasive than saying “student loan cancellation would be unfair.”

Being a professional philosopher, I would be remiss if I did not mention that there are philosophical theories in which moral claims are just expressions of emotions or preferences. While this oversimplifies things, on such views saying, “student loan cancellation is unfair” would be means something like “I don’t like student loan cancellation” or even “student loan cancellation yuck!” Crudely put, on these views there is nothing more to ethics than these feelings or preferences. Fortunately, even if these views of ethics are correct, we could still have a meaningful debate about whether student loan forgiveness is fair in terms of considering the quality of the arguments advanced in favor of the various positions. There are also some sophisticated theories of emotion or preference-based ethics that do allow for meaningful moral debate about which feelings or preferences are more apt. But let us set aside these theoretical meta-ethical concerns and get into the debate over fairness and student loan cancellation.

While people think they know what is fair (and hence unfair), they usually do not have a well-considered concept of fairness. So, a sensible place to begin is with some discussion of the notion of fairness. Perhaps the simplest version of fairness is that everyone gets the same treatment. This view does have considerable appeal and is one I use when teaching. For example, students will sometimes ask for individual extra credit. My response is always that allowing this would be unfair to the other students. While this oversimplifies things, a fair class treats the students the same.

On this view of fairness, student loan cancellation would clearly be unfair. Those who happened to have unpaid student loans right now would receive a benefit that no one else would. Those who paid off their loans, especially those who did so soon before the forgiveness, would be denied this government largesse because they were responsible and probably made sacrifices to repay their loans. Many people who never took out student loans could contend that the debts they have are just as deserving of cancellation as student loans. Since everyone is not getting the same treatment, student loan cancellation is wrong and should not be done. This can be presented as an argument from fairness:

 

Premise 1: Government student loan debt cancellation would not treat people the same.

Premise 2: The government not treating people the same is unfair.

Premise 3: Treating people unfairly is wrong.

Conclusion: Student loan debt cancellation is wrong.

 

While this is certainly a viable moral position, it runs directly into the fact that the government routinely treats people differently. For example, business owners and corporations receive subsidies (agricultural subsidies are a common example) that other people do not receive. As another example, the wealthy and corporations enjoy the advantages of tax laws and policies that allow some of them to pay no taxes despite being greatly benefited by the state.  As such, if someone uses this sort of fairness argument against student loan debt cancellation, then they would be inconsistent if they failed to apply it to other cases in which the government does not treat people the same—which is most cases.

There are two main approaches to having the government treat people the same. One is for the government not to do anything for people. This would treat people the same because the government would not be doing anything for anyone. For example, not providing any form of relief or benefits (such as student loan cancellation or tax cuts) would treat people the same. Taking this to the extreme would result in anarchism (the elimination of the coercive state) or a return to the state of nature (an absence of any government). While there are those who advocate anarchism and even those who favor the state of nature, these would be a long way to go just to avoid cancelling student loan debt.

The other approach is for the government to do things but ensure that each person receives the same services and benefits from the state. For example, if one person received subsidies, then everyone would. If one person got a 10% tax cut, then everyone would. If one person had $50,000 in debt cancelled, then everyone would (perhaps getting a voucher for future debt). Taken to the extreme, this would resemble a common straw-person version of socialism in which everyone is treated identically by the state.  While this might have some initial appeal, reflection shows that it would be absurd. As everyone does not have the same needs and wants, treating everyone exactly the same would not be a very wise approach. Although the rest of us would certainly be better off if we were all treated like the wealthy, the powerful and the corporations by the state.

It would seem that taking fairness as treating people exactly the same in order to argue that cancelling student loan debt is unfair would create some problems: one would seem to be committed to either the state treating everyone the same by doing nothing (no more state) or by having the state treat everyone the same in every way which would seem absurd. As such, we need to consider another conception of fairness.

Long ago, when I was a student, student loans were mostly manageable. Over the years, the cost of college has increased dramatically, and student loans have become increasingly burdensome. There is also the issue of predatorial for-profit schools. Because of this debt burden, there have been proposals to address the student loan problem. Some have even proposed forgiving or cancelling student loans. This proposal has generated hostile responses, although Roxane Gay has advanced some well-reasoned arguments in its defense. I paid my relatively modest loans long ago, so my concern with is a matter of ethics rather than self-interest. In this essay and those to follow I will consider the ethics of student loan forgiveness and provide some logical assessment of various relevant arguments.

As Gay noted in the New York Times, Damon Linker tweeted that “I think Dems are wildly underestimating the intensity of anger college loan cancellation is going to provoke. Those with college debt will be thrilled, of course. But lots and lots of people who didn’t go to college or who worked to pay off their debts? Gonna be bad.” Linker was right. Even if there was not genuine grassroots anger at student loan forgiveness, Republicans and the right-wing media  generated rage against it. But is there any merit to the anger argument?

Put a bit simply, the anger argument against student loan forgiveness is that because federal student loan forgiveness would make many people angry, then it would be incorrect to do it. This is obviously the appeal to anger fallacy; a fallacy in which anger is substituted for evidence when making an argument. Formally, this version of the fallacy looks like this:

 

Premise 1: X would make people angry.

Conclusion: X is wrong or incorrect.

 

This is bad logic because the fact that something makes people angry has no connection to whether it is true or correct. People can be angry about claims that are true and enraged about things that are good. They can, of course, also be angry about claims that are false and enraged about things that are evil. But the anger people feel does not prove (or disprove) falseness or wrongness. A silly example illustrates this:

 

Premise 1: The triangle haters get angry when it is claimed that triangles have three sides.

Conclusion: Triangles do not have three sides. 

 

Somewhat less silly examples are as follows:

 

Premise 1: Some people got angry about the American colonies rebelling. 

Conclusion: The colonies were wrong to rebel.  

 

Premise 1: Some people are angry about evolution. 

Conclusion: Evolution does not occur.

 

Premise 1: Atheists would be angry if God exists.

Conclusion: God does not exist.

 

As these examples show, drawing a conclusion about the truth of a claim or the morality of something from people being angry is bad reasoning. As such, the anger people might feel about student loan forgiveness is irrelevant to whether it is the right thing to do. But perhaps there is a way to make a non-fallacious argument from anger. One way to do this is to switch from concerns about truth and morality to pragmatism. That is, perhaps it could be argued that the anger of some people would provide a practical reason to not have student loan forgiveness.

While this greatly oversimplifies things, pragmatic arguments are aimed at establishing what would be the most prudent or advantageous thing. This is an argument from consequences. The idea is that the correct choice is the one that generates the best consequences for those who matter. While people tend to think the correct choice is the one they think is best for them, working out an appeal to consequences requires arguing to establish who matters and how to assess the value of the consequences. Laying aside all these concerns, pragmatic arguments from anger can easily be made.

To illustrate, imagine that a politician sees the polls show that most voters are angry about student loan forgiveness and this anger is strong enough to influence their vote. From a pragmatic standpoint, the anger of their voters does give them a practical reason to oppose forgiveness: if they want to increase their chances of being re-elected, then they should oppose it. While this could be for selfish reasons (the politician might want to stay in office to keep cashing in on insider trading) it could also be for benevolent reasons (the politician might want to stay in office to try to improve the lives of their constituents). From a pragmatic standpoint responding to the anger could be the prudent or advantageous thing to do. While these pragmatic reasons can be strong motivating factors, they do not prove (or disprove) anything about the rightness or wrongness of student loan forgiveness. But there is still an option for using anger in a non-fallacious moral argument.

Utilitarianism, a view argued for by the likes of Bentham and Mill, is the moral view that the morality of an action depends on the consequences for those who are morally relevant. Put in simple terms, an action that creates more good for those who count would be better than an action that creates less good (or causes harm). Since utilitarian arguments deal with consequences, it is often possible to re-tool a pragmatic consequentialist argument into a moral argument. Here is how it could be done.

Suppose that there is good reason to believe that Linker is right and anger at any student loan cancellation “gonna be bad.” If the harms generated by this anger outweighs the benefit of the loan cancellation when considering all Americans, then the loan cancellation would be wrong. Thus, it would seem that the right sort of appeal to anger can work. But there is an obvious concern about the role of the anger in generating the harms.

If cancelling the loans itself resulted in greater harms than not doing so (such as pulling money from critical social programs), then it would seem right to not cancel them. But the anger argument rests on how people respond to the cancellation, not the harm done by the cancelling itself. That is, the harms in question would arise because of what people do because they are angry in response to the cancellation. This leads to an old ethical debate about how to factor in responses when doing the utilitarian calculation. On the one hand, it does seem reasonable to consider how people will respond when sorting out consequences. On the other hand, there is the obvious problem that people could force a change in the moral calculation by responding in ways that would create harms. That is, they could “rig” the moral argument by threatening to respond with terrible actions.

To use a fictional example, imagine a debate over raising minimum wage in which businesses said they would kill their minimum wage employees, their pets, and their loved ones if the wage was increased. In terms of consequences, this would make increasing the minimum wage extremely harmful and so it would be wrong to increase it. As an alternative fictional example, imagine the much-feared radical leftists threatened to kill business owners, their pets, and their loved ones if the minimum wage is not increased. This would make not increasing it wrong. But there is clearly a problem with assessing the morality of an action based on what the worst people might do in response to that action since this would make morality hostage to the worst people. One fix is to consider the action apart from such efforts to prevent the action by intentionally increasing the harms while also, obviously enough, assessing the ethics of these efforts. So, when considering student loan cancellation there is the moral issue of the consequences of the cancellation itself and there is the distinct moral issue of whether the responses to it would be morally appropriate or not. That is, we need to see if the anger against loan cancellation is morally warranted. If it is not, then the anger might have negative consequences but yielding to that anger would be wrong. In the next essay I will consider the fairness argument, free of anger.

In sci-fi people upload their minds to machines and, perhaps, gain a form of technological immortality. Because of the obvious analogy to the way computer memory works, it is appealing to take uploading the mind as uploading memories. In fiction, the author decides whether it is the same person or not, but philosophers need to argue this matter.

While the idea of mind uploads might seem a recent thing, philosophers have been considering this possibility for a long time. On excellent example is John Locke.  On his view, a person is their consciousness, and he considered the possibility that this consciousness could be transferred from one soul to another. Locke’s terminology can get a bit confusing since he distinguishes between person, body, soul, and consciousness. But suffice it to say that on his view, you are not your soul or body. But you are your consciousness. Crudely put, this consciousness can be considered to be your memory. As far back as your memory goes, you go. The basis of personal identity is important: for you to achieve technological immortality (or as close as possible) it needs to be you that continues and not just someone like you.

Locke anticipates the science fiction idea of uploading your mind and considers problems that arise if consciousness makes personal identity and could be transferred or copied. His solution seems to be a cheat: he claims that God, in His goodness, would not allow this to happen. But if Locke is right about consciousness being the basis of personal identity and wrong about God not allowing it to be copied, then it would be at least metaphysically possible to upload your mind by copying your memories.

David Hume, an empiricist like Locke, presented an argument by intuition against Locke’s account: people believe that they can extend their identity beyond their memory. That is, I do not think that it was not me just because I forgot something. Rather, I suppose that it was me and I merely forgot. Hume took the view that memory is used to discover personal identity and then went off the rails and declared personal identity to be about grammar rather than philosophy. But even if the memory approach to personal identity fails, there are other options. One simple approach is to cheat a lot and just talk about the mind (whatever it is) being uploaded. The mind would, of course, also need to be the person otherwise it would not be you getting immortality.

Assuming the mind is the person, there are two possibilities: it can be copied/transferred or it cannot. If it cannot, then this sort of technological immortality is impossible.

Suppose that the mind can be copied. If it can be copied once, then there seems to be no reason why it cannot be copied multiple times. The problem is that what serves as the basis of personal identity is supposed to be what makes me who I am and makes me distinct from everyone else. If what is supposed to provide my distinct identity can be duplicated, then it cannot be the basis of my distinct identity. Locke, as noted above, “solves” this problem by divine intervention. However, without this there seems to be no reason why my mind could not be copied many times if it could be copied once. As such, a being might have a copy of my mind, just as it might have a copy of the files from my PC. There seems to be a paradox here: to have technological immortality, then the mind must be copyable. But if it can be copied, then it is not the basis of personal identity and it is not what makes you the person you are, distinct from all other things. So, if your mind can be copied, you are not your mind, and the copy will not be you. It will just be someone like you; a technological doppelganger. If your mind cannot be copied, then there is no technological immortality in the strict sense.  So, for the copy to be you, it would need to possess whatever it is that made you the person you are and what distinguished you from all other things: your personness and your distinctness. But perhaps the basis of identity could be transferred rather than copied.

One interesting possibility is that the mind could be transferred from a biological system to a new technological one. In this case, you would be transferred rather than copied. It would be like handing off a unique item as opposed to creating a copy. In this case you could achieve technological immortality. Your original body might keep living, but if you are transferred whatever that entity is it would no longer be you. It would be like a house you once occupied. This, of course, is analogous to possession: an entity takes over a new body by transferring into it.

As a final possibility, it is worth considering that the Buddha is right: there is no self. In this case, you can never upload yourself because there is no self to upload.