During Trump’s first term the United States assassinated Iran’s Qassem Soleimani which raised moral questions about targeted killings. As it seems likely Trump will order more assassinations, this is a topic worth revisiting.

While the definition of “assassination” can be debated, it is a targeted killing aimed to achieve a political, economic or ideological end. While one could quibble over the fine points of definitions, my concern is with the issue of whether assassination can be morally warranted.

It can be argued that I am misguided to even consider this issue. Some might point out that assassination is killing and killing is wrong, thus there is no need for a distinct discussion about assassination. But I will assume, perhaps incorrectly, that at least some killings are morally acceptable. If I am in error, then the issue would be settled: assassination would be wrong because all killing is wrong,

Others might take the stance that morality is irrelevant and embrace the pragmatic approach that a country should kill when doing so is advantageous. On this view, as Hobbes said, profit is the measure of right. This is a viable approach but entails that if the United States is justified in killing on pragmatic grounds, then everyone else is also justified. The only unjustified killings would be those that were not advantageous, as defined by the killers. This seems problematic.

In discussing this matter “in the wild”, I have found that people can be confused about what counts as ethics. For example, during a Facebook discussion of assassination someone rejected the notion of applying ethics.  They did so for what they claimed were two non-moral reasons. The first was that the United States is justified in assassinating people based on self-defense. The second is that the United States is justified when it kills in retribution.  But self-defense and retribution justifications are moral justifications and are subject to evaluation.

During the discussion, the “anger justification” was also advanced, which is often used to try to justify violence. For example, people will often try to “defend” the death penalty by asking people how they would feel if someone they loved were the victim of a terrible crime. They are supposed to feel angry, and this is supposed to somehow justify the death penalty based on this anger.

 The gist of the argument about assassination was that I would be mad if someone I knew had been killed by a foreigner and I would want to kill them and this entail that killing them would be somehow justified. The gist of the “logic” seems to be

 

Premise 1: If B did X to you, then you would be angry enough to do Y to B.

Conclusion: Doing Y to B is morally justified. 

 

While there might be a macho appeal to this “reasoning”, whether I would be angry enough to kill someone is irrelevant to whether killing them is right. If this was good logic, it would entail that sufficient anger would justify any killing, which is absurd.  For example, it would justify someone killing you if they were enraged because they thought you cut them off in traffic.

This sort of reasoning seems to be fueled by the tendency people have to think that if they are angry, then they are justified in being angry.  But this does not follow; being angry just means you are angry. The anger you feel is irrelevant to truth and justification. Naturally, a person can be both justified and angry, so anger does not invalidate justification.

Getting back to the ethics of assassination, if the principle was adopted that anger justified killing, it would mean that people who killed Americans would also be justified if they were angry and that someone who was angry at you would be justified in killing you. This all seems absurd, so this “principle” is absurd. But perhaps a case can be made for ethical assassination.

A good historical example is Operation Vengeance. In WWII, American P-38 fighters intercepted and killed Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. This had a significant impact in terms of morale and the elimination of an important leader.

The moral justification for this is clear: when one is engaged in war, then leaders are legitimate targets. In the broader moral perspective, the overall ethics of a killing would depend on whether the war was just or unjust.  In fact, one could argue that targeting leaders in a just war is morally superior to the killing of soldiers. In general, the soldiers are not involved in the decisions that started the war and would not be fighting without being sent by their leaders. In contrast, the leaders are making the decisions and are morally responsible for the wars they start. As such, if a soldier in a war is a morally legitimate target for violence, then the leaders who sent them to war are also morally legitimate targets. Or even more legitimate, since it is their war.

In the example of Soleimani, the United States and Iran were not at war, hence the ethics of war do not apply. However, one could appeal to the ethics of conflict between nations. In general, killing the citizens of other nations outside of war is wrong. But there can be exceptions if the person did things that morally warranted their death. But accepting this as a justification requires accepting the corresponding moral principle and we would need to accept that Americans could be justly killed by other nations if their evil deeds warranted their deaths. For example, there are those who would argue that the deaths caused by American politicians could warrant their assassination on moral grounds.  There is also the option of just insisting that it is acceptable for the United States to engage in assassination because it is “my country”, but the same sort of argument can be made by citizens of other countries. For example, Iranians can make an equally bad case that it is acceptable for Iran to engage in assassination because it is their country.