When discussing liberty in my ethics class, I use the example of the time the mayor of New York considered a ban on selling sweetened drinks larger than 16 ounces. When considering an imposition on liberty to protect people from harm, there are factual and moral issues that should be addressed. General factual issues include whether the harm is real and whether the imposition on liberty would address the harm effectively. As would be suspected, politicians often make up harms (often as part of the culture wars) or propose ineffective solutions to real harm.
In the case of the danger of “big sodas”, there are two key factual issues. The first is whether such large drinks are harmful (the harm is usually claimed to be obesity). The second is whether imposing a ban on big sodas would be effective. The same sort of reasoning would apply to other proposals to limit liberty to protect people from harm.
When the ban was proposed, the folks in businesses that profit from “big soda” claimed the drinks are not the cause of the problem. On the one hand, one could say they are wrong. After all, it makes sense that consuming large quantities of high calorie beverages (a 12 ounce soda has 124-189 calories) would contribute to people being overweight. On the other hand, it can be argued that these drinks are not the problem. After all, big drinks are not the only (or even main) source of calories for most people and hence they are just one contributory cause among many. One could also claim that people are not compelled to consume large beverages and people are often obese because of their choices. One could claim that these drinks make it easier to be obese, but they don’t seem to be the primary villains in the obesity epidemic, so to speak.
As a general principle, I hold that any imposition of liberty must be effective at addressing real harm if it is to have any reasonable chance of being justified. In the case of banning big drinks, the obvious flaw is that people can just get refills or buy multiple drinks. People buy multiple burgers or tacos and could adjust easily to getting multiple drinks. To be fair and balanced, an imposition need not be perfect but there is reasonable concern about whether the effectiveness of a proposed imposition adequately addresses the alleged harm. This is but one example and the same consideration would apply to other similar proposals, such as banning a food additive or other food product.
While the factual matters are of concern, what is of philosophical interest is whether the state has a right to impose such bans. As might be imagined, it is easy to argue for and against this right using the very same principles.
One reasonable principle is that the state has a legitimate role in preventing harm to the citizens and has a right to use its compulsive power in this capacity. The most obvious examples of this include the state’s role as a military protector and its role as the police (to the extent the police protect). Another reasonable principle, taken from John Stuart Mill, is that the state does not have a right to impose on the liberty of individuals except in cases in which the individual’s actions could cause unwarranted harm to others. For example, the state has a right to prevent citizens from murdering each other. Arguing that the state has the right to keep people from offending each other is a much heavier lift.
In the case of a drink ban, it could be argued that the state is acting to prevent harm to the citizens and is thus operating within its legitimate rights. After all, the easy accessibility of high calorie foods in high volume servings makes it easier for people to over-consume calories and this leads to increased obesity. Obesity presents a clear health threat to individuals as well as imposing significant costs on society (such as lost productivity and increased medical costs). As such, the state would be acting rightly in banning such sweet drinks. Or so one might argue. Again, this same reasoning could be applied to other alleged dangers, such as guns, same-sex marriage or video games.
One easy reply is to contend that such a ban would not be effective (as argued above) and hence would be an imposition on liberty that fails to achieve its stated goal. It seems reasonable enough to accept that the state should not restrict liberty when doing so would not achieve the stated goal of the imposition. This is because the justification for the imposition is that it will reduce or prevent harm.
Another reply, and the one I favor, is that even if such a ban was effective, it would be an illegitimate violation of liberty. The state does, of course, have a right to protect people from toxic ingredients, especially when the consumer does not know such ingredients are in their food. To use a specific example to illustrate this, the state would be acting legitimately by banning companies from surreptitiously using lead acetate in place of sugar as sweetener. This is because this substance is known to be toxic and most customers would not willingly consume “sweet lead.” In this case, the state would be protecting the customers from being harmed by the manufacturers. After all, companies should not have the liberty to poison ignorant customers. Unfortunately, in the US companies can easily sneak new chemicals into our food. One striking example was the use of Tara flour by Daily Harvest in one product. Tara flour was found to be a hepatoxin and the FDA now bans it.
In the case of sweet drinks, the customer knows what they are getting: a high calorie (typically low nutrient) drink. While it is unwise and unhealthy to consume large amounts of such drinks, if the consumer is freely making the choice to drink the beverage and is aware of its contents and effects, then the state has no right to impose on the individual’s liberty. As usual, John Stuart Mill’s arguments in favor of liberty apply here. Naturally enough, the state would be well within its rights to require companies to provide information about the beverages so that they can make informed choices. However, treating adults as if they were children in this regard is not acceptable nor within the legitimate rights of the state. After all, what is solely the business of the individual is not the business of the state and how much sweet drink a person consumes would seem to be solely his or her business. The choice is thus the right of the individual, be it a good choice (to avoid sweet drinks) or a bad choice (to consume mass quantities of sugar water).
The obvious reply to this is that the harm done by obesity is not limited to the individual. Obesity increases health care costs for everyone, impacts productivity, and has other consequences that extend beyond the individual. Given that the obesity of an individual harms others, then it would seem that the state would have the right to step in and impose restrictions to counter obesity. After all, while people have the liberty to be as obese as they can and want to be, they do not have the right to expect the rest of society to bear the consequences and costs of their poor choices. After all, that is the job of the companies that are “too big to fail.”
To modify a stock line from the right in the US, why should the rest of us subsidize the cost of obesity–that would be a socialism of fat. If this reasoning is plausible, then there seem to be two reasonable alternatives (and, of course, there might be others).
The first is that the state should act within its legitimate rights to endeavor to counter causal factors that significantly contribute to obesity (such as high-volume high calorie beverages). The second is that individuals who wish to enjoy the liberty to be as fat as they choose to be would need to take full responsibility for the consequences of their choices. They would, for example, need to opt out of state medical support in regard to any conditions caused by or aggravated by their obesity, perhaps by purchasing special insurance. Provided that an individual was willing to eliminate the harm their choices would impose on others, then they would have the right to do as they please. This is analogous to how certain states allow people to ride motorcycles without helmets if they have adequate insurance. Perhaps people could receive special ID cards proving they have obesity insurance and this would allow them to purchase large beverages (and other such things). Then again, this might just be silly.
A second reply to the liberty argument is that it could be argued that the sweeteners used to create sweet drinks is actually a toxic substance. Interestingly enough, lead acetate was once used as a sweetener until it was established that it is, in fact, toxic. As such, it is not wildly implausible that sweeteners in use are toxins that should be properly regulated. While it is easy enough to dismiss the idea that, for example, sugar could be toxic because it just sounds silly, it should be assessed based on scientific evidence. If sweeteners were not harmful, then an objective scientific investigation would show this. As such, those who think that it is silly to consider sugar and other sweeteners as toxic should insist on objective and extensive evaluation. After all, doing so would silence the rational critics of sweeteners and provide hard evidence to counter attempts to ban or restrict sweeteners and products that use them, such as sweet drinks.
My own view on the matter is that people have a right to the liberty of self-abuse (even self-destruction). However, this liberty does not allow them to impose on others. As such, the freedom to be fat comes with the responsibility of ensuring that other people are not forced to bear the price that the individual alone should pay. As the hackneyed saying goes, freedom is not free-and this goes for fat freedom as well. But while we are following hackneyed sayings, we should also consider stopping the practice of repeatedly using tax dollars to save the ruling elites from their endlessly bad decisions. After all, freedom isn’t free.
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