Obligations to People We Don’t Know

“It’s a good thing, protecting other people’s homes.”
–Himmel the Hero

One of the classic moral problems is the issue of whether we have moral obligations to people we do not know.  If we have such obligations, then there are also questions about the foundation, nature and extent of these obligations. If we do not have such obligations, then there is the obvious question about why there are not such obligations. I will start by considering some stock arguments regarding our obligations to others.

One approach is to base such moral obligations on religion. This requires two main steps. The first is establishing the religion imposes such obligations. A stickler might even require that the truth of the religion be established. The second is transitioning from religion to ethics.

Many religions impose such obligations. For example, John 15:12 conveys God’s command: “This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I have loved you.”  If love involves obligations, then this would place us under these obligations. That said, one could argue for an empty love free of any obligations Other faiths include injunctions to assist others.

In terms of transitioning from religion to ethics, one way is to use divine command theory—the moral theory that what God commands is right because He commands it. This does raise the classic Euthyphro problem: is something good because God commands it, or is it commanded because it is good? If the former, goodness seems arbitrary. If the latter, then morality would be independent of God and divine command theory would be false.

Using religion as the basis for moral obligation is also problematic because doing so would require proving that the religion is correct—and this is no easy task. To be fair and balanced, attempting to prove a moral theory would also be challenging. There is also the practical problem that people differ in faiths, which makes finding a universal religious grounding for moral obligations difficult. But one could either argue that their faith is the one true view or that multiple religions enjoin us to accept obligations to others.

Another approach is to argue for moral obligations using the moral method of reversing the situation.  This method is based on the Golden Rule (“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) and the idea is that consistency requires a person treat others as they would wish to be treated.

To make the method work, a person would need to want others to act as if they had obligations to them and this would  obligate the person to act as if she had obligations to them. For example, if I would want someone to help me if I were hit by a car and dying in the street, then consistency requires I accept the same obligation: If I should be helped, then consistency requires that I must help others.

This approach is somewhat like that of Immanuel Kant. He argues that because a person necessarily regards herself as an end (and not just a means to an end), then she must also regard others as ends and not merely as means.  He endeavors to use this to argue in favor of various obligations and duties, such as helping others in need.

There are, unfortunately, at least two counters to this sort of approach. The first is that it is easy imagine someone willing to forgo assistance and can consistently refuse to accept obligations to others. So, for example, a person might be willing to starve rather than accept assistance from other people. While such people might seem irrational, if they are sincere then they cannot be accused of inconsistency.

The second is that a person can argue that there is a relevant difference between himself and others that would justify their obligations to him while freeing him from his obligations to them. For example, a person of a high social class might claim this obligates people of lesser classes while freeing her from any obligations to them.  Naturally, the person must provide reasons in support of this alleged relevant difference.

A third approach is to present a utilitarian argument. For a utilitarian, like John Stuart Mill, morality is assessed in terms of consequences: the correct action is the one that creates the greatest utility (typically happiness) for the greatest number. A utilitarian argument for obligations to people we do not know would be rather straightforward. The first step would be to estimate the utility generated by accepting a specific obligation to people we do not know, such as rendering aid to an intoxicated person who is about to be assaulted. The second is to estimate the disutility generated by imposing that obligation. The third step is to weigh the utility against the disutility. If the utility is greater, then such an obligation should be imposed. If the disutility is greater, then it should not.

This approach rests on embracing utilitarianism. There are numerous arguments against this moral theory, and to the degree they are effective, they would undercut a utilitarian grounding for obligations. Even for utilitarianians, there is the possibility that there will always be greater utility in not imposing obligations, thus undermining the claim that we have obligations to others.

A fourth approach is to consider the matter in terms of rational self-interest and operate from the assumption that people should act in their self-interest. In terms of a moral theory, this would be ethical egoism: the moral theory that a person should act in her self-interest rather than acting in an altruistic manner.

While accepting that others have obligations to me would certainly be in my self-interest, it initially appears that accepting obligations to others would be contrary to my self-interest. That is, I would be best served if others did unto me as I would like to be done unto, while I am free to do unto them as I wish. If I could get away with this, it would be ideal (assuming I am selfish). However, as a matter-of-fact people tend to notice and respond negatively to a lack of reciprocation. So, if having others accept that they have some obligations to me were in my self-interest, then it would be in my self-interest to pay the price for such obligations by accepting obligations to them.  For those who like evolutionary stories in the context of ethics, the tale is easy to tell: those who accept obligations would be more successful than those who do not.

The stock counters to the self-interest argument are the problem of Glaucon’s unjust man and Hume’s sensible knave. While it seems rational to accept obligations in return for getting others to accept similar obligations, it seems preferable to exploit them while avoiding acting on one’s supposed obligations whenever possible. If a person should act in accord with self-interest, then this is what a person should do.

It can be argued that this approach would be self-defeating: if people exploited others without reciprocation, the system of obligations would eventually fall apart. As such, each person has an interest in ensuring that others hold to their obligations. Humans do, in fact, seem to act this way—those who fail in their obligations sometimes get a bad reputation and are distrusted. From a purely practical standpoint, acting as if one has obligations to others would thus seem to be in a person’s self-interest because the benefits would generally outweigh the costs

The counter to this is that each person still has an interest in avoiding the cost of fulfilling obligations and there are ways to do this using deceit, power and such. As such, a classic moral question arises once again: why act on your alleged obligations if you can get away with not doing so? Aside from the practical reply given above, there seems to be no answer from self-interest. In fact, the President of the United States is this sort of person.

A fifth option is to look at obligations to others as a matter of debts. We are born into a worldwide human civilization built on thousands of years of effort. Since each of us arrives as a helpless infant, each person’s survival depends on others. As the person grows up, she also depends on the efforts of countless other people she does not know. These include soldiers that defend her society, the people who maintain the infrastructure, firefighters who keep fire from sweeping away the town or city, the taxpayers who pay for all this, and so on for all the many others who make human civilization possible. As such, each member of civilization owes a great debt to those who have come before and those who are here now.

If debt imposes an obligation, then each person who did not arise ex-nihilo owes a debt to those who have made and continue to make their survival possible. At the very least, the person is obligated to make contributions to continue human civilization as a repayment to these others.

One objection to this is for a person to claim that she owes no such debt because her special status obligates others to provide all this for her with nothing owed in return. The obvious challenge is for a person to prove such an exalted status.

Another objection is for a person to claim that all this is a gift that requires no repayment on the part of anyone and hence does not impose any obligation. The challenge is, of course, to prove this implausible claim.

A final option I will consider is that offered by virtue theory. Virtue theory, famously presented by thinkers like Aristotle and Confucius, holds that people should develop their virtues. These classic virtues include generosity, loyalty and other virtues that involve obligations and duties to others. Confucius explicitly argued in favor of duties and obligations as being key components of virtues. While not a philosopher, the Hero Himmel from Frieren seems best characterized as following virtue ethics. He acts from the virtues of compassion, empathy, and respect. Very much in line with Aristotle, Himmel strove to improve himself and endeavored to act in the right way, towards the right people and to the right degree. From a philosophical perspective, one of the most interesting aspects of Himmel’s ethics is that he always asked for a reward. While this might strike some as selfish (albeit standard adventurer practice), Himmel explains that “if you accept a reward from someone, they will not need to owe you. We are the hero party.” By this practice Himmel acts on his obligations to others by always helping them even with small things while also allowing them to act on an obligation to his party. Although the payment is small, it allows the person helped to discharge the burden of debt and to show that they were not helpless recipients of charity.

In terms of why a person should have such virtues and accept such obligations, the standard answer is that being virtuous will make a person happy through excellence. Also, it’s what Himmel the Hero would have done.

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