While details of each conspiracy theory vary, they often attribute great power and influence to a small group engaging in nefarious activities. A classic example is the idea that NASA faked the moon landings. There are also numerous “false flag” conspiracy theories ranging from the idea that the Bush administration was behind 9/11 to the idea that school shootings are faked by anti-gun Democrats. There are also various medical conspiracy theories, such as those fueling the anti-vaccination movement.
There has been considerable research into why people believe in conspiracy theories. A plausible explanation is that anxiety and feeling a loss of control lead to accepting such theories. Ironically, people who embrace conspiracy theories seem less inclined to act against the conspiracy, perhaps because they feel helpless in the face of such imagined power. But there are some exceptions, such as when the conspiracy theory about Hillary Clinton running a slavery operation in a pizzeria led to a concerned citizen shooting up the place.
It is tempting to embrace a stereotype of the conspiracy theorist: someone immune to logic, oblivious to opposing evidence and perhaps suffering from mental illness. To broadly dismiss conspiracy theorists using this stereotype would be an error, though it does apply in some cases. Interestingly, some conspiracy theorists use the same tools of logic and reasoning employed by critical thinkers and I will endeavor to illustrate this in a series of essays.
Since the world is a complicated place and is beyond the understanding of any one person, we often turn to experts. For example, most of us lack the time and resources to investigate immigration, so we must rely on experts. Accepting such claims based on the (alleged) expertise of the person making the claim is to use an argument from authority. This argument has the following form:
Premise 1: Person A is (claimed to be) an authority on subject S.
Premise 2: Person A makes claim C about subject S.
Conclusion: Therefore, C is true.
This reasoning is inductive (the premises provide a degree of support for the conclusion that is less than complete) and its strength depends on the quality of the authority making the claim. If the authority is qualified to make reliable claims in the subject area, then the argument would be a good one. For example, believing that this is what an argument from authority is because of my expertise as a philosophy professor who has taught critical thinking since 1989 would be good reasoning. If the alleged authority is not qualified to make reliable claims in the subject area, then the argument would be a fallacious appeal to authority because the premises would not adequately support the conclusion. For example, if you believed what I said about quantum theory because of my alleged expertise, then you would fall victim to this fallacy because my expertise in philosophy does not confer expertise in quantum theory.
Most people who rationally believe any theory believe it based on an argument from authority, the exceptions are those who are the experts. For example, most of us believe in the theory of relativity because of Einstein, not because we have done scientific research. In the case of conspiracy theories, believers often use an argument from authority: they believe the theory because an (alleged) expert told them it is true. For example, those who accept the anti-vaccination theory often refer to the debunked paper claiming a causal link between vaccines and autism or they believe because a celebrity tells them vaccines are dangerous. As such, for almost everyone the reasoned belief in a theory is the result of an argument from authority. So, then, what is the difference between the conspiracy theorist who believes that vaccines are dangerous because of what a celebrity says and a person who accepts relativity because of what Einstein said?
The difference, in general, is that conspiracy theorists fall for fallacious arguments from authority as opposed to accepting good arguments from authority. For example, believing that vaccines cause autism because of a debunked paper or because of what an actor says would be to fall for this fallacy. After all, unless the actor is also a medical expert on vaccines what they say about vaccines has no logical weight.
Resisting fallacious arguments from authority can be challenging, especially when the alleged authority is appealing, or the view being presented is what one wants to believe. However, there are standards by which to assess an argument from authority. To be a good argument, it must be such that:
- The person has sufficient expertise in the subject matter in question.
- The claim being made by the person is within her area(s) of expertise.
- There is an adequate degree of agreement among the other experts in the subject in question.
- The person in question is not significantly biased.
- The area of expertise is a legitimate area or discipline.
- The authority in question must be identified.
If all these conditions are met, then the conclusion is probably true. However, since the argument from authority is inductive it suffers from the classic problem of induction: even if all the premises are true, the conclusion could still turn out to be false. So, conspiracy theorists who believe “experts” are using the same argument as good reasoners, they are just using the fallacious version.
Just to add: the proposed “standards by which to assess an argument from authority” apparently ignore the fact that many now “respectable” authorities failed to meet many (sometimes all) of the proposed standards with regard to the work which established their eventual authority.
For example, Wittgenstein (aeronautical engineer>philosophy), Darwin (amateur collector>biology), Freud (hypnotist>psychoanalysis), Marx (philosopher>economics), Wegener (meteorologist>geology), Mendel (monk>genetics), Einstein (patent assessor>physics), were each responsible for paradigm shifts in human knowledge, and all were singularly “unqualified” to opine on the phenomena for which they won fame; indeed, they were severally derided as charlatan, con-artist, evildoer, lunatic or crank.
These geniuses were oddballs and mavericks but, notwithstanding, they shifted paradigms and became authorities when enough followers joined a crank’s bandwagon which was believed to offer better explanations. History demonstrates that paradigms don’t shift from within a consensus; therefore outsiders and wannabees invariably lead. Paul Feyerabend: “The distinction between the crank and the respectable thinker lies in the research that is done once a certain point of view is adopted. The crank usually is content with defending the point of view in its original, undeveloped, metaphysical form, and he is not prepared to test its usefulness in all those cases which seem to favor the opponent, or even admit that there exists a problem. It is this further investigation, the details of it, the knowledge of the difficulties, of the general state of knowledge, the recognition of objections, which distinguishes the ‘respectable thinker’ from the crank. The original content of his theory does not.”
Believing that we are surrounded by conspiracy theorists whose beliefs are grounded on nothing but dysfunctional thought processes (either malicious or misguided) is itself just another “conspiracy theory”. Indeed, observe how hard it is for a conspiracy theorist to see past his own dysfunctional thought processes. No so-called “conspiracy theory” should ever be immediately dismissed with another conspiracy theory, however “reasonable” it appears; rather, it must be subject to the same investigation of the evidence any hypothesis should undergo. Some such hypotheses will emerge as probable (“no WMD in Iraq” or “clerical abuse”) and others as improbable (“NASA faked moon landings” or “Protocols of Zion”).
Of course, if someone defines, a priori, the theories he detests as “conspiracy theories”, then both are in the same boat:
“conspiracy theories postulate a black-and-white world in which good is struggling against evil. The general public is cast as the victim of organised persecution, and the motives of the alleged conspirators often verge on pure maniacal evil. At the very least, the conspirators are said to have an almost inhuman disregard for the basic liberty and well-being of the general population. More grandiose conspiracy theories portray the conspirators as being Evil Incarnate: of having caused all the ills from which we suffer, committing abominable acts of unthinkable cruelty on a routine basis, and striving ultimately to subvert or destroy everything we hold dear.” (Robert Brotherton, 2013.
Answer to the claim “conspiracy theorists base their malicious or misguided beliefs off dubious or spurious authority figures”? Well, yes; except when they don’t; and so? As for “my expertise in philosophy does not confer expertise in quantum theory,” neither does it confer expertise in research immunology, thus “unless the [opinionated individual] is also a medical expert on vaccines what they say about vaccines has no logical weight.” Quite so. Clearly, an expertise in philosophy is not sufficient to examine the merits or otherwise of any particular “conspiracy theory”. Further, where is it established that experts are above arrogance, prejudice, error, ambition, fashion, hate or vested interest? Handing over debate on “conspiracy theories” to experts would seem to require a thought police to suppress the rabble (which, unfortunately, often will and often does include philosophers). Be careful what you wish for.