Some years ago, I was firing my .357 magnum at an indoor range. It made a very satisfying “bang.” Then there was a much louder noise, and I felt a “whuummmp” in ribcage. My friend Ron was firing his .44 magnum in the next lane, close enough for me to feel the shockwave from the weapon.

While the .44 magnum is a powerful handgun, it is a peashooter compared to the Carl-Gustav M3, a shoulder fired heavy infantry weapon. When fired, this weapon generates a strong shockwave that might be causing brain injuries to the operators. Mortars and other weapons have also been linked to brain trauma. While some doubt that the shockwave can cause trauma, the shockwave from such weapons is analogous to that of other explosions, such as IEDs that have caused terrible injuries. While IEDs can inflict shrapnel wounds, their shockwaves can inflict brain damage without leaving a mark on the target.

The United States military had been gathering data using blast gauges worn by soldiers. However, their use was discontinued when it was claimed they could not consistently indicate when a soldier had been close enough to an explosion to suffer a concussion or mild traumatic brain injury. These gauges did provide a wealth of information including data that showed infantry operating heavy weapons were being repeatedly exposed to potentially dangerous levels of overpressure. Because the data could link such exposure to long term health issues in soldiers, it might be suspected that the Pentagon stopped collecting data to avoid taking responsibility for such harms. This can be seen as like the NFL’s approach to concussions. This leads to some moral concerns about monitoring the exposure of operators and the use of heavy infantry weapons.

While it might seem awful, a moral argument can be made for not gathering data on soldiers operating heavy weapons. As noted above, if it were shown that being exposed to the overpressure of such weapons can cause brain injuries, then this could cost the state money. Without such data, the state can claim there is no proof of a connection and avoid responsibility. From a utilitarian standpoint, if the financial savings outweighed the harm done to the soldiers, then this would be the right thing to do. However, intentionally evading responsibility for harm is morally problematic, at best. It can also be objected that the benefits of being aware of the damage being done outweigh the benefits of intentional ignorance. One obvious benefit is that such data could help mitigate or eliminate such damage and this seems morally superior to intentional evasion by willful ignorance.

While there are steps that could be taken to minimize the damage done to troops operating heavy weapons it is likely that such damage cannot be avoided altogether. One technological solution would be to remotely operate heavy weapons, thus allowing the operator to be out of the damage zone. Another technological solution would be to automate such heavy weapons, thus keeping humans safe. Well, some humans.  Either of these options would increase the cost of the weapon system and would require weighing this against the wellbeing of soldiers. But many who are fiscal conservatives about human wellbeing are fiscal liberals when it comes to corporate profits, so a way to sell these ideas is to ensure that it would be profitable to corporations. There is also a moral argument that can be made for using the weapons as they are, even if they are harmful to the operators. It is to this that I now turn.

From a utilitarian standpoint, the ethics of exposing operators to damage from their own weapons would be a matter of weighing the harm done to the operators against the benefits of using such heavy weapons in combat. Infantry operated heavy weapons are useful in combat. One benefit of such weapons is they allow infantry to engage vehicles, such as tanks and aircraft, with some chance of success. Taking on a tank or aircraft with light weapons generally goes badly for the infantry. As such, if the choice is between risking some overpressure damage or facing a greater risk of being killed by enemy vehicles, then the choice would be obvious. If the effectiveness of the weapon against the enemy outweighs the risk to the operator, then it would be morally acceptable for the operators to take that risk.  There is, however, still the question of the damage suffered during weapon training

The obvious way to argue that it is acceptable for troops to risk injury when training with heavy weapons is that they will need this practice to use the weapon effectively in combat. If they were to try to operate a heavy weapon without live practice, they would be less likely to be effective and more likely to fail and be injured or killed by the enemy (or their own weapon). As such, the harm of going into battle without proper training morally outweighs the harm suffered by the operators in learning the weapon. This, of course, assumes that they are likely to end up in battle. If the training risks are taken and the training is not used, then the injury would have been for nothing, which takes this into the realm of considering odds in the context of ethics. On approach would be to scale training based on the likelihood of combat, scaling up if action is anticipated and keeping a minimal level when action is unlikely.

Making rational choices about the risks does, obviously enough, require knowing the risks. As such, there must be a proper study done of the risks of operating such weapons. Otherwise, the moral and practical calculations would be essentially guessing, which is morally unacceptable