David Hume is credited with raising what is now known as the problem of induction. As Hume noted, the contrary of any matter of fact is logically possible. To illustrate, it is not a contradiction to claim that although the earth is now rotating around the sun, this will not hold true tomorrow. This is in contrast with what he called the truths of reason, as it is a contradiction to deny them. For example, to deny that a triangle has three sides is to assert that a three-sided figure does not have three sides.
In considering our reasoning about matters of fact, Hume notes that we try to justify our beliefs by appealing to other beliefs about causal laws. That is, people tend to think that there is a causal order set in the laws of nature that ensures a consistent universe. For Hume, an empiricist, this process is based on experience. As he sees it, people observe similarities between events and then form the expectation that the same things will occur in unobserved cases (such as those occurring in the future). While most of us have faith in causality based on our experience, Hume contends that the reasoning from the observed cases to the unobserved cases is unwarranted. The gist of his argument focuses on the idea that the future will be like the past, which is essential to engaging in inductive reasoning about the future. This sort of reasoning takes the form of inferring that because X happened in situation Y in the past, X will happen in situation Y in the future. For example, people think the earth will still be revolving around the sun tomorrow because it has done so in the past. The challenge is showing that this reasoning is warranted. Hume claims this cannot be done.
As Hume argued, the argument that because X has happened in the past, X will happen in the future is not a sound deductive argument. This is because it could be true that X has happened in the past, while the conclusion could still be false. A sound deductive argument must, of course, be valid (such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true) and have all true premises. This is by definition.
If one attempts to justify inductive logic by using an inductive argument, this will beg the question. To justify induction by induction, inductive logic would already need to be justified. As such, neither a deductive nor inductive argument can justify induction and so we get the problem of induction. In practical terms, the problem is that since an inductive argument always involves a leap from what has been observed to what has not been observed, even if all the premises are true and the reasoning is strong, the conclusion could still be false.
Like many other philosophical problems, the problem of induction initially seems silly and trivial. It seems silly because, as Hume noted, only a fool or a mad person would deny faith in induction. For example, someone who insisted that while fire is hot today it might be cold tomorrow would be regarded as deranged. It seems trivial because, like the problem of the external world, it seems to have no real-world implications. However, it is neither silly nor trivial.
The easy way to argue for this is to point out that the problem of induction has serious practical consequences. Inductive reasoning is used in all aspects of life and the consequences of not keeping this problem in mind range from the embarrassing to the disastrous. For example, most of the inductive generalizations (surveys and polls) predicted that Clinton would win in 2016. While many were shocked when these polls “got it wrong”, this was one more example of the problem of induction: no matter how careful the evidence is gathered and how skillfully the argument is crafted, the conclusion can always be false. As another example, a person might be confident that they will safely arrive at their destination and end up dying in a plane crash. After all, that inference is also inductive. More broadly, the problem infects all inductive reasoning ranging from simple analogies to large scale scientific experiments. As such, it is only fools and lunatics who do not worry about the problem of induction and consider that no matter how careful they are in their reasoning, they could still get things wrong.
At this point, it might be claimed that although this practical aspect of the problem of induction is a meaningful problem, the philosophical variation is still trivial and silly. To be more specific, the notion that our faith in basic aspects of reality is unfounded is a silly idea. For example, to say that while gravity, fire and electromagnetism work in certain ways now, they might not work the same tomorrow would be absurd. Gravity will always work as it does, fire will always burn and so on. Even those who accept inductive arguments can always fail tend to have faith in a consistent and reliable reality. However, as Hume argued, this faith is unwarranted.
As noted above, the idea that induction can fail in everyday cases is reasonable. For example, it is clearly not absurd to consider that while someone loves you today, they might stop loving you someday. As another example, it is not silly to think that while you have never been allergic to bee stings in the past, you might become allergic to them. In such cases, our faith is not absolute, and we accept the possibility of error. But, in the case of things like fire and gravity, our faith tends to be absolute. A seemingly faithful spouse might betray their partner, but fire will always burn. But, of course, our faith reflects our feelings and not reality and we simply feel strongly, but we do not know, that fire will always burn and so on for the other matters of our faith in the workings of the world. If we set aside our faith and consider the matter in terms of inductive reasoning, then we would realize that our confidence that the future will be like the past is not well founded. We could be wrong, though we certainly feel otherwise. After all, the same inductive logic that is used for brand buying (“my previous Asics shoes were good, so the next pair I buy will also be good”) is also used for predicting that future fire will be like past fire. The main difference thus cannot be in the logic; it lies in how we feel. Because of this, what is needed is not another logical argument about the problem, but a way to sway intuitions. This is a common approach in the case of big and weird philosophical problems, such as the problem of the external world.
The problem of the external world, which was most famously developed by Descartes in his Meditations, is the problem of proving that the world I think I am experiencing is really real for real. Like most philosophy professors, for years I found it challenging to motivate students to see the problem as a real problem. After all, thinking that the world is not real seems like insanity. Then the Matrix came out and getting people to accept the problem became easy. Fortunately, shows like Black Mirror provide fresher examples. Unfortunately, there has yet to be a big movie or show that includes the problem of induction as a central theme. However, I can use video games to illustrate this problem
Imagine, if you will, that you are a character in a video game like Destiny 2, World of Warcraft or Warframe. From your perspective, the world has rules, and things work in the same way. At least until they do not. After all, a game world is under the control of the programmers, and they can change the reality at will. Think of what the inhabitants of such game worlds would think if they were aware and could remember what had come before. For example, the developers of Destiny 2 accidentally released a bugged weapon, the Prometheus Lens, into the game. Because of the bug, the weapon could kill a character in player versus player battles almost instantly making it insanely overpowered and broken. Bungie then patched the weapon (“nerfing” it, in gamer slang) so that it would perform properly. From the standpoint of the game world inhabitants, the weapon suddenly and inexplicably went from a fiery engine of instant death to an average gun. Game worlds can also experience far more radical alterations: entire sections of mechanics can change with a patch or update. Players, of course, know that the changes are made in the code by programmers. But, from the perspective of the hypothetical game world inhabitants, reality suddenly changes without any warning or explanation.
Now imagine that we live in a world subject to the alterations of a creator—we could suddenly find that our game has been patched or updated and that there are radical differences between yesterday and today. To say that we have not seen such changes in the past would miss the point—after all, the last patch or update could have been long before our time or perhaps this will be the first update or patch. We have no way of knowing whether this is impossible or not—which is, of course, the problem of induction.
The problem of induction has a huge bearing on how stable one considers one’s life and its experiences. Of course, any -ist or a religious man or anyone with strong conviction has already made a commitment on what makes the world stable (the laws that govern nature and men), but to the wonderers, it is very much a problem. The solution cannot be, I think, the solution of picking the basis on which one considers life stable and predictable from experiences fails to engage with the seriousness of the problem — though most certainly, they experience a great psychical relief. The question at heart of the problem of induction, I find, is whether man should aspire to such psychical relief from the concerns with the very notion of stability in life or to outgrow the discomforts through the prolonged familiarity and friendship with the discomfort.
Further thinking…Then I will leave this alone.
Hume was right, in that CHANGE does affect—or, is that effect?—certain matters of fact. Until change *factually* occurs, there is little accounting for that, unless we choose to believe predictions of prognosticators such as, say, Nostradamus (spelling?). I don’t know anything about others, but, I’m from Missouri. I have to be shown. All this means is that there WERE once matters of fact that were, seemingly, rock-solid, until change brought different realities. Hume illustrated this, whether his view was an expression of reality. Or not. My own notion of contextual reality applies, equally, to the time of Hume’s thinking and now. Some things do not change materially…change is similar to time, in this respect. Both witness what happens, without any sort of prejudice. So, immeasureability is, uh, irrelevant, until it BECOMES measurable? There we go. Hume was not de facto wrong. He just did not have all the facts…
I realized I made no claims or assertions regarding video games in my comment(s). oops. My bad there. Insomuch as video games entail an albeit large number of combinations and permutations of outcomes, this does not mandate those numbers be infinite. Even it outcomes WERE infinite, would that scenario be meaningful in a practical sense? I don’t think so. Game theory is applied to other more important activities—war, for example. Did Hume know or anticipate this? Maybe, though I doubt it. His thinking was pretty deep for his time—I will grant that. But, I doubt he had any notion(s) concerning video games or many other features of our modern lives. When I was twenty years old, I had no notion of the neuropathy that would destroy my mobility, progressively, after around age forty-five. Even had I possessed such knowledge, that would not have helped me much. There is no effective treatment for that neurological disorder. That is, as is put, what it is. My consolation? I will likely be dead before losing toes, feet and more. I’m just having a good time—right now, while I can. …best I can, with what I’ve got and know… Turing would have conceptualized video games, I think. But he had more important things on his plate, yes?
OK. I suppose Hume’s argument is sound enough. But, as a pragmatist, I find it irrelevant, insofar as the earth is still doing what is has done for a very long time. As is the sun. And so, nihialistically speaking, what Hume asserted years ago, matters little if we are still living, breathing and chugging along. As a judge in administrative law, I learned there were levels of reasoning: adductive; inductive; deductive; reductive, and, wild assed guesses. The wild assed guess applies when all others fail, and any outcome is thereby fallacious anyway. Wild assed guessing is, largely, metaphysical, and, thinkers like Hume generally discard such reasonings. Some thinkers don’t think much of Hume. As a pragmatist, that is alright with me, inasmuch as I support what is more useful, rather than what is less so. So, OK, Maybe I just don’t understand *the problem of induction*. Good enough. Thinkers, it seems, don’t understand *the problem of consciousness* either.I am betting on a sunrise, tomorrow. I also bet on that, whether I see it, or not. And, nihialisticly speaking, whether I witness that sunrise or not does not matter. Some philosophical views are more important than others—if it does not make a difference that makes a difference, it does not matter.