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When everyone is in danger from a disease, it seems irrational for a political party to politicize the threat. But this happened during COVID-19.  One reason is that while Americans seem extremely polarized; this is  more appearance than reality. While Americans do disagree strongly on some issues, there is considerable consensus about many issues. Because of this, political parties need to manufacture a conflict in which they can score points. Since a threat generates strong emotions, it can be ideal for politization as a party can tap into the emotions and manipulate them to its advantage. Taking a threat seriously can also be contrary to the interests of some and they will try to prevent this by politicizing the threat. If they succeed, they can recruit voters and get them to support policies that endanger these voters. Thus, a political party can have two excellent reasons to politicize a universal threat: to score political points and serve the interests of those who benefit from allowing the threat to remain unaddressed.

Politicization can be effective at engaging emotions and disengaging reasoning. There are many fallacies (such as group think) and cognitive biases (such as in group bias) that feed and are fed by ideology. If you are liberal, then you probably just thought of the Republican politicization of climate change. If you are a conservative, you might have been thinking about the sins of the Democrats. If so, then you can see how conflict can easily be created along party lines.

The COVID-19 virus presents a threat to everyone, but it was politicized. Initially the Trump administration downplayed the virus and accused the Democrats of using it to attack Trump and the idea that is a hoax aimed at hurting Trump persists. There were short-term advantages to politicizing the virus, such as keeping the markets calm through ignorance, to allow business to continue as usual and to hope that the virus would not arrive until after the 2020 election. Political points were also scored against the Democrats by accusing them of making up a virus threat to hurt Trump.

From the Republican perspective, the Democrats were the villains, doing terrible things to harm Trump and impede his efforts. On their view, it was the Democrats who were manufacturing the conflict; first by creating a virus hoax and then by interfering with Trump’s efforts to address the virus.  How one sees this matter will, obviously, tend to shake out along ideological lines, thus politicizing the issue of politicization.

While, as noted above, political points can be scored by politicizing an objective threat, this does have negative consequences. The most obvious is that time and resources are spent fighting manufactured political battles rather than uniting against a threat to everyone. Another consequence is that manufacturing a conflict requires that misinformation, thus misleading people and this can have enduring consequences. In the case of the virus, while Fox News and the White House did shift their position to match reality, the groundwork they laid still serves as a foundation for the enduring view that the virus is either a hoax or not very serious.

Some Republicans will want to blame the Democrats; a common narrative is that their impeachment efforts are partially to blame for the virus crisis. As would be expected, one’s ideological lens determines how one sees this matter: Trump and Fox News as the villains who politicized the virus or the Democrats as the villains who distracted Trump from the virus.

There are three solutions to the needless harm caused by this sort of politicization. The first is that politicians need to exercise judgment and restraint before engaging in politization of a crisis. The problem is that it is seen as a useful political tool. As such, getting politicians to use good judgment and exercise restraint is challenging. The second solution is that voters can support candidates who are more likely to exercise judgment and restraint. Third, voters also decide how they respond. If they resisted efforts to politicize a crisis that should be non-partisan, then the efforts of politicians would be far less likely to succeed.

One concern is the charge of politization can be used, ironically, to politicize an issue and silence legitimate criticism. For example, the facts show that Trump’s initial handling of the crisis was terrible and that he made untrue claims about the virus and the situation. As such, legitimate criticisms of these failures could be non-political. But if critics are Democrats or liberals, they could be accused of politicizing. To address this problem, critics should focus on the facts and steer clear of what might appear overtly political. This will be challenging, since the other party is unlikely to accept legitimate and fair criticism and will claim it is unfair politicization. As such, the manufactured polarization in the United States that has served the parties has done massive damage to America. As should be expected. Unless we address this, new crises will  repeat the harmful politicalization of the  COVID-19 crisis.

In the United States, health care is often seen as a private good. The benefit of a private good belongs primarily (or even exclusively) to the individual. But a private good could have some broader benefit as well. A private good is usually seen as being the responsibility of the beneficiary. Put roughly, you should pay for your private good, not the rest of us. There are many things that are clearly private goods.

For example, my running shoes are a private good because they benefit me, and I should be the one to buy them.  In terms of broader benefits, my health means that I do not miss work, and this benefits my employer and students. But this is not enough to make them a public good.  .

Obviously. a public good is supposed to benefit the public and is often seen as being the responsibility of society. Put roughly, it is a good for us and we should pay for it collectively. A public good need not benefit everyone directly. For example, public transport does not directly benefit someone who never uses it and only gets around by walking or biking.  There is considerable debate over what goods (if any) should be public. Public versus private health care is a matter of debate in the United States.

Apart from the United States, most wealthy countries have chosen public health care. The United States offers some public health care in the form of Medicare and Medicaid but people need to qualify for both and the Trump administration and Musk are doing what they can to cut into these programs.

Most working people rely on private health care. One reason is the rhetorical narrative that health care is a private goo or at least better as a private good. In terms of being a private good, the idea is that each of us is responsible for our own health care in that we must earn the money to pay for insurance and treatment. With the exceptions of Medicare and Medicaid, we are on our own. The idea is that my health is good for me, but not for you, hence I should bear the cost.

There are also arguments that private health care is better than public health care. This can be countered by the fact that people go bankrupt due to medical expenses, people cannot afford and hence do not get basic care, and people  turn to GoFundMe to pay their medical bills. It is true that we have the best health care money can buy, if you have the money to buy it. I will set aside this debate to focus on the main issue: whether health care is best seen as public or private good. One way to approach this matter is to consider paradigm cases of public goods.

Consider, if you will, an alternative America in which defense, police, fire and the legal system are private goods analogous to how health care is a private good in the real America. In this alternative America, citizens need to purchase military, police and legal insurance or face high costs for purchasing military, police, fire and legal services. In the case of military and police coverage, a citizen would be provided with various degrees of military protection for their person and property. Without such coverage, a citizen would need to pay high costs to secure such services as defense against foreign enemies and police investigations into crimes committed against them. Those who could not pay might be able to qualify for some basic services through government programs such as Militaryaid and Policecare. Those unable to qualify for these programs and unable to afford the services would be on their own. They would need to rely on self-defense, a garden hose and vigilante justice to address threats and crimes against them. This would be fair and just—after all, having the military protect me does not benefit you, nor does having the police investigate theft of my truck benefit you. Only having the military protect you benefits you. Only having the police investigate the theft of your truck benefits you. So, by the logic of health care as a private good, police and military services are also private goods. The same would also apply to aspects of the legal system. Being able to defend my property or other rights in a legal system does not benefit you, it just benefits me.

There would be, of course, certain police, military and legal activities that would occur because they would be good for these institutions and the state. The police would certainly enforce laws that generated revenue for them and the state; but if the law served only your private good, then you would need to pay for its enforcement. Such institutions would be lean and efficient, operating in accord with strict market forces as God intended. Unless, of course, they grew bloated and inefficient.

In this world, the results would be like health care in the real world. People would be locked into jobs to keep their police, military, fire and legal benefits. People in need would turn to GoFundMe to pay to have their spouses’ murder   investigation or keeping Canadians off their land. Many people would be victimized, injured or killed because they lacked basic coverage. But defenders of the system would praise it for all it alleged virtues and mock other countries for their public police, military, fire and legal services.

Things like police, military, legal and fire services are seen as public goods because they meet a state’s minimal obligation of protecting its citizens. Such goods require large expenditures, thus requiring collective funding and this can be seen as justifying providing a collective good. The same can be applied to health care; just as the state should protect its citizens from ISIS, fire and crime, it should also protect its citizens from COVID-19 and cancer. After all, you are dead whether you are killed by an ISIS bomb, a criminal’s bullet or COVID-19.

Police, military and other such services are also seen as public goods because they do (mostly) benefit everyone—even though the specific applications benefit specific people. The same also applies to much of health care. For example, infectious illnesses spread and containing them is a public good. As another pragmatic example, sick and injured people contribute less to the economy, so treating them benefits the public by getting them back into serving their core functions in capitalism: working and spending. As such, health care should be seen as analogous to the public goods of the military, police, fire, and legal system. There are, of course, obvious exceptions in which medical procedures are entirely private goods (like face lifts) but these exceptions do not disprove the general principle.

When the COVID-19 virus invaded the United States, it found an ill-prepared and complacent foe. As such, the impact proved devastating. One clear lesson is that the aggressively for-profit health care system is a weak point in our national defense against disease. I will make my case with the obvious analogy between health care and military defense.

Imagine, if you will, that the United States military operated like our health care system. Our current health care system is analogous to relying on mercenaries, albeit with a professional code of ethics and some loyalty to the nation. During normal times, the health care system is almost entirely mercenary: it fights battles to make a profit. This is not to disparage medical professionals, but the profit model chosen by those who control health care. Because the goal is profit, the health care system is operated to minimize costs and maximize income. This means operating like a mercenary force: employing minimal personnel to do the job, maintaining only necessary resources for normal operations, focusing on the highest paying customers, and only taking on profitable contracts. This is a rational way to operate a mercenary unit. But is it a good way for a national military to run? That is, would it make sense for the United States to switch from a public military to a mercenary military?

Laying aside the usual problems of loyalty and dependability, relying on a mercenary (for-profit) military model would be a problem for the United States. One obvious problem is the United States needs a large force that ready to engage in prolonged conflicts that we do not always get to pick. After all, national security need not match up with what would be the most profitable military operations and requires keeping resources available, such as the reserves, that no purely for-profit military would sensibly maintain. If the United States relied on a mercenary military for its defense, it would face many challenges in times of crisis: rapidly ramping up to meet the challenge, making the operations profitable enough to motivate mercenary forces (such as paying them enough to protect everybody). These are, in fact, all the reasons why a country should have a public, national military rather than relying on mercenaries. After all, the United States needs a military that is ready to face whatever threat arises and not a force limited by the need to make a profit. It is thus no surprise that our mercenary healthcare system runs into analogous problems.

Being focused on profits, the health care system operates with minimum resources and personnel. Maintaining a reserve of medical professionals and the resources needed for a crisis would cut deeply into profits. The government, it should be noted, does keep some medical resources in reserve, but this is obviously the public sector in operation. Because of this razor thin operation that maximizes profits, the health care system is like a mercenary unit: ill-prepared when the battle turns into a full-scale war requiring large reserves and resources. The health care system normally deals with the problem of resources by allocating them based on profit; like a smart mercenary commander who accepts the lucrative contract to fight easier opponents. In the case of health care, the wealthy get the best health care money can buy, while the poor get whatever is left over. But in the case of a national crisis, the response must be large scale: it is an invasion and not just the usual battles. People face the same problem, be it in a battle fought by mercenaries or health care provided by mercenaries: they need to be able to pay in order to get protection.

One principled reason we have a national public military rather than using mercenary forces is that we accept that the military should protect all citizens and not just those who can afford to hire their own mercenary forces. The same principle should apply to health care: having a mercenary medical system means that a citizen’s survival depends on what they can pay, and this is not acceptable. If we believe that the state should protect all citizens equally from ISIS and North Korea, then we should accept that the state should protect all citizens equally from COVID-19 and H1N1.

It could be sensibly argued that the military model fits in the case of pandemics and while health care should be modified to address the threat of pandemics, the for-profit model should remain for everyday medical matters. So, for example, everyone should have access to testing and treatment for COVID-19, but we should still be on our own when it comes to the flu, hepatitis or automobile accidents.

One reply is to argue that the state has obligations in the everyday medical care of the citizens. To use another analogy, if handling pandemics is like fighting a war, lesser threats are analogous to small-scale conflicts or police operations. We do not, for example, expect Americans to pay to get police services to address crimes against them, just because the crime is against them and not a pandemic of crime.

This is not to say that the state must pay for everything. No doubt someone is thinking about the state  paying for breast implants or face lifts. But expecting the state to pay for these would be like expecting the state to pay the bill because a citizen wanted to see a military parade on their street. As such, only the medically necessary should be covered. Just as we limit the obligations of the national military and local police, the obligations of health care can also be limited. This can lead to debates about what is necessary, but these disputes can be addressed in good faith.

It could be objected that people bring on their own health problems by bad choices and this should not be the responsibility of the state. But the same argument would apply to the police and military. For example, if the police thought that you did not take enough precautions to protect your car, they could refuse to do anything about it being stolen. Or, as another example, if you get attacked and injured, they could refuse to help you because you failed to take enough karate.

If we continue to rely on mercenary health care as part of our national defense, we can expect things to play out in a manner analogous to relying on mercenary forces for our national defense: no matter how brave or dedicated the individual soldiers are, a mercenary system is simply not up to facing the challenge.

The survival argument for establishing off world colonies has considerable appeal. It begins with a consideration of the threat of extinction. There have been numerous extinction events in the past and there is no reason to think humans are exempt. There are a variety of plausible doomsday scenarios that could cause our extinction, ranging from the classic asteroid strike to the human-made nuclear Armageddon. Less extreme, but still of concern, are disasters that would end our civilization without exterminating us.

In the face of these threats, it can be argued that a rational response is to ensure there is an off-world population of humans that would allow humanity to survive even if the earth were subject to an extinction event. In the less extreme scenarios, the off-world population could preserve civilization and help restore it. These scenarios are all familiar to sci-fi fans.

From a moral standpoint, the argument that we should establish colonies to ensure survival is a utilitarian one. The gist is that while they are expensive, this is offset by the value of increasing the odds that humanity and human civilizations will survive. This sort of ethical reasoning, made famous by J.S. Mill, involves weighing the positive and negative value created by an action. The action that creates the most positive value (factoring the negative) for the beings that count is the right action to take.

The obvious moral counter, which is also utilitarian in nature, is to argue these resources would be better spent increasing our chances of survival on earth. While an obvious concern is climate change, there are many other threats that could be addressed by using resources on earth. The “earth first” argument is often made in terms of the return on investment. For example, spending billions for a moon colony would provide less benefit than spending billions addressing terrestrial threats to survival.

While this is a reasonable moral argument, an obvious counter is that spending on space development need not exclude addressing terrestrial problems. After all, we already expend vast resources on things that do not increase humanity’s odds of surviving (and many that decrease it). There is also the practical fact that buy-in is needed from the upper class that controls the resources, and it is far more likely that the Trump administration would fund a moon base or Mars mission before doing anything to address climate change. As such, while the “the money is better spent on other things” argument is reasonable, it is not an effective practical argument against spending resources towards off-world colonies.

Another reasonable objection is both moral and practical: morally justifying expending vast resources based on the survival argument fails because we lack the technology and resources to create a viable colony intended for survival of the species. While some might use the story of Adam and Eve as an inspiration, creating a viable and self-sustaining colony or even just preserving civilization is incredibly unlikely. The colony would need enough population to be viable and must be able to exist without any assistance from the earth. As such, it would need to grow its own food and produce its own water, air and equipment. Think of how difficult it is for humans to operate in Antarctica; operating a colony on the moon or mars would be vastly more difficult.

A counter is to argue that such a colony is not impossible, although it would require massive investment and perhaps centuries of effort. Which would, of course, take us back to arguments about effective use of resources. It would make more sense, critics would argue, to use those resources improving life on earth.

A third objection is to argue that humans are not suitable for life in an off-world colony. We cannot survive in space or on any of the other worlds in our solar system without life-support. Laying aside concerns about air, food and water, and radiation, there is also gravity. Humans, at least the current model, do not do well living in low gravity.

One counter is to argue that the moon and mars might have enough gravity to make them viable for human habitation. There is also the option of using spin, as in sci-fi, to create “artificial” gravity in orbital habitats. Another counter, which is radical but possible, is to argue we can modify our species to live in such environments through genetic engineering and technological augmentation. Life on earth shows a remarkable ability to adapt to hostile environments and humans could be modified to survive and even thrive in such conditions. Getting into the realm of science fiction, we can imagine radical alterations to humans ranging from complete biological reconstructions to putting human brains into mechanical bodies.

Proposals to modify humans do raise serious questions, including the question of what it is to be human. After all, imagine a modified person who could survive on the surface of the moon just wearing shorts. Would such a person still be human? This raises the concern that going into space for survival might be impossible: if we must cease to be human to survive, then that would be the end of humanity.

One response to this worry is to argue that it is not biology that matters, but some other factors. For example, it could be argued that if the “space people” have cultural and moral ties to the “human people” then the survival of the “space people” would mean the survival of humanity, if not homo sapiens. Of course, the same sort of argument could be made if AI exterminated biological humans; our AI “children” would survive. As a closing objection, there is the classic judgment day problem, one I recall from my first space arguments as a college kid.

The judgment day problem is that God has set judgment day, perhaps as laid out in Revelations. On this view, humanity is perfectly safe on earth until judgment day, because nothing can happen to interfere with it. So, there is no point in expanding off earth for the purpose of survival. There might be other good reasons to expand into space, such as finding aliens to convert or to mine asteroids, but the survival argument would have no weight on such a world view. The challenge is, of course, to prove that this view is correct. The same logic can, of course, be used against doing almost anything: if God has judgment day all planned, there is no sense in coming up with cures for disease or even bothering to try to stay alive at all. That is, the fatalism of this view should be universal.

My overall view is that while the survival argument has merit, it requires taking an extremely long-term view as building a self-sustaining off-world colony would probably take centuries of effort. And there is the problem with surviving long enough for success. As such, a reasonable approach would be to focus on survival on earth while taking steps to expand into space. Of course, the “easiest” solution would be to let AI replace us; AI systems would have little trouble surviving off-world.  

As noted in previous essays, critics of capitalism are often accused of being Marxists and this attack is used to fallaciously justify rejecting their claims. The accusation of Marxism is also used as a signal to certain audiences; it is a way of saying the target is a “bad person” and should be disliked. In most cases the target is not a Marxist as they are rare in the United Sates, even in higher education.

While some might suspect philosophy departments are infested with Marxists, this does not match my own experience. Large philosophy departments, such as those at Ohio State or Florida State, sometimes have one Marxist. Most professional philosophers do not embrace Marxism, and most are critical of this philosophy.  This view is nicely summed up my dissertation advisor’s view of analytical Marxism: “Analytical Marxism…that would be doubly vacuous.” While Marx offered useful insights into political philosophy, I have not won over by Marxism. This is because of my philosophical disagreements with this philosophy.

While not focused on metaphysics, Marxism endorses metaphysical materialism and economic determinism. Materialism, in this context, is the view that reality is entirely composed of physical entities. This is usually contrasted with dualism, which is the view there are two basic types of entities: physical and immaterial. Descartes is a paradigm example of a dualist, since he argues for the distinction between mind and body. Marx’s materialism involves the obvious rejection of God. I’m a Cartesian dualist, so I part company with Marx here. As Marx was an atheist and Marxism is often presented as atheistic, this is another point of disagreement, as I am not an atheist.

While economic determinism can be analyzed in different ways, the oversimplified idea is that we are not free and are instead controlled by economic factors. This is not in the everyday way that people are controlled by their need to work to survive, but in a metaphysical sense. My argument for freedom is weak, but I rather like it. If we are not free, then I am caused to say that I believe we are free. I am wrong but could not do otherwise. If we are free, then I am right. While this is a silly argument, it does show that I reject economic determinism (and determinism in general).

As part of this determinism, Marx believed that he could predict the economic future: the bourgeoise would shrink as the proletariat grew, leading to a revolution. This would give rise to socialism (the state owning the means of production) which would end in communism (the state withers away and utopia is reached at last). While Marx was right that wealth is often concentrated and that revolutions occur, I do not agree with his vision of the future. I think it is likely that the state will endure. While I can imagine science-fiction scenarios in which the state no longer exists, these scenarios require more change than Marx envisioned. In favor of my view is the fact that socialist states do not seem to be progressing towards not being states. “Communist” states like China are doing the opposite as the “communist” state grows ever stronger.

Marx also believed in economic classes, but this is so obviously true and widely accepted that believing it would not make one a Marxist. If it did, we’d all be Marxists. Given how my views differ from Marxism, it is safe to conclude that I am not a Marxist.

It could be contended that I secretly hold to Marxism and am engaging in a Marxist form of taqiya: denying my true faith to remain hidden. This would require a systematic deception on my part, including living a relatively comfortable middle-class life under capitalism as part of my elaborate deception. While it is not impossible, supporting this claim would require strong evidence. Merely being critical of the excesses and harms of current capitalism would not suffice as evidence of being a Marxist or most people would be Marxists.

It could also be claimed that while I disagree with the core metaphysics of Marxism, I could still be some kind of Marxist. While people are usually sloppy in their ideologies, this would be like saying a person is some kind of Christian despite not believing in souls, angels and Jesus being divine. While not impossible, it would be odd.

In closing, the truth of my claims and the quality of my arguments are unaffected by whether I am an envious Marxist. There is also no evidence of my being either envious or a Marxist, so such a charge is either a set up for ad hominem attacks or simply signaling that I am “bad.”

As noted in previous essays, a tactic used by critics of capitalism is to accuse them of envy. As an argument, the Accusation of Envy is a fallacy. However, as was noted in the previous essay, a person’s envy could bias them and impact their credibility. Even when envy is relevant to credibility, proof of envy has no relevance to the truth of the person’s claims or the quality of their arguments. But from a rhetorical standpoint, such attacks can be effective: if someone is convinced another person is envious, they will often dismiss claims and arguments for psychological rather than logical reasons. Some people also enjoy attacking those they disagree with and casting them as being corrupted by vices. So, how would one tell if another person is envious?

My rough account of envy is that it involves an improper desire for what someone else has and the feeling includes an unwarranted resentment towards the possessor of the desired thing.  It often includes the desire to unjustly take it from the other person. An envious person would tend to be unable to get what they desire. If they could, they would presumably cease their envy (though they might become jealous). Determining if a person is envious would require assessing a person in terms of these factors in a fair and objective way.

A central part of the assessment is determining if the person has an improper desire for what someone else has. If a person shows no interest in the alleged object of desire, the accusation of envy would seem unwarranted. Even if a person is interested, it must be shown there is a defect in their desire and that unwarranted resentment is present.  As an illustration, consider the difference between training to be as good a basketball player as Jordan because he is an athlete you respect and bitterly begrudging his ability because you wish you had his talent.

 Discerning the presence of unwarranted resentment involves assessing the person’s words and deeds relative to the target of the alleged envy. Due caution must be taken to distinguish criticism and even anger from unwarranted resentment. Consider the difference between being justly angry at someone who harmed you and being unjustly resentful of someone who has done well in an area where you have failed. If a fair and objective assessment shows that the person is suffering from envy, then it would be reasonable to make that claim. But this would still be irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments.

In some cases, people will make their envy clear: they will express bitter, yet unwarranted, resentment and have a record of failed attempts to acquire what they desire. They might even admit their envy. In other cases, it will be harder to determine if a person is envious. After all, strong criticism can resemble unwarranted resentment, and justified anger can arise from a string of unfair failures. For example, a person who tries to start a small business and is repeatedly driven out of business by corporations exploiting their unfair advantages could be seen as having righteous anger at an unfair system or cast as a failure who is envious. If a person does not show clear signs of envy or denies that they are envious, one evil rhetorical tactic that can be used is Secret Motive.

Secret Motive (or Real Motive) is a rhetorical technique in which a person is accused of having a secret, typically bad, motive for their claims, arguments or actions. That is, they are being accused of having a real motive that is wicked. This is often a set up for an ad hominem attack based on the alleged secret motive. For example, consider a critic of capitalism who denies they are envious of the rich and there is no good evidence to the contrary. An evil “solution” is to insist their real motivation is envy, despite the lack of evidence. The accuser often claims a special insight or understanding into the psychology of the accused and this is why they somehow know the person’s secret motive despite being able to provide evidence for their claim. While primarily a rhetorical device (and hence not an argument) it can also be cast as a fallacy:

 

Premise 1: Person A asserts that person B has a secret (or real) motive.

Conclusion: B has a secret motive.

 

The error occurs when A fails to provide adequate evidence for their conclusion. This is not to say that “evidence” will never be provided; but what is offered fails to support their claim. For example, the “evidence” of envy might be that the person has been critical of the rich, though they have never expressed resentment at wealth earned fairly and have never exhibited interest in becoming rich. But the accuser somehow “knows” the accused is secretly envious, apparently through some exceptional epistemic abilities. Aside from dishonesty, one possible motivation is that the accuser honestly cannot conceive of anyone being critical of capitalism for a good reason. Hence, they infer there must be a secret wicked motive. But it is more likely the accuser knows there are good criticism of capitalism and to not accuse the critic of wicked motives would be to acknowledge this.

The defense against this technique is objectively assessing whether adequate evidence exists for the accusation of the secret motive. If not, the claim should not be accepted. It must also be remembered that even if a person has a bad (secret or not) motive, this is irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments.

As noted in my previous essay, critics of capitalism are often accused of being envious or Marxists. As shown in that essay, even if a critic is envious, it is fallacious to conclude their criticism is therefore wrong. But it could be argued that a person’s envy can bias them and diminish their credibility. I will look at this and examine envy. I will then engage in some self-reflection on whether I am envious.

Since envy involves resentment, an envious person could have a bias and see who they envy in an unwarranted or negative manner. This might occur for a variety of reasons, such as a desire to explain away their own failures or feel better by attributing negative qualities to who they envy. For example, a person who envies the rich might explain their own lack of wealth in terms of the machinations of the wealthy and “the system” while seeing the rich as suffering from greed, dishonesty and corruption. Thus, it is an envious person could be biased against those they envy.  If such a bias exists, then the envious person’s credibility would be reduced in proportion to their bias. This is because they would be more inclined to accept negative claims about those they envy. So, it would be rational to consider the influence of bias when assessing claims.

But the mere possibility of bias is not proof of bias, there would need to be evidence the person 1) is envious and 2) is biased by this envy. If this evidence exists, then we should consider the impact of this bias on the person’s claims. This approach can have merit in the context of the Argument from Authority.

An Argument from Authority occurs when it is argued that a claim should be accepted because the person making it is an authority (expert) on the subject. It has this form:

 

Premise 1: Person A is an authority(expert) on subject S.

Premise 2: A says P about S.

Conclusion: P is true.

 

This inductive argument is assessed in terms of the quality of the expert, and this includes considering whether the expert is significantly biased. If an expert is biased to a degree that would render them untrustworthy, then accepting a biased claim from them would be an error of logic. If I were so envious of the rich that I was significantly biased against them, then unsupported claims I make about them should not be accepted as true based on my (alleged) expertise.

But even if someone is envious and extremely biased, this would not disprove their claims since claims stand or fall on their own. To think otherwise would be to fall into the Accusation of Envy fallacy discussed in the previous essay. The logical response to bias is not to reject the claims, but to subject them to scrutiny. Even if I was extremely envious of the rich, it would not follow that my claims about capitalism are false, and they would need to be assessed on their own merit.  But am I envious of the rich? To answer this, I need to consider the nature of envy.

At its core, envy involves wanting what someone else has. This can range from a possession (such as money) to a quality (such as being a fast runner). But merely wanting what someone else has is not the defining feature of envy. You might want to have artistic skills to match Rembrandt, but this need not make you envious. Envy includes a resentment towards the possessor of the desired thing and often includes a desire to take it. But even this does not properly capture envy. Suppose that you start a business with a trusted friend, but they betray you and flee the country with your money. You want the money, you resent that they have it, and you desire that it be taken away from them. But it would be incorrect to say that you are envious of them. More must be added to complete the recipe for envy.

One plausible addition is that resentment must be unwarranted, and the desire is improper in some relevant way. In the case of the hypothetical betrayer, your resentment is warranted and the desire for your money is proper. Establishing a claim of envy would thus require showing that a person wants what another has, that they unjustly resent that the other person has it, and that there is something improper about their desire for it. Envy also often involves an inability by the envious to get what they desire. If they could, they would not be envious.  The envious person thus suffers from a series of moral failings relative to their desire. While this is hardly a necessary and sufficient definition of “envy” it should suffice for sorting out whether I am envious of the rich.

To be envious of the rich, I would need to want to be rich.  I would also need an unjust resentment of the rich, an improper desire to be rich, and perhaps a desire that the rich no longer be rich and I would need to lack the ability to become rich. Let us walk through each of these in turn.  While I want to have some money (food and running shoes are not free), I do not desire to be rich. As for evidence, my life choices have not been aimed at becoming rich. For example, I earned my doctorate in philosophy and then became a professor. I could have picked a much more lucrative degree and profession.  While I write books, these are in philosophy and gaming rather than more profitable areas. If I wanted to be one of the rich, I would have been going about it in an ineffective way. But it could be contended that while I want to be rich, I lack the ability and have continuously been stuck in an “inferior” life.

The easy and obvious reply is that since I had the ability to complete a doctorate, I also had the ability to complete a far more lucrative advanced degree. Given that I was a college athlete and still train regularly despite numerous injuries, I can stick to challenging tasks and persist through difficulties. While it would be immodest to go through my strengths and accomplishments, suffice it to say that I could have certainly succeeded in a career far more profitable than being a professor if I desired to be rich. I am not saying that I would be rich; simply that if I wanted to be rich, I could have put myself on a path far more likely to achieve that result than a career in philosophy. If being rich was my goal, I would have tried. If I had turned out to be a bitter failure, then a charge of envy might have some merit. But to say that I am envious of what I never aimed for is a bizarre claim. One could claim some secret knowledge of my motives, but that would be unsupported speculation.

I do not unjustly resent the rich who have earned their wealth, such as by working hard in a demanding job. I do  have a negative view towards those who have acquired wealth unjustly, who use their wealth to the detriment of others, or who squandered the opportunities their wealth afforded them. I do believe that the current system is unfair, but I do not feel indignation that I have been treated unfairly. Rather I feel moral anger at the harmful aspects of the economic system we have created and perpetuate.

I do think that the rich should have less wealth, that they should contribute more and do better with their wealth. But I also think that everyone should use more of their resources to do good, me included. Like most people, I do not always live up to my moral ideals. But I do not want the rich to be stripped of their wealth and left poor. Being poor in America is a terrible thing, so I do not want anyone to be poor. 

As such, while I do have a negative view of some rich people and I have serious criticisms of the current economic system, I do not envy the rich. And even if I did, this would be irrelevant to any criticism I make.

 

I am, on occasion, critical of capitalism. I am, on occasion, accused of being critical because I am allegedly envious or a Marxist. If these were attacks aimed only at me, they would be of no general interest. However, accusing critics of capitalism of being motivated by envy or Marxism is a common tactic that warrants evaluation. I will begin with the accusation of envy.

While the accusation of envy is rarely presented as a developed argument, it aims to refute criticism of capitalism by attacking the critic’s motive.  The logic is that their criticism is wrong because they are envious of those who are winning capitalism. Obviously, this reasoning is fallacious and can be called the Accusation of Envy or Refutation by Envy. This fallacious argument has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Person P makes critical claim C about X.

Premise 2: P is accused of envy (typically relating to X).

Conclusion: Therefore, claim C is false.

 

This is a fallacy because whether a person is envious has no bearing on the truth of the claims they make. Even if a person is driven by envy, it does not follow that their claims are false. The following example illustrates this “reasoning” is flawed:

 

Sam: “When tyrants oppress their people and commit genocide, they are acting wrongly.”

Sally: “Why you are just envious of tyrants. So, you are wrong. They are acting justly and morally.”

 

Another absurd example, involves math:

 

Cool Joe: “2+2 = 7.”

Mathematician Mary: “That is wrong; 2+2=4.”

Cool Joe: “You are just envious of my being so cool. And rich. And handsome. So, you are wrong. 2+2 =7.”

Cool Cathy: “Oh, Joe, you are so right, and Mary is so wrong. Work through your envy and maybe you’ll get a man someday.”

 

Even if Mary was envious of Joe, it does not follow she is wrong when she claims 2+2 =4. The example is intended to be absurd, because its absurdity shows that this logic is fallacious.  If this logic was good, it would be easy to “disprove” anything, be it basic truths of math or criticisms of capitalism.

As such, accusing anyone of envy does not refute claims. Since this is a fallacy, it might be wondered why someone would use this tactic. One possibility is that the fallacious attack is the best the person has; they have no good refutation. A second possibility is that while fallacies are logically flawed, they can be very powerful persuasive tools. As a practical matter “winning” an argument has nothing to do with truth or the quality of the logic; it is about persuading the target audience to accept a claim whether it is true. Ad hominem style attacks are effective psychologically, so this tactic can be a winning one. In many cases the target audience wants to reject the criticism, hence they are happy to accept any “reason” to do so.

It might be wondered whether a person’s envy can be relevant to their claims. While it is, as shown above, irrelevant to the truth of their claims, it could be a relevant factor in assessing bias. But even if a person is biased, it does not follow that their claim must be false.  It is to the matter of envy and credibility that I will turn in the next essay.

Because the United Kingdom was suffering from a shortage of sperm donors it was been proposed that men be allowed to donate their sperm after they are dead. As with other post-death donations, the donated material would be extracted and used. This does raise some ethical issues.

It must be noted that the donation process is voluntary, and the sperm is not simply harvested without consent. As such, the main moral issue is whether such a donation is morally acceptable. The specific act of donating sperm post death falls under two broader moral areas. The first is the ethics of donating anything after death. If such donations were morally unacceptable, then it would follow that sperm donation after death would also be unacceptable. While the general ethics of post-death donations is beyond the scope of this work, the ethics of donating organs after death is well-established: it is not only acceptable, but laudable. But this does not establish that post-death sperm donation is acceptable.

The second is the ethics of sperm donation in general. If this is morally wrong, then post-death sperm donation would also be morally wrong. While some might take issue with sperm donation in generally, it does not seem morally problematic, but this is also matter is beyond the scope of this work

The distinction between post-death sperm donation and general post-death donation is that what is being donated is sperm, but the ethics of this falls under the more general ethical topic of sperm donation. Thus, the moral concern specific to post-death sperm donation is that it occurs post-death. As such, this is the one factor that would distinguish post-death sperm donation from normal sperm donation. So, the question is what, if any, moral difference is made by the donor being dead before their donation.

While there might be a bit of an “icky” factor to the post-death aspect, the “argument from icky” does not have much moral weight unless the “ick” can be spelled out in terms relevant to the moral status of the action. There are certainly numerous other considerations that are morally relevant, and I will focus on these.

One moral concern is the treatment of the dead. While the dead person is presumably beyond caring, there is a possible impact on family and friends when they learn of the procedure. There is also the concern about treating the dead with respect and one might argue that extracting sperm would be disrespectful. It could be argued that the procedure is no more (or less) disrespectful than those used to harvest donated organs. There is also the fact that the person consented to the procedure; if they were not deceived or misled about the procedure, the consent of an adult overrides the concerns of their family and addresses the issue of respect. If those doing the extraction are acting in accord with the donor’s consent and do not do anything beyond that consent, they would be acting in a respectful manner.

There is also a pragmatic concern: a donor might have died from a genetic condition. This can be addressed by providing prospective recipients with this information so they can make an informed choice. And any donated sperm would come with an unknown risk of possible genetic problems.

One objection is that children from donated sperm will have lost a parent before they are even conceived. They will never be able to meet their biological father. While this might seem an odd situation, this is like cases in which a father dies before their child is born. While this is not common, it does happen. Wars, for example, claim fathers before their children are born. In the case of the typical donor, there is likely to be far less emotional impact, since the donor would have no connection to the mother. There is also the fact that a living sperm donor could die before his children decide to seek him out and there is the possibility that neither children nor donor will ever want to meet. As such, there seems to be no special moral problem with post-death donation that makes it different from other cases in which a child never meets the man who donated the sperm that created them.

Another concern is that while a donated organ might grant life, donated sperm creates a new person. One worry is that the spouse or partner of the dead man might be harmed by this. While this is a matter of concern, the same problem arises with living sperm donors. Also, if the spouse or partner is worried about this, they need to address this with the man while he is still alive. But this is obviously not unique to post-death sperm donation; the man chooses to donate his sperm in both types of donations. So, the ethics of a married man deciding to donate sperm remains the same whether the donation occurs when he is alive or dead.

Based on the above, if the man consented, there is no specific moral problem with post-death sperm donation. So, if sperm donation and post-death body component donation are acceptable, post-death sperm donation is as well.

Thank you for being here. You all meant a lot to my dad, and he appreciated your presence in his life.

Waiting for a phone call that will never come is hard.

After his cancer diagnosis, my dad called my sister every day without fail. 7:00 am, except for holidays and weekends. Then 8:00 am. He wanted her to know that he was okay and not to worry. He was a very thoughtful and reliable man; you could count on him, and he loved his family.

For years, he would call me on Sundays. As men, we had mastered the manly art of saying a lot with few words. Hence, we just needed the one call a week.

When he was teaching college, we would talk about our classes and students.  We’d also commiserate about meetings and how they should have been emails. He was a great teacher. Whenever I went anywhere with him, we’d run into former students and their faces would light up, so I knew he had made their lives better.

One reason I became a teacher was because of him; like him I want to help make people’s lives better. He was good at math and even better at teaching it in ways students could understand. I could never do that, so I teach philosophy. Math is hard.

We would also talk about our dogs, sharing stories of the crazy things they had done that week. We both agreed we had the smartest, best dogs in the world. And we were right.

As I got older and started talking about “back in the day”, we’d reminisce about our adventures together. One of his favorite stories was about the insane number of fish we caught on an ice fishing trip; the flags were popping up like it was a parade and we went home with more fish than bait. Another was when we went smelting and I gave up on the net and jumped into the water and started grabbing them with my hands. It worked. Really.

My dad preferred  fishing with a pole, and had extensive fishing wisdom, such as his saying that you  “can’t catch fish if your fly is out of the water.”  He loved going to Tim Pond, and introduced my sister and her husband to the place. When they couldn’t catch anything while he was reeling in his limit, he shared another bit of fishing wisdom, saying, “that’s why they call it fishing and not catching.” 

As a boy he dreamed of owning a hunting camp in his hometown of Norway. That dream came true when he and his father built it. His best friend, Don Soler, helped him build an add on to it, and they spent many deer seasons hunting from there. My sister and I would sleep in the loft, with Beth asking him and our mom not to tell the bears they had children.

Beth survived the bears to work at L.L. Bean. Her most important job was advising him on which new Bean flannel shirts to buy, although his closet was already full of them. But you can never have too much flannel.

Before her passing, dad would tell me what his wife Carolyn was up to. This usually involved Roger’s Farm. A place she loved and where she practiced her role as a master gardener.

When Nancy Blanchard became part of his life, he’d tell me about their week together. Every Friday they went to Pepper’s Landing. Nancy always had the same thing, which is something I can relate to. Once you find something good, you stick with it.

Another bit of wisdom my dad liked to share is that “Every day is good, some are just better than others.” While today is a sad day, it is good that we are together and thinking of him.

I’ll end this as I did our phone calls: I love you dad.