Archives for June 2020

Appeal to Tradition 1: Family of Fallacies

June 29, 2020 by Michael LaBossiere Leave a Comment

One fallacious way to argue that something is true or good is to make this inference by appealing to tradition. When the debate over same-sex marriage was at its peak, this sort of poor reasoning was commonly deployed in an effort to defend “traditional” marriage. While that debate is largely settled, the appeal to tradition is still employed to defend what some people see as traditions worth defending, such as “traditional” gender roles and “traditional” religious values. The obvious problem with this approach is that it involves a fallacy—a bad argument in which the premise(s) fail to logically support the conclusion. As to why people would use a fallacy, some reasons include not realizing it is a fallacy, not having any good arguments to use, or knowing that a fallacy can be far more persuasive than a logically good argument.

Rather than engage in the endless task of addressing the multitude of specific fallacious appeals to tradition, I will focus on the fallacy itself in the hopes that it will provide people with the tools needed to recognize and defend against such appeals. I will go beyond merely describing the fallacy and will do something of a deep dive. To begin, we should consider two relatives of the appeal to tradition, the appeal to belief and the appeal to common practice.

The appeal to belief fallacy occurs when a person infers that a claim is true simply because all or most people believe the claim. It has the following pattern:

Premise 1: All (or most) people believe that claim X is true.

Conclusion: Therefore, X is true.

This line of “reasoning” is fallacious because the fact that many people believe a claim does not, in general, serve as evidence that the claim is true.

There are, however, some cases when the fact that many people accept a claim as true is an indication that it is true. Avoiding the fallacy in such cases does require including this as a premise. For example, while you are visiting Maine, you are told by several residents you see fishing that they believe that people older than 16 need to buy a fishing license to fish. Barring reasons to doubt these people, you have good reason to believe their claim because they most likely know the law and are probably not lying to you.

There are also cases in which what people believe determines the truth of a claim. Avoiding the fallacy in such cases does require including this as a premise. For example, the truth of claims about manners depend on what people believe to be good manners. The meaning of words also seems to rest on belief: words, in a practical sense, mean what most people believe they mean. Some philosophers argue that ethical and aesthetic claims fall into this category. Those who embrace moral relativism argue that what is good and bad is determined by the beliefs of a culture. Those who embrace aesthetic relativism contend that beauty is determined in the same way. These theories cannot be simply assumed without committing another fallacy, that of begging the question. Now to the appeal to common practice.

While the appeal to belief involves what people believe, the appeal to common practice involves what people do. It occurs when someone concludes that an action is correct or right simply because it is (alleged to be) commonly done. It has the following form:

Premise 1: X is a common action.

Conclusion: Therefore, X is correct/moral/justified/reasonable, etc.

It is a fallacy because the mere fact that most people do something does not make it correct, moral, justified, or reasonable.

As with appeal to belief there are philosophers who argue that there can be arguments from common practice that are not fallacious. For example, moral relativism is the theory that morality is relative to the practices of a culture. If what is moral is determined by what is commonly practiced, then a non-fallacious argument could be constructed using that as a premise.

People sometimes mistake an appeal for fair play to be an appeal to common practice. For example, a woman working in an office might say “the men who do the same amount and quality of work I do get paid more than I do, so it would be right for me to get paid the same as them.” The argument does not rest on the practice being a common one; rather it is an appeal to the principle of relevant difference. On this principle two people, A and B, can only be treated differently if and only if there is a relevant difference between them. For example, it would be morally acceptable to pay people differently for work of different quality; but it would not be acceptable to pay people differently for the same quality and quantity of work simply because one person is a male and the other female. As would be suspected, there is considerable debate about what differences are relevant.

You might be wondering what the appeal to belief and the appeal to common practice have to do with the appeal to tradition. Roughly put, the appeal to tradition fallacy involves arguing that something is true or right because it has been believed or done for a long time (or both). As such, the fallacy occurs when it is assumed that something is better or correct simply because it is older, traditional, or “always has been done/believed.”

This sort of “reasoning” has the following form:

Premise 1: X is old or traditional (believed or done a long time)

Conclusion: Therefore, X is correct or better than the new/non-traditional.

This sort of “reasoning” is fallacious because the age of something does not automatically make it correct or better than something newer. This is made quite obvious by the following example: the theory that witches or demons cause disease is far older than the theory that microorganism cause diseases. Therefore, the theory about witches and demons must be true.

While one should avoid falling for the appeal to tradition, it is equally important to avoid falling for the appeal to novelty. This fallacy occurs when one infers that something is correct or better simply because it is new or non-traditional. This sort of “reasoning” has the following form:

Premise 1: X is new (or non-traditional).

Conclusion: Therefore, X is correct or better than the old/traditional.

This sort of “reasoning” is fallacious because the novelty or newness of something does not automatically make it correct or better than something older. To use a silly example, if someone just created the “earthworm diet” that involves eating only earthworms, it obviously does not follow that this is better than more traditional diets. As a general rule, the age or traditionality of something provide no evidence for or against its truth or goodness. In the next essay I will get into some deeper philosophical analysis of the appeal to tradition and why it is defective.

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The Tyranny of the Mask?

June 26, 2020 by Michael LaBossiere 8 Comments

Leon County in my adopted state of Florida has mandated the wearing of face coverings in indoor, public spaces. There are numerous exceptions to the requirement, such as while exercising (at a distance) and for health reasons. Those who violate the ordinance face an initial $50 fine which increases to $125 and then up to $250. As would be expected, this ordinance has been met with some resistance. For example, there have been posts on social media encouraging businesses to post signs that encourage people to dishonestly use the health exception to avoid wearing masks. As would also be expected, this has been labeled as tyranny by some. This provides an excellent context in which to discuss tyranny and liberty.

One obvious challenge in discussing whether imposing a mask requirement is tyrannical is agreeing on a serious definition of “tyranny” that is more than “something I don’t like.” Since American political philosophy is based heavily on John Locke, he is my go-to for defining the term.

Locke takes tyranny to be the “exercise of power beyond right.” For him, the right use of power is for the good of the citizens and a leader’s use of power for “his own private separate advantage” is exercising that power “beyond right.” Locke also presents some other key point about tyranny, noting that it occurs when “the governor, however entitled:

Makes his will and not the law the rule
Does not direct his commands and actions to the preservation of the properties of his people.
Directs them to the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.”

Does the ordinance, and similar impositions, meet the definition? On the face of it, it does not. After all, the aim of the ordinance seems to be for the good of the citizens: it is aimed at reducing the chances that people will get infected. It is also aimed at allowing businesses and other public places to operate. That is, it is aimed at the preservation of the properties of the people. There is no evidence that those in office are using the ordinance for their “own private separate advantage” or trying to satisfy some “irregular passion.”

It could be argued that while the objectives of the ordinance are not tyrannical, the ordinance involves exercising power “beyond right.” That is, the ordinance oversteps the legitimate limits of the power of the governing body. Since I am not a lawyer, I will let the legal aspect of this matter be addressed by those who are experts in this field. I will focus on the moral aspect: do authorities have the moral right to impose a mask requirement on the people?

While people tend to answer such questions in terms of their likes and dislikes, I will follow J.S. Mill and make use of principles that I consistently apply in cases of liberty versus safety. As in all such cases, my first area of inquiry is into the effectiveness of the efforts at safety. After all, if we are giving up liberty to gain nothing, this would be both foolish and wrong.

While there is some debate over the effectiveness of masks, the consensus of experts is that they do help prevent the spread of the virus. There is also the intuitively plausible argument that face coverings will reduce the spread of the virus because they help reduce the volume and distance of expulsions as well as helping block some of what is incoming when you breathe. Wearing a mask is not without its costs. Aside from the possible cost of buying or making masks, they are uncomfortable to wear, they interfere with conversations, and it is hard to look good in a mask. While breathing does require a tiny bit more effort, this is generally not a significant factor for most people. Those with pre-existing conditions impacting their breathing are more likely to be severely impacted by the virus—but they will need to rationally weigh the relative risks. Anecdotally, I do not find the masks problematic—but I used to run wearing a face mask during the Maine winters so perhaps I mastered mask breathing long ago.

Weighing the effectiveness of the masks against the harms, they seem to have a clear safety advantage: by enduring some minor discomfort for short periods of time you can reduce your risk of being infected with a potentially lethal disease. You also reduce the risk of infecting others if you are already infected. The second issue to address is whether the gain in safety warrants the imposition on liberty. After all, some people do not want to wear masks and it is an imposition to require this under the threat of punishment. A good guide to liberty is the principle of harm presented by J.S. Mill.

Mill contends that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” I will rely on Mill’s arguments for his principle but certainly agree that it can be criticized, and alternative principles can be advanced.

During the discussion of his principle Mill argues that we (collectively) have no right to infringe on a person’s liberty because doing so would be good for them or even to prevent them from harming themselves. As long as their actions impact only themselves, their liberty is absolute. Applying this to the masks, if they only served to protect a person from infection, then Mill’s principle would forbid the imposition of masks: people have a liberty of self-harm. If this were the case, I would agree with those who see mask impositions as tyranny: they have the moral right to put themselves at risk if doing so does not harm others. As they say, their body, their choice. To use an analogy, If I want to go shooting without any eye protection (and I have medical insurance), I have the right to be stupid and risk losing an eye. But the masks do more than protect the wearer—they also protect other people. If I go out without a mask and I am unaware I am infected, I am putting other people in greater danger—I am potentially harming them. As such, it is no longer just my business—it is their business as well.

Going back to the gun analogy, I do not have a right to fire my gun around the range whenever and wherever I want—doing so puts other people at risk of injury and death and I can be rightfully prevented from doing so. To use another analogy, while I think a person has the moral right to turn off their airbag in their car and thus face a greater risk of injury or death, they do not have the right to drive without brakes—they are now putting everyone at risk.

The obvious conclusion is that the imposition of masks is not tyranny. In fact, it is an excellent example of how the state should exercise its power: for the protection of the citizens on the basis of the best available evidence.

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Protests: Denial of Association

June 24, 2020 by Michael LaBossiere 2 Comments

As discussed in an earlier essay, it is tempting to define a group you do not like by the worst people associated with it—this can easily lead to committing the fallacy of guilt by association. To illustrate, those on the left will be tempted to see the lock down protesters as racist because some associated with the protests have openly displayed racist symbols. Those on the right will be tempted to see those protesting police violence as violent and destructive because some associated with the protests have engaged in violence and vandalism. Not surprisingly, there is an equal temptation: to refuse to acknowledge bad elements of groups one likes. Giving in to this temptation can result in committing a version of the purity fallacy which could be called the Denial of Association.

This version of the fallacy occurs when a negative claim about a group based on certain members is rejected by asserting, without adequate support, that the alleged members are not true members of the group. The fallacy is also known as the No True Scotsman fallacy thanks to the philosopher Anthony Flew. For example, if a 2^nd Amendment rights group is accused of being racist, they might simply assert that those displaying racist symbols at their events were not members of their group. This version of the fallacy has the following form:

Premise 1: Negative claim P has been made about group G based on M members of G.

Premise 2: It is claimed, without support, that the members of M are not true members of G.

Conclusion: Claim P is false.

This reasoning is fallacious because simply asserting that problematic alleged members are not true members does not prove that the claim is not true about the group. As always, it is important to remember that fallacious reasoning does not entail that the conclusion is false. A group’s defender could commit this fallacy while their conclusion is correct; they would have simply failed to give a good reason to accept their claim.

Like many fallacies, it draws its persuasive power primarily from psychological factors. Someone who has a positive view of the group has a psychological, but not logical, reason to reject the negative claim without adequate evidence. Few are willing to believe negative things about groups they like or identify with. In Flew’s original example, a Scotsman refuses to believe a story about the bad behavior of other Scotsmen on the grounds that no true Scotsman would do such things. People can also reject the claim on pragmatic grounds, such as when doing so would provide a political advantage.

The main defense against this fallacy is to consider whether the negative claim is being rejected on principled grounds or is being rejected without evidence, such as on psychological or pragmatic grounds. One way to try to overcome a psychological bias is to ask what evidence exists to reject the counterexample. If there is no such evidence, then all that would be left are psychological or pragmatic reasons—which have no logical weight.

Sorting out who or what belongs in a group can be a matter of substantial debate. For example, when people displaying racist symbols show up at gun rights events and lock down protests the question arises as to whether the protesters should be regarded, in general, as racist. Some might contend those openly displaying racist symbols should not define the broader group of protesters. Others contend that by tolerating the display of racist symbols the general group shows that it is racist. As another example, those peacefully protesting police violence generally disavow those who engage in violence and vandalism and claim that the violent protesters do not define their group. Others contend that because violence and looting sometimes occurs adjacent to or after peaceful protests, the protesters are violent looters.

Debates over group membership need not be fallacious. If a principled argument is given to support the exclusion, then this fallacy is not committed. For example, if a (fictional) 2^nd amendment rights organization “Anti-Racists for Gun Rights”(ARGR) was accused of being racist because people at their protest displayed racist symbols, showing that none of the racists were members of ARGR (and perhaps videos showing ARGR members telling the racists to get away from them) would not commit this fallacy. As another example, if peaceful protesters can show that those who engaged in violence and looting are not part of their group, then it would not be fallacious for them to reject the claim that they are violent on the grounds that those committing the violence are not in their group.

Sorting out which people belong to a group and how the group should be defined can be quite challenging; but this should be done in a principled way. To define a group by the worst of those associated with it runs the risk of committing the guilt by association fallacy. Denying that problematic members are not true members of a group runs the risk of committing the denial of association fallacy. While both fallacies are psychologically appealing and can be highly effective means of persuasion, they have no merit as arguments.

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The Allegory of the Fire

June 22, 2020 by Michael LaBossiere 2 Comments

It is cold and dark but, in the distance, you see a fire. As you approach, you feel its warmth and can see within its light. You move closer; the warmth grows, the light is brighter. Nearer still, you become uncomfortable, it is too warm. You try to move away, but you are pulled forward. Or pushed by an invisible hand? This close to the fire, it is too hot. Sparks sting like wasps and the smoke chokes you like brutal hands. You want to move away, back to the pleasant warmth. But you are pushed forward. You hear anguished screams over the fire’s crackle, you see people burning within the flames. They stand upon a heap of charred bone and ash. This fire has burned a long time. You are shoved into the flames. As it consumes you, you understand that many who bask in the fire have no idea what it burns. Others know full well—they command the fire be fed and they are obeyed. This fire is racism in all its forms and its fuel is human beings.

This allegory is, obviously, modeled on Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Like any philosophical allegory, it requires additional explanation and analysis.

The fire, as noted in the allegory, consists of racism in all its forms. Being within the fire is analogous to living fully with the harms of racism. For example, being wrongly imprisoned because of the racism of those running the justice system one had the misfortune to encounter. Or being killed because of racism—in that case, the analogy is to the charred bones.

The too hot circle is analogous to those who are harmed by aspects of racism, but the harms are not as great as within the fire itself. As an example, people who have enough financial resources to usually avoid the most brutal of harms of racism.

The too warm circle can include two types of people. One group can be people who do experience some of the lesser harms of racism, but not the full effects—an extreme example would be an African-American celebrity who is pulled over for driving while black but is let go when the officer realizes who they are. The second group consists of those who are not the target of racism but are aware of its existence and are uncomfortable with its existence—this comes in degrees ranging from a mild discomfort when hearing about the harms of racism to a sincere and burning hatred of racism.

The “just right” circle is made up of three groups of people. Those who benefit from racism while being ignorant of it, those who benefit from racism and are aware of it, and those who benefit from racism, are aware of it and play an active role in inflicting and maintaining it. Those who play an active role in maintaining it are part of the hand and they include those who command, such as politicians and corporate leaders, and those who obey, such as the police.

There are, of course, many fires that are defined by those who are pushed into them. People are burned based on the sex, economic class, gender, sexual orientation, religion and so on. A person can, of course, be both the burned and the burner. For example, a poor white man might support racist policies while he is pushed into the economic fire when he is forced to choose between working in a pandemic or suffering economic ruin.

This allegory is obviously subject to many criticisms. One obvious point of criticism is that it can be seen as an argument by analogy—I am obviously intending that the audience think that racism is bad because being burned in a fire is bad. As with any argument by analogy, it can be assessed in terms of the number of similarities (the more the better), the relevance of the similarities (the more the better), and the number of dissimilarities (the more the worse).

One can also engage the allegory by arguing against my claims about racism—one could argue that racism is not that bad, that it does not exist, or that people are generally getting what they deserve—or all of these at once, as some do.

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Protests: Guilt by Association

June 20, 2020 by Michael LaBossiere Leave a Comment

The pandemic tore at the American mask, revealing to many the injustice and brutal inequality it concealed. Police violence set fire to the mask, causing many Americans to take to the streets. While most protesters are peaceful even in the face of armed assault there have been undeniable cases of looting and destruction. For example, the Wendy’s where Richard Brooks was killed was burned by protesters. The predictable response is that critics of the protests have cast the protesters as violent rioters, destroyers and looters. This approach involves two fallacies which I will discuss. But first I will use an obvious rhetorical tactic myself.

If I rushed to discussing how the attacks on the protesters often involve empty rhetoric and fallacies, this would appeal to most folks on the left and be rejected by many folks on the right out of hand. So, I will use an example that is likely to appeal to folks on the right, that of the armed lockdown protesters.

In Michigan armed protesters peacefully occupied the capital but some among them displayed symbols of white supremacy such as the swastika, the Confederate flag, and nooses. These protesters were, in addition to criticizing the lockdown, making symbolic threats to minorities. In response, many on the left cast all the lockdown protesters as racists, white supremacists and even Nazis. Since there is video and photographic evidence showing these symbols among some of the protesters, it cannot be rationally denied that they were present. But it can be argued that the inference based on seeing some protesters displaying racist symbols is flawed—even fallacious.

Since people generally do not make their reasoning clear, it often must be reconstructed. One possible line of bad reasoning is the use of a hasty generalization. A hasty generalization occurs when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on a sample that is not large enough to adequately support the concussion. It has the following form:

Premise 1: Sample S (which is too small) is taken from population P.

Premise 2: In Sample S X% of the observed A’s are B’s.

Conclusion: X% of all A’s are B’s in Population P.

This is a fallacy because the sample is to small to warrant the inference. In the case of the protesters, inferring that most lockdown protesters are racists based on the observation that some clearly are would commit this fallacy. It does not follow that they are not racist—the conclusion of a fallacy need not be false. At this point it is likely that someone is thinking that even if most lockdown protesters are not open racists, they associate with them—thus warranting the inference that they are also guilty. This leads us to the guilt by association fallacy.

The guilt by association fallacy has numerous variants but the version in play here occurs when it is inferred that a group or individual has certain bad qualities because of their association with groups or individuals who have those qualities. The form of the fallacy is this:

Premise 1: Group or person A is associated with group or person B

Premise 2: Group or person B has (bad) qualities P, Q, R.

Conclusion: Group A has (bad) qualities P, Q, R.

The error being made is that the only evidence offered is the association between the two—what is wanting is an adequate connection between the two to show that the inference is justified. In the lockdown protester example, the general lockdown protesters were associated with protesters displaying racist symbols, but this is not enough to warrant the conclusion that they are racists. More is needed than mere association. The more is, as one would imagine, a matter of considerable debate: those who loath the lockdown protesters will tend to accept relatively evidence as supporting their biased view; those who love the lockdown protesters might be blind even to the strongest evidence. But whatever standards are used to judge association, they must be applied consistently—whether one loathes or loves the group or person. Now back to those protesting police violence.

As noted above, people associated with protesting police violence have engaged in destruction of property and looting. But the same standards applied to the lockdown protesters need to be applied: to infer that because some protesters have been observed to be violent and destructive that most (or all) are would be to commit the hasty generalization fallacy. Naturally, if there is evidence showing that most (or all) lockdown protesters are racist or evidence showing that most (or all) police violence protesters are violent, then the fallacy would not be committed.

To infer that those protesting police violence are violent because some associated with the protests are violent would be to commit the guilt by association fallacy, just as the fallacy would be committed if one inferred that the lockdown protesters are racists because they are associated with racists. Obviously, if there is good evidence that those protesting police violence are violent or that the lockdown protesters are racists, then the fallacy would not be committed.