Humans have a tendency to think of themselves of being outside of nature and often as being better than the rest of the natural world. This view has been embraced by intellectuals as well as the masses, and it often serves to blind us to the reality of the situation-at least until another disaster reminds us that we are firmly embedded in the natural world.
Our latest reminder is, of course, the terrible disaster that has struck Japan. The shaking of the earth and the rising of the sea struck a terrible blow against humanity and their works, thus showing that we are not beyond the reach of nature. Even the nuclear disaster reveals that we are vulnerable to nature as well-radiation is part of the natural world and though we might have thrown a leash on that dragon, it is always ready to consume us with its fire.
This situation, like all the other disasters before it, serves to show that despite all our technology and pride, we are still very vulnerable. While we so often see ourselves as masters of creation, in a matter of seconds we can become its victims. This is something that we should keep in mind.
While our delusion that we are somehow outside of nature does contribute to our failure to plan and prepare adequately, we are also hindered by other factors.
First, while we often overreact to threats from other humans (as our war on terror indicates), we generally tend to under estimate the threats posed by the forces of nature. So, for example, while we are dumping billions to fight a few rag tag terrorists, we are ill prepared to face the natural disasters that are certain to strike. Katrina, of course, shows just how well prepared we have been for such disasters. This is no doubt due to a key factor in human psychology regarding threat assessment. Also, there is the rather obvious fact that railing against human threats is great fodder for politics (and contractor profits), while being concerned about natural disasters seems to merely bore most of the public (at least until disaster strikes).
Second, in a nice bit of irony, the places that humans tend to find most appealing also tend to be places where disasters occur. An obvious example is the coast of Florida. It is beautiful, but also routinely hammered by storms. While it would make some sense to stay away from disaster areas, I doubt this is a viable option. After all, I really like the coast, too.
Third, planning and preparing for disasters seems to fall, psychologically, under the same sort of area as eating healthy and working out. Everyone knows that these are good ideas, yet people seem to find it very hard to actually act on that knowledge. It might be because the effort does not have an immediate payoff. Eating a bag of Cheetos feels good immediately while exercise feels bad to most people and won’t yield immediate results. Likewise, disaster planning and preparation does not yield immediate results and requires effort and expenditures that will probably only pay off in the future.
If my analogy holds, it would seem to follow that just as people often need coaches and trainers to motivate them to work out, we also need people who can motivate the public into preparing for disasters. Or, failing that, we need people and organizations that are willing to do the work for everyone else.
Fourth, people have a tendency to live in denial about future problems. Just as a smoker will not think much about lung cancer, people tend not to think about the next disaster. Just as a smoker will try to quit when they learn of a friend dying of lung cancer, we do worry about disasters when one strikes. So, for example, now that the Japanese reactor is spewing radiation, the rest of the world is poking at their reactors. Of course, just as most smokers go back to smoking after the funeral, we will be right back to ignoring things after we forget about Japan.
As the human population continues to increase and as our civilization grows ever more reliant on easily broken technology, the impact of disasters will continue to grow. After all, the more people who live in more concentrated areas, the greater the number of people who will be killed in a natural disaster. There is also the concern that our own actions are making the world more prone to more serious weather events. As such, we need to reconsider how we handle disaster planning and preparation or we can be sure that the coming disasters will be even worse.
Good article. We arrogantly boast of our ability to conquer and control nature yet all we can do is watch and wait helplessly as the wind blows the toxic plume of radiation coming from the damaged Fukushima reactors wherever it will. Last report I saw (Weather Channel – 3/18/2011) predicted the winds would tun to the southwest and blow the radioactive plume right over Tokyo by Monday (3/21) and would persist blowing in that direction through Wednesday. Let’s hope they can seal it off before then.
“Third, planning and preparing for disasters seems to fall, psychologically, under the same sort of area as eating healthy and working out.”
Or in the sense that neither guarantees reaching the intended goal.
RIP Jim Fixx.
Over the past two years two young–39 and 43– active men died suddenly of previously undetected heart problems.Both, believe it or not, were sons of women in my wife’s card club. Both mothers are,ironically I guess, in their late sixties, overweight and inactive, yet relatively healthy.
These could be classsified as exceptions to a rule, if there is a rule. But active preparation does not guarantee immediate or long term results.
To carry your analogy a bit further. It’s highly likely that Jim Fixx and those two young men were building whatever level of fitness on the anatomical equivalent of a seismic fault. Some congenital weakness in the heart, most likely. As all the preparation in the world would likely not have lengthened their lives appreciably, it’s likely that all the design changes and newly developed safety measures that are implemented after this disaster will not prevent another nuclear disaster–particularly not with reactors that are designed or redesigned by hubristic numb skulls who believe that, if a fault has produced only earthquakes of 8 or lower on the Richter Scale, it will never produce anything higher than an 8.5 quake. Therefore there’s no need to prepare for 9.0 quakes.
More of the analogy. That’s a bit like assuming that the exercise and the healthy diet will insure even one extra moment of life . Yet, as with earthquakes, nuclear reactor disasters, tidal waves, etc. we are, in the long run better off if we prepare as best we can for the WORST scenarios and expect our preparations to fall well short of our HIGHEST expectations. Prepare for 10.0 quakes, not 9.5 quakes, whatever the cost to owners and shareholders. Unless of course, you value money more than lives. . . And don’t be surprised when the Richter Scale has to be redefined to account for a 10.2 quake.
A merchant in Baghdad sends his servant to the marketplace for provisions. Shortly, the servant comes home white and trembling and tells him that in the marketplace he was jostled by a woman, whom he recognized as Death, and she made a threatening gesture. Borrowing the merchant’s horse, he flees at top speed to Samarra, a distance of about 75 miles (125 km), where he believes Death will not find him. The merchant then goes to the marketplace and finds Death, and asks why she made the threatening gesture. She replies, “That was not a threatening gesture, it was only a start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appointment_in_Samarra
Yes, if one is by nature inclined to personal destruction rather than the avoidance of same, immediate successful results are more likely. . .but not guaranteed.
If one ascribes to the concept that “When your time is up, it’s up”, that our lives are planned from the beginning, then there’s no arguing with the conclusion that we have no control over the the timing of our demise. Death will come as it did in medieval morality plays, first to warn us, perhaps, then to take us. But go we shall, and not on our schedule. It’s a particularly bleak and brutal view of life designed, I believe, to encourage us to seek salvation and a place in the afterlife.
It can be argued that modern medicine, now having the power to change our “arrival” times, also has the power to change our “departure” times as well. We still die, because that’s nature’s way, but,not on the medieval schedule. We can replace valves and insert stents, and carry bottled oxygen on our shopping trips or choose not to.
But maybe that’s part of the big plan, too. So what the hell. Let’s party! But wait! We can only do that if it’s part of the plan. Damn.
Edit 1:29 above for clarity:”That’s a bit like assuming that the exercise and the healthy diet will insure even one extra moment of life .” Add: “Or that they won’t. God knows. Perhaps”
“Or in the sense that neither guarantees reaching the intended goal.”
That’s not the way successful people live. Is getting a bachelor’, masters, or PHD guarantee that we will get a well-paying job? Should I tell my daughter to not to school?
You focus on Jim Fixx because the is the exception. The benefits of exercise, avoiding smoking, and eating proper food is shown to be overwhelmingly beneficial:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=&sid=a4emdcRyNi3M
So yes, we play our hands and take our chance. But successful people usually figure out what gives them the best hand and thus the best chance.
Unsuccessful people think nothing they do matters, or wait for success to magically manifest them.
I speak as a person who has been both successful and unsuccessful and can point to specific actions that made me both.
“That’s not the way successful people live.” Indeed, ‘ most’ successful people take risks. We can ignore those who inherit a fortune, I imagine. But some unsuccessful people take risks in pursuing their goals as well. And both the unsuccessful and the successful, sometimes fail and even die in the pursuit of success.
“You focus on Jim Fixx because the is the exception.” No. I provide two personal examples as well, which you can doubt if you wish. I also said, specifically:
“These COULD be classsified as exceptions to A rule, IF THERE IS A RULE. But active preparation does not GUARANTEE immediate or long term results.” I added the caps this time, because apparently they are needed. . . Is there something in my two quoted sentences that’s debatable or deserves questioning?
“Unsuccessful people think nothing they do matters.” You’ve been unsuccessful, so you’re qualified to read their minds and speak for the whole pack? Well. SOME unsuccessful people, believe it or not, actually try mightily, perhaps even harder than you, and fail because of psychological problems or some external calamity. And, of course, not every person comes equipped with the ability to overcome all hurdles, but that doesn’t mean that they feel “nothing they do matters, or [that they’re] wait[ing] for success to magically manifest them”.
“I speak as a person who has been both successful and unsuccessful and can point to specific actions that made me both.” And of course, you’re still alive, likely despite all the problems externally inflicted and self-inflicted that you’ve survived. It’s a lot easier to speak when you’re alive, of course. But I wouldn’t be surprised if there are some people who have taken a similar approach and failed. Just guessing. I hope you can appreciate their fates and not take the hard-line “If I did it, they can, too” attitude. A little empathy is not a bad thing. In fact, t goes a long way toward helping us fulfill the New Testament Jesus’ invitation to “love your neighbor”, even when he displays shortcomings that you do not.
Let me again restate what I actually said, not as it’s filtered through your vision*: “These could be classsified as exceptions to a rule, if there is a rule. But active preparation does not guarantee immediate or long term results.” I’m taking a sensible approach to get to the reality that whatever path one follows, nothing is guaranteed, nothing more, nothing less. I make no contention that your daughter should or shouldn’t pursue a higher degree because that would be a futile exercise . God bless her and keep her if she does.
And read the last paragraph of that 1:29 post:
“That’s a bit like assuming that the exercise and the healthy diet will insure even one extra moment of life . Yet, as with earthquakes, nuclear reactor disasters, tidal waves, etc. we ARE, in the long run BETTER OFF if we prepare AS BEST WE CAN for the WORST scenarios and expect our preparations to fall well short of our HIGHEST expectations.”
That sounds to me suspiciously like an endorsement for a good diet, exercise, and not smoking. How about we add drinking to the list?”
* Is that kinda like a straw man? Filtering it, somewhat inaccuratelly, through your vision, then attacking it?
Good article for Mike’s “Nuclear Power” article and this one:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/5-myths-about-nuclear-energy/2011/03/15/AB9P3Oe_story.html?hpid=z6
A heads up for the “New World Order” group in the audience: It’s written by Michael Levi from the Council on Foreigh Relations.
“But what happened in Japan reminds us that unanticipated vulnerabilities are inevitable in any highly complex system ” The human mind and body qualify as “highly complex systems”, I believe. Nothing is guaranteed. What I was emphasizing previously: “But active preparation does not guarantee immediate or long term results.” It may affect those results, but how it affects them, positively or negatively, is not guaranteed, either.
Quite right.
Preventative measures have to be looked at in terms of statistics. For example, not smoking will not ensure that a person will not get lung cancer-one of the best runners I have known died of it. However, not smoking lowers the odds of cancer (and other health problems).
“First, while we often overreact to threats from other humans (as our war on terror indicates), we generally tend to under estimate the threats posed by the forces of nature”
I assume, Mike, that you don’t think we overeacted in the case of Rwanda or the Sudan, since we in fact did not react at all.
As Clausewitz stated: “We make war for a better peace.” So they few deaths you see in many wars are a result of intervention by stronger forces to stop genocide. Genocide by the way is the ancient way of making peace.
So it’s easy for you to say we overeact, because the enemy was not able to do the really bad things they wanted to do.
800,000 deaths in Rwanda
300,000 dead in Darfur
There’s plenty more examples.
Historically, far, far more people have died in war than by natural disaster. You’re just spoiled by Pax Americana.
I agree that in some cases we simply ignore deaths in countries that lack the resources or strategic importance we regard as important. However, this does not refute the original claim-it merely introduces another issue.
But did our response to the terrorists 1) prevent a vast number of deaths and 2) actually match the severity of the threat presented?
“But did our response to the terrorists 1) prevent a vast number of deaths and 2) actually match the severity of the threat presented?”
This line of reasoning is both intellectually vapid and philosophically dishonest. There is no way to know for sure about #1. There is no way to come close to a guess. The unknowns involved are enormous. And you want to base an argument on that? As for “matching” a threat, I favor overwhelming it. Engineers (you know, people who have real responsibilities in the real world of unpredictable behavior) have a rule of thumb, which varies by industry but it generally works such that you calculate your maximum load/worst case scenario and then design to a specification 10%/20%/100%/whatever beyond that. You certainly don’t “match” your threat. Not that all of them always follow it or calculate the risks accurately ahead of time, but they’d be pretty crappy engineers if they didn’t do it to some degree.
Of course, proactively nothing can be done to prevent natural disasters from occurring. We can only react to them in the sense that we prepare to react. We cannot influence their behavior. Terrorists, OTOH, can, will, and do react to what we do. And so long as they are reacting to our behavior, they are less able or inclined to take action against us. It’s almost as if you work hard at refusing to see the difference between action and reaction.
Such a line of reasoning from a couple of sophomores sitting in a dorm room passing around a doobie, I could expect. Reasoning such as this from a trained philosopher whose job it is to educate America’s youth is pitiful. Or are you trying to insult our intelligence?
1/ Language is often forgotten. Words ignored. Specifically, we can’t move on with the issue until we define what a “vast number” IS.
As for engineers who “calculate your maximum load/worst case scenario and then design to a specification 10%/20%/100%/whatever beyond that”, I’d feel much better if the engineers responsible for designing our nuclear reactors would live up to letter of your understanding of how engineers operate. It’s true we can’t prevent tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes and the like. But we can take a more realistic approach to determining what the worst case scenario is and designing to specifications 30%, 50%, 80% beyond that.
I’m not sure of the math here, but if engineers knew that the worst earthquake near that reactor in Japan was an 8.3 and according to this source
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/tech-mainmenu-30/energy/6706-japanese-nuclear-reactor-faces-media-meltdown
“The Economist noted the reactors “were designed to withstand tremors of magnitude 8.2. That they survived relatively unscathed through a magnitude 9.0 earthquake … seems remarkable.” That would seem to indicate that engineers designed to somewhat less than what a worst case scenario might be if an8.3 was already recorded.
And the tsunami? Headline from Bloomberg Online 3/15 “Japan Nuclear Safety Plan Foresaw Quake, Underestimated Impact of Tsunami”. They foresaw the quake but underestimated the tsunami worst case possibilities. In a country that has a history of same?
http://www.stfrancis.edu/content/ns/bromer/earthsci/EarthScienceMon/student5/WEBPAGE/webpage.html
Do you think the engineers involved with the Japanese reactor followed your description of an engineer’s goals? Perhaps the corporate bottom line should be totally eliminated as a determining factor in the engineering process?
So. Finally. If you were an engineer tasked with designing a reactor to replace any reactor within The Ring of Fire, knowing that this earthquake has been upgraded to 9.0, (and don’t forget those tsunamies) what worst-case-scenario specifications would you design to?
“Troll?”
It is hardly vapid to ask if a response actually had a significant effect and if it matched the threat in question.
Sure, we can never be certain. But surely we can make some intelligent estimates?
Using an engineering example, it seems to make sense to determine if a adding safety features to a vehicle will actually have a significant impact relative to the cost and the threat presented. For example, all cars could be equipped with heavy armor, automatic fire suppression equipment, run-flat tires, NASCAR grade driver protection, and a weapons package.
Sorry, I thought it was a rhetorical question. So tell me then, did our response to the terrorists 1) prevent a vast number of deaths and 2) actually match the severity of the threat presented?
How do you make that “intelligent” estimate based on what you know? Is there value in keeping you enemy reacting to what actions you take as opposed to reacting to his (or her, as the case may be) actions? Yes or no, is a terrorist threat significantly different from a natural one in this regard?
“Is there value in keeping you enemy reacting to what actions you take as opposed to reacting to his (or her, as the case may be) actions?”
Given that it’s “impossible to make that ‘intelligent’ estimate based on what you know”, and given that a good engineer” calculate[s] [the] maximum load/worst case scenario and then design[s] to a specification 10%/20%/100%/whatever beyond that,
perhaps there’s value in both action and reaction. And perhaps we should be planning for scenarios above and beyond that worst case scenario of any kinds of threats, terrorist , natural disasters, or otherwise. Questions. Are we, individually or as a nation, willing or able to pay the price to do that. OR would we rather pay the price of failing to take that the worst-case preparation approach?
To match the threat you’ll only get what the public is willing or able to afford in terms of money spent and safety sacrificed. No profit, no energy, or energy that’s considerably less safe.
And if cost is part of the equation, I’d like to add “convenience to the consumer” to the list of considerations.
Rear-facing child safety seats and seat belts, though proven effective, are still considered a pain in the a** by many. Many would choose not to use them if there weren’t regulations requiring their use. Yet, few complain about airbags, collapsible steering wheels, and automatic seat belt systems. Those safety features require no effort; they require only the ability to pay for them. I haven’t been able (lets’ say willing) to pay for a car I like that has traction control yet, but most consumers would probably like that feature, too. Maybe it’ll be available in even the least expensive cars–eventually.
I’d lke to get me an armored vehicle with a weapons package so I can be more effectively prepared for the coming Revolution–or the End of Days–whichever comes first. 🙂 Do they sell a sleek two-seater in Kandy Apple Red? And I’ll need luxury leather seats, XM Satelite Radio (paid for the life of the car) and . . . . . . .
An interesting conversation with Nassim Nicholas Taleb (he of The Black Swan –not the movie–fame)
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2011/04/23/nassim-taleb-on-living-with-black-swans.aspx
“But I’ve been trying to emphasize the true message of the black swan, which is that there are some environments in which rare events are simply not predictable.Most people think that they can predict the black swan, that with quantitative sophistication they can get answers. They don’t get the idea that because we can’t predict black swans, then we need to restructure institutions and rethink strategies to be more robust in the face of uncertainty.”
That point of view,could have prevented this particular nuclear disaster ( by assuming the most robust way to deal with any possible negative nuclear event at that location might be , simply stated, not buildiing a damn nuclear plant on a seismic fault in an area where tsunamis are common). Or that approach could have lessened the effects by simply building the plant to withstand the maximum natural destruction possible–10 earthquake and the most powerful tsuanami imaginable. Since the bottom line seems to dictate such decisions the first choice seems most doable.**
“The black swan problem is much more difficult, vastly deeper, and does not have a solution that does not entail a total revamping of some institutional architecture.”
The tsunami, earthquake, nuclear plant disaster does indeed present the need for a solution that involves an entirely different institutional view of how to analyze nuclear safety– plant by plant– and how to deal with the real need for nuclear energy in light of this fresh assessment.
**There’s plenty of disagreement out there as to whether Fukushima was a Black Swan. In terms of my point here, that argument is irrelevant.
An interesting conversation with Nassim Nicholas Taleb (he of The Black Swan –not the movie–fame)
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2011/04/23/nassim-taleb-on-living-with-black-swans.aspx
“But I’ve been trying to emphasize the true message of the black swan, which is that there are some environments in which rare events are simply not predictable.Most people think that they can predict the black swan, that with quantitative sophistication they can get answers. They don’t get the idea that because we can’t predict black swans, then we need to restructure institutions and rethink strategies to be more robust in the face of uncertainty.”
That point of view,could have prevented this particular nuclear disaster ( by assuming the most robust way to deal with any possible negative nuclear event at that location might be , simply stated, not buildiing a damn nuclear plant on a seismic fault in an area where tsunamis are common). Or that approach could have lessened the effects by simply building the plant to withstand the maximum natural destruction possible–10 earthquake and the most powerful tsunami imaginable. Since the bottom line seems to dictate such decisions the first choice seems most doable.**
“The black swan problem is much more difficult, vastly deeper, and does not have a solution that does not entail a total revamping of some institutional architecture.”
The tsunami, earthquake, nuclear plant disaster does indeed present the need for a solution that involves an entirely different institutional view of how to analyze nuclear safety– plant by plant– and how to deal with the real need for nuclear energy in light of this fresh assessment.
**There’s plenty of disagreement out there as to whether Fukushima was a Black Swan. In terms of my point here, that argument is irrelevant.