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Archives for September 2007

Settling

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When it comes to relationships people often talk about the matter of settling. Settling seems to involved getting into a relationship with someone who is regarded as not really being quite good enough. People claim to settle for a variety of reasons including fear of being alone and being tired of the whole dating process. While there are people who settle, there are also those who have decided they will not (or will no longer) settle.

Choosing not to settle can be an excellent idea. First, it hardly makes sense to be content with less than you think you deserve. To use an analogy, if you can win first place in a race it does not make sense to settle for second or third. Second, settling can lead to discontent. A person who settles believes s/he can do better and this belief will always be there in the back of his/her mind. In most cases this will tend to make a person feel badly about the relationship. After all, it is hardly pleasant to think “well I’ve got someone who is okay, but I could do so much better.” Further, if a person thinks s/he has settled, s/he will probably be on the lookout for an opportunity with someone better. This makes settling in this case morally questionable since the “settler” could simply be using the other person until someone better comes along. Using people, as Kant and others have argued, certainly seems morally wrong-especially if the person thinks they are actually loved.

Of course, there is a risk in choosing not to settle. One thing I have learned from years of teaching critical thinking is that most people tend to overvalue themselves. This is not surprising-people see those they love in a better light and most people love themselves most. The obvious difficulty is that when someone is deciding whether she is settling or not she will be basing her evaluation of what is good enough based on her own overvaluing of herself. This leads to two possible problems. First, the person might never find anyone that meets his standards because they are too high. Second, the person might meet people who meet her standards but they will see her as unworthy because she is expecting far more than she has to offer herself. Either way the person will be alone until he either settles or finds someone who is willing to settler for him.

My perspective is that we almost all will have to settle to some degree. None of us are perfect and all relationships require compromise. Success depends, as with most matters in life, determining what can be compromised and what cannot.

As usual, here is a dialogue to illustrate this discussion:

Her: “I’m sick of settling. I’m not going to settle anymore. I’m going to find the right man.”

Me: “Yeah, I guessed that.”

Her: ‘How?”

Me: “Well, I could hear the song blasting out of your iPod as you approached. I didn’t catch all the lyrics but the gist seemed to involve not settling…and something about hitting men and/or their trucks with baseball bats. As loud as you play that thing, it is a wonder you are not deaf…or that your brain has not been sonically zapped into pudding.”

Her: “What? You need to speak up. I can’t hear you over my iPod.”

Me: “Nothing. So, you’re not settling. What does that mean?”

Her: “Just like it sounds. I’m not dating anyone who is not good enough for me anymore.”

Me: “So, I must assume that you have been carefully and objectively assessed to determine your value.”

Her: “Um, why would I do that?”

Me: “Well, in order for you to know that a guy is good enough for you, you’d need to know just how good you are. You know, it is like determining the selling price of anything. If you wanted to sell that iPod on eBay…what is it with these names…you’d determine what it was worth so you’d know whether you were settling for less or not.”

Her: “Well, I know what I want. That’s what is important!”

Me: “Yeah, that is something different. Being good enough for you and being what you want are two very different things. You might want to get a million dollars for your iPod but that is different from what would be a good enough selling price. You might want the perfect guy, but that is different from what would be a good enough guy for you. Unless, of course, you are the perfect woman.”

Her: “But I am the perfect woman.”

Me: “Of course you are.”

Her: “Hey!”

Me: “Well, laying aside your desire for the perfect man, what would be good enough for you?’

Her: “He’d need to be smart, but not nerdy, strong but not a bully, kind but not a sissy, honest, loving, faithful, handsome, educated, employed, sensitive, know what I want, understanding, always even tempered, rich, supportive of my career, good with children…”

Me: “I assume you could go on for hours like that.”

Her: “Hell yes.”

Me: “Isn’t that expecting a lot from a person?”

Her: “Well, he does have to be good enough for me.”

Me: “So, would you be good enough for him? Can you match that ideal man point for point by being the ideal woman? Can you do that all the time?”

Her: “What?”

Me: “Fair is fair. If the man has to meet all your ideals, then you have to meet his.”

Her: “But men set their ideals too high. They expect too much from women. How could we ever meet those ideals?”

Me: “You can’t, obviously. But the same is true for men. We’re all imperfect beings and are not always at our best.”

Her: “So, are you saying I should settle for some slob who will yell ‘woman, fetch me a beer and some nachos’ while he’s watching thirty six straight hours of NASCAR DVDs?”

Me: “I think you’d secretly enjoy that. They have NASCAR on DVD?”

Her: “Damn you. Yes, I’m sure they do.”

Me: “Seriously, no. You can and should have standards. You just need to be realistic about what you can expect from people.”

Her: “Hmm, all that wisdom yet you’re still single.”

Me: “Well, I’m waiting for the ideal woman.”

Her: “Well, I am the ideal woman.”

Me: “Then fetch me a beer, some nachos and a NASCAR DVD.”

Her: “My hate for you could scorch the sun.”

Me: “My work here is done. Now for some pie.”

Philosophy & Cold Medicine

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This past Sunday I woke up at midnight with that most wonderful of things-a sore throat. Not just a bit sore, but the sort of pain one might experience if a crazed porcupine decided to set up housekeeping in one’s throat. Well, perhaps not quite that bad, but rather bad.

 

Naturally, I had to teach three classes on Monday. If there is anything more fun than a having a sore throat it would be talking for a few hours with a sore throat. Of course, I turned to the healing power of modern medicine. Well, not really a healing power-more like a masking power. As far as I can tell, cold medicine works by confusing your body-you are still sick, but you just don’t care. I understand that is what is like to be a Republican, but I could be wrong.

 

Since I’m a professor and, in theory, am supposed to present coherent lectures, some might wonder what effect all these medicines had on my teaching. Here is how things have gone this week:

 

 

Student: “Do gay penguins go to hell?”

Me: “Clearly.”

Student: “Is that bad for them?”

Me: “Yes. They are accustomed to the cold so the fires of Hell will be extra uncomfortable for them.”

Student: “That makes me sad.”

Me: “As well it should. But, the penguins only have themselves to blame.”

Student: “Should disobedient children be stoned?”

Me: “Well, the bible is pretty clear on that.”

Student: “That seems harsh.”

Me: “Well, look at it this way. Following that precept will result in fewer people. This means less time waiting in line or trying to find a parking space. Think about that the next time you’re waiting to check out a movie at Blockbuster.”

Student: “I find that intriguing. Tell me more about this idea.”

Me: “Hell, I’m hallucinating again…I’m still in my office and class is 20 minutes away.”

Student: “No, you’re in class now. Um, where are your pants?”

Me: “I think the penguins stole them.”

Student: “Then they should be stoned.”

Me: “You have learned well young Jedi.”

Isis: “Wawoof”

Me: “Thank goodness, it was just a dream. I’m still at home. Hey, where are my pants?”

Penguin: “Muhuah.”

Me: “Damn penguins.”

 

And so it goes.

Is God Compatible with Evolution?

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While the theory of evolution is considered as a matter of established scientific fact, there is still very significant opposition to the theory from the religious community. The main concern is that the theory of evolution is a threat to faith and religious belief. Some thinkers content that religious belief is compatible with evolution-that a person can have science and God. It is to this matter that I know turn.

 

 

Addressing this matter requires being clear about what exactly is being debated. If the theory of evolution is taken to involve the claim that there is no God, then obviously God and the theory are not compatible. While this is a commonly held view, the theory does not actually explicitly deny the existence of God. What is does is postulate a mechanism of natural selection in place of an intelligent designer. So, rather than having an intelligent being design and create life forms, new life forms emerge through mutations and selection in terms of survival and reproduction. Mutations that survive and breed can eventually differ enough from the original species that they become a new species. As odd as it might seem, natural selection seems initially compatible with the existence of God.

 

 

God could have created the universe and put in place the method of natural selection as the means by which new life forms would arise from older ones. So, rather than designing each life form in hands on acts of creation, God would set the universe up so that a natural mechanism of selection did the work for Him. This sort of view is not without precedent. Many thinkers have argued that God created a world of laws and natural machinery that run without his direct intervention. The best known version of this view is deism.

 

Of course, there is the question of why God would use such a method and whether it is compatible with His other alleged traits.

 

 

God is, in Philosophy 101 terms, supposed to be all good, all powerful and all knowing. These attributes do seem to clash with using natural selection. First, if God is all powerful and all knowing, He could simply create the life forms He wants and not have to rely on a mechanism to do the work for him. An obvious reply to this is, however, to re-emphasis the view that God is the divine watchmaker who builds a world that can run on its own. Of course, many religious thinkers, such as Berkeley, regard this view as unacceptable. After all, if laws and mechanisms do all the work, what need is there for God? In any case, this does rekindle the old debate over the degree of God’s involvement in the world.

 

 

Second, if God is all good, then natural selection seems incompatible with God. This is so for two main reasons. The first reason is that natural selection seems to be terribly wasteful and brutal. It seems almost inconceivable that an all good being would allow so many species to simply perish. The second reason is that natural selection seems arbitrary. It is, after all, a chance driven mechanism. To leave survival up to chance hardly seems like the action of a perfectly good being.

 

Of course, this sort of problem is really nothing new-it is but the problem of evil with the twist of natural selection added in for a different flavor.

 

 

Thus, the logical conclusion seems to be that God is compatible with evolution, but serious problems arise with reconciling God with the nature of natural selection.

Unlimited? Not Exactly.

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Companies generally try to get and keep customers but recently some companies have intentionally gotten rid of customers. Some of these cases seem morally questionable.

 

As reported on page 41 in the October 2007 Issue of PC World (“Companies to Customers: You’re Fired”, by Tom Spring) some companies have been terminating or degrading services. There are three main types of cases.

 

First, some ISPs like Comcast have started terminating service for residential users who use more bandwidth then the company deems suitable. This typically results from downloading large files and large numbers of files. While companies do have the right to deny service, Comcast advertises its service as unlimited. While this is a marketing term, it is also a term with a very clear meaning. “Unlimited” is, by definition, without limits. Hence, one cannot use the service too much.

 

It might be objected that “unlimited” is like “all you can eat”-it does still involve some limits. At an all you can eat buffet a person cannot stuff food into his pockets, pack it into a back pack or take food from the buffet and just keep dumping it in the trash. By analogy, there are some limits on “unlimited” service.

In reply, “unlimited” is much less restrictive than “all you can eat.” After all, the “eat” part takes care of such improper uses as throwing food away or saving it for later. “Unlimited”, as mentioned above, is quite clear in its meaning. If Comcast wishes to terminate service for people using too much bandwidth, then they need to make that part of the contract and they must not advertise their service as unlimited. If they meet those conditions, then they can justly terminate service for excess use.

 

Second, some phone companies have started terminating service for customers who make “excessive” calls to customer service or roam too often (Sprint Nextel) and others have restricted or terminated services for customers who roam or use the data services too often. As with Comcast, this sort of behavior is fine provided that the details are spelled out in the contracts. However, as with Comcast, some companies advertise their digital services as being unlimited when these services are not actually unlimited-as some customers found out when their services were terminated. A better solution would be to be honest about how the service is really handled and then provide suitable fees to motivate people to comply. And if people do not, then the company will have no reason to terminate their contracts-after all, they will be making suitable profits.

 

Interestingly, The New York State Consumer Protection Board has contended that Sprint should pay the terminated customers $200 each-the fee Sprint charges to customers who terminate their contracts early. From a moral standpoint this is certainly fair. After all, the justifications Sprint uses for such fees can simply be used by the customers who have had their contracts terminated early.

 

Third, as most people know, Netflix offers a service in which a customer can get an unlimited number of DVDs for a flat monthly subscription fee. Some customers use the service so much that Netflix is losing money. In retaliation, Netflix punishes them by giving those who rent fewer DVDs priority access to new titles. The company contends it is acting in a way that is “equitable.” However, this is not the case. If Netflix offers an unlimited service, it is unjust to punish customers who take advantage of what they are paying for. As with the other unlimited services, the company should be honest and upfront and simply refine its services so that they can maintain profits without having to resort to such tactics.

 

Thus, companies should avoid these problems by either ditching the use of the term “unlimited” (or similar terms) and clearly spelling out what the limits are. To punish customers for using what they pay for is unjust. Naturally, companies like to use terms like “unlimited”-it is a good marketing phrase and most customers will not take advantage of it. But, when a promise is made, it must be kept. After all, most companies expect their customers to abide by their contracts and they retaliate when they do not.

For Doug: Yes, Al-Qaeda is Evil.

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My conservative friend Doug pointed out that although I have been critical of the Bush administrations endorsement of torture and its violations of privacy rights I have failed to argue that Al Qaeda is evil for conducting terrorist attacks and cutting off heads. I initially thought that, given my criticism of torture, it would be safe to assume that I would be morally opposed to beheadings and the murder of innocents. But, for the sake of making my views clear, I will argue that Al Qaeda is evil. I’ll focus on their terrorist attacks and beheadings.

Terrorist attacks, of the sort conducted by Al Qaeda, are evil. Their beheadings are also evil. In support of this claim, consider what would be considered morally acceptable reasons to kill people. In general, these moral reasons fall into three broad categories. The first is that the people killed deserve to be killed. For example, they have committed acts that justify their deaths. This sort of justification is applied in cases such as the capital punishment of murderers. The second is that while the people do not deserve to be killed, they may legitimately be killed for other morally relevant reasons. For example, it is generally accepted that the killing of a soldier in battle is not an evil action (there are obviously exceptions). The third is that the people killed died as the result of actions that are otherwise justified. Such deaths, it might be said, are regrettable but acceptable if they were unavoidable. For example, civilian causalities are generally accepted in war provided that certain conditions have been met (they were in a legitimate target area such as a munitions factory, etc.) Such deaths might also be justified on consequentialist grounds-while regrettable, if the deaths are the result of actions that create more good than evil, then they would be morally justified.

In the case of the terror attacks and beheadings, the people killed generally do not deserve to die. Terror attacks, in particular, are often aimed at the general population and often kill young children. At the very least, the children cannot deserve to die. After all, they almost certainly have not done anything that warrants death. Further, terrorist attacks are generally intended to create terror-as such, they strike at the general population and not on the basis that the targets deserve to die.

In regards to the second justification, it might be argued that terrorist attacks are acceptable because they are fighting a war that recognizes no distinction between soldiers and civilians so that everyone is a legitimate target-even infants. The main flaw with this view is that it simply ignores all morally relevant distinctions. By failing to recognize the distinction between an armed combatant in a war zone and a baby in a day care center this view is clearly morally unacceptable. It might be replied that my reply begs the question-after all, the position being argued against is that there are no such moral distinctions. However, it is those who hold this position that are begging the question. Our moral intuitions clearly indicate that an infant is morally distinct from an armed soldier on the battlefield. Hence, the burden of proof rests on those who would advocate that the murder of children is morally acceptable.

The third justification is the most plausible. After all, in its war on terror the United States has inflicted civilian casualties and these have been deemed acceptable in some cases. It is, as has often been argued, one of the necessary consequences of war. Since defeating terror is a moral goal, the deaths of civilians (by accident) can be morally justified in terms of that goal. The terrorist can, of course, use the same logic.

On the face of it, the argument would seem to work-unless, of course, one is willing to condemn all killing of innocent people. That moral position would be quite laudable. It would also, some might say, ignore the realities of war.

Even allowing that the United States tolerates civilian deaths, one important moral distinction is that the United States does not intentionally set out to kill civilians. For example, in Iraq the American policy is to kill combatants and terrorists while avoiding civilian deaths as much as possible. Soldiers who murder civilians are treated as criminals and punished. Al Qaeda takes a different approach-they have shown their willingness to murder anyone. That is certainly relevant difference. Of course, since the argument is on consequentialist grounds, it could be replied that what matters is the consequences.

Al Qaeda purports to have a moral goal that justifies their murders. However, this does not seem to be the case. They do use moral language and invoke God, but their end seems to certainly lack moral purity. The fact they are willing to use such terrible means when moral means would serve as well ( or better) does more to reveal the truth about Al Qaeda than their words. They are clearly evil people doing evil things to achieve evil ends. So there, Doug.

Hate Crimes

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Recent news stories have brought hate crimes into the national spotlight. A hate crime is defined in terms of the criminal’s motivations. Put in general terms, a hate crime occurs when the criminal targets someone because of his/her membership in a specific group. Typically, the group is defined in terms of race, religion, sexuality, nationality, age, gender, political affiliation or other such factor. While the name seems to suggest that hate is the defining factor, committing a crime that is motivated by hate is not a sufficient condition for a hate crime. For example, if Bill (a Caucasian) beats Sam (also a Caucasian) to death with a tire iron over the course of several hours because he hates Sam for being successful, then no hate crime has been committed. If Bill throws a beer can at Juan (a Hispanic) while yelling a racist slogan about Juan’s ethnicity, then he has (potentially) committed a hate crime.

 

The importance of defining something as a hate crime is that it typically changes the legal seriousness of the action. For example, suppose that Alice and Bill commit crimes that are otherwise the same. If Bill commits a hate crime and Alice does not, then Bill will typically receive a more severe punishment than Alice. This raises important questions about the justification of such disparity.

 

On one hand, there do seem to be good grounds for punishing hate crimes more severely. One reasonable justification can be found in the fact that motive is a relevant factor in assessing a crime. As an obvious example, if Alice kills Jane it makes a great difference whether she killed Jane to protect herself from a senseless attack or because she was angry about Jane sleeping with her husband. Another reasonable justification can be found in the fact that punishment is often intended to bring about a social good. Many of the relevant groups, such as those based on race, sexual orientation or gender, have often been given far less protection in the past. For example, in the United States African Americans were often subject to terrible crimes (such as lynching) and the wrongdoers were not punished. By having special punishments for crimes against members of such groups, a message is sent that such evil will no longer be tolerated.

It might be objected that the law should simply be enforced and that the special punishment is unjustified because punishments should match the crime. It can be replied that “over-punishment” is needed to make sure that the message is clear and also to make it more likely that the deterrence will be effective. After all, one might argue, the more severe the punishment, the greater the deterrence value.

On the other hand, there seem to be grounds for questioning the disparity. One thing worth considering is that while motive is an important factor in assessing a crime, there seem to be cases in which the distinction would not warrant a different punishment. For example, if Alice kills Jane because she hates Jane for being so pretty, then Alice has clearly done something very wrong and should be punished for murder. But, suppose that Alice kills Jane because she hates her for being Hispanic. Morally, the cases seem the same. Both involve murder that is motivated by hatred. Further, the situations involve factors that are accidental in the philosophical sense: Alice did not choose to be born pretty nor did she choose to be born Hispanic. In both cases, Alice is killed because Jane hates a quality about Alice that clearly does not warrant such hatred. In either case, Alice is just as dead and the motive is hatred. From a moral standpoint, there would be no reasonable justification for punishing Jane more in one case than in the other-the harm and the motives are morally equal.

It might be objected that the hate crime is worse. After all, if Jane killed Alice for being Hispanic, then Jane is, in a way, attacking all Hispanics. This makes the crime worse. The obvious reply is that if Jane killed Alice because she hates pretty people, then she would be attacking all pretty people. Thus the crimes would be on par.

It might be further objected that perhaps hate crimes should be defined so that any crime based on group membership would be a hate crime. The obvious problem with this is that everyone belongs to many groups, so it would seem that all crimes would be hate crimes. Naturally, it could be said that the motivation has to be based on the person being part of a group, so that a crime aimed at an individual for other reasons would not be a hate crime. For example, if Jan stabbed Carl because she wanted to steal his wallet, that would not be a hate crime (unless, of course, it is a hate crime directed against people who have wallets). If she stabbed him for being a transsexual, then it would be a hate crime.

Naturally, in either case Carl would still be stabbed and presumably the motive would not be his main worry. Of course, this then again raises the question about whether the motive in such cases would be a relevant difference. From the standpoint of Carl, it does not seem to be a relevant difference-what seems to matter is that he was stabbed by a person who was acting from an evil intent in both cases. Thus, it does seem that while the motive can be a relevant factor in assessing a crime, the distinction between crimes committed from hate and crimes committed out of other evil motivations does not seem relevant in assessing the just punishment.

A second factor worth considering is that punishing people more severely in order to send a message seems unjust. If punishing people more for committing a hate crime is intended to deter hate crimes, the same logic should apply across the board. If it is justified in the case of hate crimes, then it would also be justified in the case of other crimes. Unless, of course, it is somehow less important to prevent crimes then it is to prevent hate crimes. In this case, the disparity would be justified. However, this does not seem to be a justifiable position. One point well worth making is that hate crimes are often more brutal and vicious than “regular” crimes. In such cases they should be punished more severely. This is not because they are hate crimes, but because they would be worse crimes regardless of the motive of the evildoer(s).

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