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California Consumer Privacy Act

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California recently implemented a consumer privacy act aimed at giving consumers a choice about companies selling their personal data. The law is not just a matter of concern for Californians; because it is an economic powerhouse, the state has considerable influence. My home state of Maine, which has far less influence than California, has a similar law. As would be suspected, such laws are philosophically interesting.

One general concern involves the matter of scope: should such privacy laws be handled by the states or the federal government? One compelling reason for having the federal government handle such privacy concerns is that state boundaries are essentially non-existent when it comes to data and privacy concerns. After all, people around the country routinely make purchases online and use online services across state boundaries. There is also the consistency argument: it is easier for business and consumers to have one law to deal with rather than fifty. There are some reasons to oppose a federal law, such as concerns that lobbyists would craft the federal law to the advantage of certain companies and to the detriment of consumers. There is also the argument based on the idea that states are best positioned to look out for their citizens, which has some appeal. In general, I do favor having a federal standard—if only to make things easier for everyone, especially small businesses that would face the challenge of trying to sort through up to fifty different sets of rules for privacy.

While privacy seems to be intuitively good, it is worth briefly considering reasons why such privacy protection is good. One approach, which should appeal to the fans of private property, is to build an argument based on the Lockean notion that people own the product of their labor. In this case, the labor would be the creation and providing of information. While a person can sell the product of this labor, to take it from them by fraud or force would be theft and thus consent would be needed.

An analogy can also be drawn to the creation of any product, such as this essay. Once I have created it, it is mine to do with as I wish (within certain boundaries). But if someone else takes this essay and sells it without my permission, they have engaged in what is obviously theft. While personal data is obviously not identical to an intentionally created product like an essay, program or vase, the analogy certainly seems reasonable.

The matter can also be looked at the other way, by raising the obvious question of what would entitle the company or other entity collecting personal data to sell it without permission. One could argue that they put effort into collecting it, but media and software pirates could make the same argument. The burden of proof is on those who would claim those collecting the data have the right to sell it without permission; this is because such behavior would intuitively seem to be data piracy.

As should be evident, I favor laws protecting consumer privacy in this manner, largely because I also favor laws protecting creators from having their work stolen. I am, however, fine with consumers freely choosing to use their data as currency and exchanging it for goods and services—provided that the exchange does not result from force or fraud. Such informed exchanges would, I think, be better for consumers and companies in the long run. Some companies will, of course, want to be able to steal from consumers—but theft is hardly a just business model.

One problematic aspect of California’s law is that government is exempt from the law. In many cases it makes sense that the state can require people to provide personal data. For example, someone applying for a driver’s license needs to provide private data for obvious reasons. The real concern is that the exemption allows the government to sell personal data without the permission of citizens. The California DMV currently sells the data it collects to third parties. Looked at with a suspicious eye, the law does not so much protect personal data as give the government a significant advantage over the private sector. While some consumers will still allow companies to sell their data or be willing to trade data for goods and services, the state does not give people a choice: if you want a driver’s license, then your data will be sold by the state. This presumably also applies to some other data collected by the state.

While the state might not collect as broad a range of consumer data as private companies, the state exemption effectively nullifies some of the law: some data that you might refuse to let a company sell because you want to keep it private could end up being sold by the state, thus negating the supposed protection of the law.

It could be countered that this is acceptable because the state is doing it and the money will be state revenue used for the good of the people. The obvious reply is that this does nothing to address privacy concerns—someone who does not want their data out there is not worried about who is making money from their loss of privacy, they are worried about the loss of privacy. As such, people should have the same right to refuse to allow the state to sell their data, otherwise the law is unfair to businesses and its ability to protect privacy is weakened significantly.

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Abortion & Regulation

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As J.S. Mill noted in his book On Liberty, people generally do not limit liberty in a principled and consistent way. Rather, they impose or oppose restrictions based on unreasoned likes and dislikes. The political, moral and legal issues of abortion are, obviously enough, areas where this occurs.

Conservatives purport to oppose regulations and favor liberty; yet they tend to support imposing strict and even harsh restrictions on abortion. Liberals purport to favor regulations to protect people, yet also tend to accept abortion. This apparent inconsistency raises the interesting problem of working out a consistent moral position regarding liberty and regulation. I will begin with the generic conservative and then move on to the generic liberal while noting that I understand there are nuanced positions.

While it is a stereotype, conservatives are often cast as opposing many regulations aimed at protecting people from harm. For example, environmental regulations are generally supposed to be aimed at protecting people from toxins. As another example, safety regulations for products and business operations are supposed to be aimed at protecting consumers and workers. Naturally enough, few conservatives will say that they oppose protecting people; however, they argue against such regulations by claiming that they harm business and thus “kill jobs” and limit profits. Some will contend that the claims about the dangers of things like pollution are simply fabrications by liberals who are motivated by their hatred of capitalism.

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Pushing aside the rhetoric, an objective look at the general conservative stance towards regulations of this sort is that they are willing to tolerate harms, such as the deaths of children from pollution, as part of the cost of economic advantages. This is a utilitarian/consequentialist approach: a certain amount of harm (pollution, safety issues, health problems, etc.) is an acceptable price to pay for the economic advantages. This is also a cost-shifting approach: the cost is moved from the business to those impacted by the weak or lack of regulations. For example, weak regulations on pollution and environmental damage allow businesses to make more profits because they do not need to pay the full costs of these harms. They are instead shifted on to the people impacted by then. To give a specific illustration, allowing toxins to go out of a factory saves the company money, but costs those exposed to the toxin in terms of their health and economically, if only from health care costs. The idea is, in general terms, that the interests of business outweigh the interests of those harmed—even when those harmed are the unborn and young children. This is a classic consequentialist approach for resolving competing interests.

In the case of abortion, the conservatives generally profess to be against it. This is generally presented in moral and religious terms of how life is sacred, that the unborn must be protected from harm, and so on. They do not, of course, present it as imposing on liberty. The obvious problem with this position on abortion is that it directly contradicts their professed position on regulations aimed at protecting people: they oppose such regulations by arguing in favor of economic interests. Obviously enough, if it is acceptable to allow harm to the unborn when doing so is in the interest of those doing the harm, this general principle must also be applied to abortion as well—it should be acceptable when the interests of the woman outweighs that of the unborn.

This line of reasoning can be countered on utilitarian grounds: allowing businesses to harm to the unborn for economic interests outweighs the harms; allowing women to have abortions when it is in their interest does not. This could also be argued by contending that women matter less (or not at all) in the calculation, unless they are in business and harming the unborn via business activity. This approach, while honest, does seem terrible: the unborn should not be harmed, unless doing so is profitable for the right economic interests. As noted above, liberals also run into a problem here.

While it is a stereotype, liberals are supposed to favor regulation that protects people—even when doing so imposes considerable economic costs. They are also supposed to be pro-choice and support the liberty of a woman to have an abortion.

When arguing for protective regulations, one approach is to do so on utilitarian grounds: protecting people from harm creates more good than bad, even when the economic harms are factored in. There is also the fairness argument: when businesses can shift the costs to the people being harmed by their activities, this is stealing from those people. And, of course, there is the more deontological approach (that actions are good or bad in themselves) that allowing people to be harmed is just wrong.

The utilitarian justification can, obviously enough, be used to justify abortion: the benefits gained outweigh the harm done. Obviously not for the unborn, though. This suggests that the same approach can also justify opposing protective regulations—if it is acceptable to kill the unborn when doing so is in one’s interest, then this would apply both to abortion and business.

The fairness argument, also quite obviously, also seems to tell against abortion: the cost is being imposed on the unborn—they are killed for the interests of another; which seems analogous to cost shifting in business. The deontological approach would also seem to tell against abortion: if regulation is needed to protect the unborn from the harm of pollution and such, then it would also be needed to protect them from abortion.

It is important to note that I am not addressing in this essay the matter of which position is correct. Rather, my objective has been to map up the conflict between views of protective regulations and abortion. Pro-life folks should be for protective regulation across the board, or have a reasonable argument why aborting the unborn is wrong but killing them through environmental pollution is acceptable. Pro-choice folks should be tolerant of the liberty to harm others when doing so is in one’s interest, or have a reasonable argument why aborting the unborn is acceptable but harming them with pollution is not. I am confident that wise thinkers can easily address these minor challenges.

 

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The High Price of Being Shot

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In the naivety of my youth, I believed that people would not be charged for medical treatment resulting from being wounded by criminals. After all, my younger self reasoned, their injuries were the fault of someone else and it would be unjust to expect them to pay for the misdeeds of another. Learning that this was not the case was just one of the many disappointments when it came to the matter of justice and ethics. As such, I was not surprised when I learned that shooting victims were presented with the bills for their treatment. However, I was somewhat surprised by the high cost of being shot.

Dr. Joseph Sakran, who had been shot in his youth, co-authored a study of what shooting victims are charged for their treatment. Since gunshot wounds range from relatively minor grazing wounds to massive internal damage, the costs vary considerably. While the average is $5,000 the cost can go up to $100,000. These costs are generally covered by insurance, but victims who lack proper coverage become victims once again: they must either pay for the treatment or pass on the cost as part of the uncompensated care. When the cost is passed on, the patient can suffer from severely damaged credit and, of course, the cost is passed on others in the form of premium increases. There can be costs beyond the initial medical bills, such as ongoing medical bills, the loss of income, and the psychological harm.

In addition to medical expenses of those who are shot, there are also the costs of the police response, the impact on employers, and the dollar value of those who are killed rather than wounded (and do not forget that dying in the hospital obviously does not automatically clear the bill). While estimating the exact cost is difficult, a mass shooting like the Pulse Nightclub shooting will probably end up costing almost $400 million. While mass shootings, such as the recent one in Las Vegas, get the attention of the media, gunshot wounds are a regular occurrence in the United States with an estimated cost of $600 million per day. While some will dispute the exact numbers, what is indisputable is that getting shot is expensive for the victim and society. As such, it would be rational to try to reduce the number of shootings and to address the high cost of being shot.

While the rational approach to such a massive health crisis would be to undertake a scientific study to find solutions, the 1996 Dickey Amendment bans the use of federal funding for gun research. There is also very little good data about gun injuries and deaths—and this is quite intentional. Efforts to improve the collection of data are dealt with by such things as the Dickey Amendment. Efforts to impose more gun control, even when there is overwhelming public support for such things as universal background checks, are routinely blocked. While this serves as a beautiful object lesson in how much say the people have in this democracy, it also shows that trying to address the high cost of getting shot by reducing shootings is a noble fool’s errand. As such, the only practical options involve finding ways to offset the medical costs of victims. Naturally, victims can bring civil suits—but this is not a reliable and effective way to ensure that the medical expenses are covered. After all, mass shooters are rarely wealthy enough to pay all the bills and often perish in their attack.

Some victims have attempted to address their medical bills in the same way others who lack insurance have tried—by setting up GoFundMe pages to get donations. While this option is problematic in many ways, the main problem is that it is not very reliable. This, of course, lays aside the moral problem of having people begging so they can pay for being victims of a shooting. To address this problem, I will make two modest proposals.

My first proposal is that gun owners be required to purchase a modestly priced insurance policy that is analogous to vehicle insurance. In the United States, people are generally required to have insurance to cover the damage they might inflict while operating a dangerous piece of machinery. This helps pool the risk (as insurance is supposed to do) and puts the cost on the operators of the machines rather than on those who they might harm. The same should apply to guns—they are dangerous machines that can do considerable harm and it makes sense that the owners should bear the cost of the insurance. Naturally, as with vehicles, owners can also be victims.

It could be objected that owning a firearm is a right and hence the state has no right to impose such a requirement. The easy and obvious reply is that the right to keep and bear arms is a negative right rather than a positive right. A positive right is one in which a person is entitled to be provided with the means to use that right (such as how people are provided with free ballots when they go to vote). A negative right means the person must provide the means of exercising their right, but it is (generally) wrong to prevent them from exercising that right. So, just as the state is not required to ensure that people get free guns and ammunition, it is not required to allow gun ownership without insurance—provided that the requirement does not impose an unreasonable infringement on the right.

Another easy and obvious reply is that rights do not free a person from responsibility. In the case of speech, people cannot simply say anything without consequence. In the case of the gun insurance, people would be acting in a responsible manner—they would be balancing their right with a rational amount of responsibility. To refuse to have such insurance is to insist on rights without responsibility—something conservatives normally rail against. As such, both liberals and conservatives should approve of this idea.

My second proposal, which is consistent with the first, is that there be a modest state fee added to the cost of each firearm, accessory and ammunition box. This money would go into a state pool to help pay the medical expenses of the uninsured who are injured in shootings. Yes, I know that this money would probably be misused by most states, probably to bankroll the re-election of incumbents. The justification is, of course, that the people who buy the guns that could hurt people should bear the cost for the medical expenses of those who are hurt. People already pay sales taxes on such items, this would merely earmark some money to help offset the cost of people exercising their second amendment rights. To go back to the vehicle analogy, it makes perfect sense to add a fee onto the cost of gas to pay for roads and other infrastructure—that way the people who are using it are helping to pay for it. Likewise for guns.

An obvious objection is that this fee would be paid by people who will never engage in gun crime. This is a reasonable concern, analogous to other concerns about paying into anything that one is not directly responsible for. There are two reasonable replies. One is that the funds generated could cover medical expenses involving any firearm crime or accident and anyone can have an accident with a gun. Another is the responsibility argument: while I, as a gun owner, will probably never engage in a gun crime, being able to exercise my right to own guns allows people who will engage in gun crimes to engage in those crimes. For example, the Las Vegas shooter was operating under the protection of the same gun rights that protect me up until the moment he started firing. This fee would be my share of the responsibility for allowing the threat of gun violence to endanger everyone in the United States. Such a modest fee would be a very small price to pay for having such a dangerous right. Otherwise, I would be selfishly expecting everyone else to bear the cost of my right, which would not be right. So, to appeal to principled conservatives, this would be a way for taking responsibility for one’s rights. As people love to say, freedom isn’t free.

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Free Speech & Feeling Unsafe

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A somewhat recent talking point on the right is that “the liberals” are trying to violate the free speech rights of conservatives. On the one hand, this is a hasty generalization: the left counts among its numbers some of the staunchest advocates of free expression who defend the right of conservatives to engage in free expression. On the other hand, there are those on the left who are actively trying to silence conservative voices. That said, is important to distinguish between attempts to silence people and legitimate acts of protest.

To illustrate, the incident involving Charles Murray at Middlebury College illustrates how some people try to unjustly silence those they disagree with. In contrast, the students at Notre Dame who walked out on Vice President Pence’s speech were engaged in a legitimate protest—they expressed their disagreement without harassing or silencing pence. However, the Pence incident had an interesting twist that is well worth considering.

Two of the students who walked out on Pence’s speech explained their motivation: “The walkout was in response to the fact that members of our own community felt unwelcome, uncomfortable, and even unsafe…” I do understand why having Mike Pence speak would make some people feel unwelcome and uncomfortable—after all, Pence makes no secret of his views on various social and moral issues. No doubt some conservative students would feel just as unwelcome and uncomfortable in the presence of a liberal speaker. While I do think speakers should endeavor to make their audience welcome and comfortable, this is not a moral obligation on the part of speakers—especially on college campuses. A key part of education is being pushed outside of one’s comfort zone in terms of such things as values, beliefs and ideology. Students do, of course, have every right to resist being pushed out of this zone; but this is typically their loss when they succeed. The students might have benefited from enduring Pence’s words; but they did have the right to refuse to listen. After all, the right of free expression means that one should not be silenced, not that one can compel others to pay attention.

What is worrisome is the use of the term “unsafe.” When I first heard some vague details about this episode, I initially thought the students were concerned that there might be violence at the event—as has happened elsewhere. That would, of course, be legitimate grounds for concerns about safety. After all, to feel unsafe is to feel that one is at risk for harm. However, after listening to a discussion of the incident on NPR, I realized that the claim was that Pence’s mere presence as a speaker made people feel unsafe. They did not, obviously, think that Pence would attack them physically.

One way to interpret the matter is that people thought they would be harmed in some meaningful way by Pence’s presence and his words. While people can certainly inflict harm with words, it would seem to be an odd use of “unsafe” in the context of the Vice President giving a speech. But perhaps some people are so lacking in resilience that the expression of ideas they do not like or the presence of someone they disagree with can cause harm to them. In this case, they would thus be wise to leave the area before sustaining such harm. To use an analogy, if someone was so sensitive to noise that a speech would cause them pain, they should not attend the speech. They do not, however, have the right to insist that the speech not be made simply because they would experience pain.

A second, and more plausible way, to interpret this is that “unsafe” is referring to a stronger version of being uncomfortable and not a feeling that meaningful danger is imminent. While words mean what they do as a matter of convention, shifting the meaning of words in this manner is problematic for communication. As noted above, I initially thought the students feared a riot, which caused some confusion. Another potential problem is that using “unsafe” in this context makes the expression of ideas that one does not like seem dangerous. While this might be a rhetorical point the students were trying to make to justify walking out, this is a misuse of the language. To be specific, it is hyperbole that serves to distort the matter by conflating merely being uncomfortable with being in danger. Because of these problems, the term “unsafe” should not be used in such contexts. Instead, it should be used for cases in which there is an actual threat to safety and rights. Such as the push by some against free expression by conservatives.

 

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Bathroom Laws

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One way to approach the moral issue of whether transgender people should be able to choose their bathrooms is to consider the matter in utilitarian terms. This would involve weighing the harms inflicted by denying this choice against the harms inflicted by granting it. In a democracy, this approach seems to a reasonable one—at least if it is believed that a democratic state should aim at the general good of the people.

A utilitarian assessment of the bathroom choice issue leads to an obvious conclusion: bathroom choice should be granted. As I have argued in another essay, the two main arguments against bathroom choice fail in the face of due consideration and facts. One argument is that allowing bathroom choice would put people in danger. Since some states have already allowed bathroom choice, there is data about the danger presented by such choice. Currently, the evidence shows that there is no meaningful danger. As some wits enjoy pointing out, more Republican lawmakers have been arrested for bathroom misconduct than transgender people. As such, those worried about misdeeds in bathrooms should be focusing on that threat. The other argument is the privacy argument, which falls apart under analysis.

While those advancing these arguments might honestly believe in them, it might be suspected that the prime motivation for opposing bathroom choice is a dislike of transgender people—the “transgender people are icky argument.” This “argument” has no merit on the face of it, which is why it is not advanced as a reason by opponents of bathroom choice.

One stock problem with utilitarian arguments is that they can be used to justify the violation of rights. This problem typically arises in cases in which the benefits received by a numerical majority come at the expense of harms done to a numerical minority. However, it can also arise in cases where the greater benefits to a numerical minority outweigh the lesser harms to a numerical majority. In the case at hand, those opposed to bathroom choice could argue that even if bathroom choice benefits transgender people far more than it harms people who oppose bathroom choice, the rights of anti-choice people are being violated. This then makes the matter a question of competing rights.

In the case of public bathroom facilities, such as student bathrooms at schools, members of the public have the right to use them—that is the nature of public goods. There are, however, reasonable limits placed on access. For example, people are generally not allowed to just wander off the street into schools to use the facilities. Likewise, the bathrooms in courthouses and government buildings are generally not open to anyone to wander off the street and use. So, there is a right to public bathrooms—but, like all rights, it does have its limits. It can thus be assumed that transgender people have bathroom rights as do people who oppose bathroom choice. What is in dispute is whether the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to not be forced to use bathrooms with transgender people.

Disputes over competing rights are often settled by utilitarian considerations, but the utilitarian argument already favors bathroom choice. As such, another approach is needed and a reasonable one is the consideration of which right has priority. This approach assumes that there is a hierarchy of rights and that one right can take precedent over another. Fortunately, this is intuitively appealing. For example, while people have a right to free expression, the right to not be unjustly harmed trumps it—which is why libel and slander are not protected by this right.

So, the bathroom issue comes down to this: does the right of a transgender person to choose their bathroom have priority over the right of an anti-choice person to not encounter transgender people in the bathroom? My inclination is that the right of the transgender person has priority over the anti-choice person. To support this, I will use an analogy to race.

Not so long ago, there were separate bathrooms for black and white people. When the bathrooms were to be integrated, there were dire warnings that terrible things would occur if bathrooms were integrated. Obviously enough, these terrible things did not take place. Whites could also have argued that they had a right to not be in the same bathroom as blacks. However, the alleged white right to not be in a bathroom with blacks does not seem to trump the right of blacks to use the bathroom. Likewise, the right of transgender people to choose their bathroom trumps the right of anti-choice people to exclude them.

It can be objected that if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then gender mixing will occur in the bathrooms. For example, one common sight at road races (such as 5Ks and marathons) are long lines leading to the women’s bathrooms and short lines (or no lines) for the men’s bathrooms. Women runners, desperate to lighten their load, might start going into the men’s room (they already sometimes do). Then terrible things might happen. Specifically, I might need to wait longer to pee before races. This is a case where my selfishness must outweigh my moral principles: though I have no moral objection to gender mixing of bathrooms, my selfish bladder says that I cannot give up my right to a shorter line. This makes me a bad person, but a bad person with a happy bladder. Yes, this is satire. Maybe.

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Wedding Cakes & Cartoon of Muhammad

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U.S Postage Stamp, 1957
U.S Postage Stamp, 1957 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

On May 3, 2015 the American Freedom Defense Initiative put on a contest in which cartoonists drew images of Muhammad for a cash prize. To most Muslims, such portrayals of Muhammad are deeply offensive—much in the way that many Americans find the burning of the American flag offensive. As such, it is reasonable to infer that the event was intended to be provocative—the event was certainly well protected with armed security forces. As such, it was hardly shocking when two gunmen attacked the event. These armored and heavily armed men were killed by a traffic officer armed only with a pistol. ISIS has claimed credit for the attack, although it is currently unclear if the terrorist group had a direct role.

As I have argued in previous essays, the use of violence in response to offensive artwork or other forms of expression is not warranted. As such, there is no need to re-hash those arguments to support the claim that the attack on the event was morally wrong. Outside of the realm of violent extremists, I doubt there is much dispute over this point. As such, I will proceed to the main matter I wish to focus on.

But a short while ago, Indiana was making headlines with its religious freedom act. There is also the recurring talking point that religious liberty and religion are under attack in America. One example given of the threat to religious liberty was the requirement that employers of a certain size provide insurance coverage that covered birth control for full-time employees. Another example of the threat is the steady march towards legalization in all 50 states by same sex-marriage. A third example is that many states have laws that forbid discrimination against people because of their sexual orientation. This is supposed to violate religious liberty by forbidding, for example, a Christian baker to discriminate against a same-sex couple that wants to buy a wedding cake.

Though I have written extensively about these specific matters, my general view is based on the principle that religious rights do not allow a person a right to violate the legitimate rights of others. To use an easy and obvious example, a faith that claimed human sacrifice as a basic tenet of its faith would justly be denied the right to engage in this practice. After all, the right to life trumps the right to practice one’s faith on others against their will.

In the case of discrimination against same-sex couples, I follow the same principle: the freedom of religion is bounded by the principle of harm. Since same-sex couples are members of the civil society and being able to engage in free commerce is a basic right in capitalism, to deny them the right to goods and services because of their sexual orientation would harm them. While it might be countered that selling a cake to a same-sex couple would harm the Christian baker, it is not clear what harm is being done. After all, she is making a sale and the sale of an item is not an endorsement of the purchaser. If, for example, Nazis are buying my books on Amazon, I am not thereby endorsing Nazism.

In the case of a company being required to provide coverage that covers birth control, the company does not seem to be harmed by this. The company is not required to use birth control, directly hand it to the employees, or endorse birth control. They are merely required to provide employees with the opportunity to have such coverage if they so desire it. It is, in fact, a form of compensation—it certainly does not violate the rights of an employer if employers spend their salaries as they wish—even on birth control.

While the laws that are purported to defend religious freedom do not, for obvious reasons, specify that they are aimed at defending a specific variety of Christianity, it does seem fairly evident that the concern is not about defending religion in general. If it were, the event in which people competed to draw cartoons of Muhammad would have been condemned by all the folks supporting the religious “freedom” laws and those who claim religion is under attack in America. After all, holding an event explicitly aimed at mocking a religion and provoking members of a faith would seem to be an attack on religion. This sort of event would certainly seem more of an attack on religion than forbidding bakers from discriminating against same-sex couples.

While I think people should not engage in such offensive behavior (I also believe that people should not burn American flags or piss on crosses), my consistency requires that I must accept the freedom of people to engage in such offensive behavior. This is, as with the case of the wedding cake, based on the principle of harm: restricting freedom of expression because the expression is offensive creates more harm than it prevents. Part of this is because while there is a right to freedom of expression and it can be wrong to offend people, there is no right to a freedom from being offended. That said, members of civil society do fall under moral expectations of polite behavior. So, while there is no right to forbid people from pissing on crosses, burning American flags or drawing cartoons of Muhammad, a decent human being will consider her actions and act with respect for the views of others. That is what good people do. I admit, I have not always lived up to that myself and that is a failing on my part.

It is, of course, possible to cross from mere offense to actual harm. This boundary is, unfortunately, not always sharp and admits of many gray zones. Fortunately, though, the principle is clear: mere offensiveness does not warrant forbiddance and religious freedom does not warrant unjustly imposing on the rights of others.

 

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