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The Logic of Conspiracy Theories IV: Best Explanation—Argument by Elimination

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As discussed in the previous essays on this subject, conspiracy theorists often use the methods of critical thinking to support and defend their theories. One method, which is a core component of scientific reasoning, is the inference to the best explanation. As the name suggests, this reasoning aims at finding the best explanation and this typically involves pitting competing explanations against each other until the best emerges.

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This reasoning can be seen as a version of the argument by elimination. This argument has two basic forms. One version is the total elimination method in which the goal is to show that something cannot be the case. The idea is to present all possible options, refute all of them and then conclude the total elimination. As an example, Kant used this method to argue that the existence of God cannot be proven (and that it could not be disproven). His reasoning was as follows:

Premise 1: There are only three possible ways to prove the existence of God: the teleological argument, the ontological argument and the cosmological argument.

Premise 2: None of these arguments can succeed in proving the existence of God.

Conclusion: There is no way to prove the existence of God.

While this is a valid deductive argument (if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true), showing that it is also sound (valid plus all true premises) is the real challenge. Doing so requires showing that there are only three ways to prove God’s existence and that they all must fail.

Since this method aims at total elimination, it is only useful in this context when trying to argue that no explanation is possible.

The second version is like a marathon: the competition runs until one victor emerges from the pack. In its simplest form (which has but two options), it can be presented as a disjunctive syllogism:

Premise 1:  P or Q

Premise 2: Not Q

Conclusion: P

It can also be expanded to include potentially infinite options:

Premise 1: P or Q or R or …

Premise 2: Not Q and Not R and Not…

Conclusion: P

This sort of reasoning is often used in mystery/crime stories: if there are only five possible suspects and one of them did it, then elimination four of them will reveal the culprit.  This presentation can be misleading, however. While the logic is valid, to avoid committing the fallacy of false dilemma it must be the case that the two (or more) options that are presented are the only viable options. To the degree that other options remain a possibility, the truth of the first premises remains in doubt.

Conspiracy theorists (and many others) sometimes make the mistake of falling into a false dilemma when they claim that their refutation of their main competitor(s) proves their theory. For example, a flat-earther might reason like this:

Premise 1: The earth is flat or the earth is a sphere.

Premise 2: The earth is not a sphere.

Conclusion: The earth is flat.

The obvious problem is that while the best-known proposed earths are the spherical earth and the flat earth, this does not entail that those are the only options. There are, after all, many other shapes in geometry and the flat option only wins by elimination when all those shapes have also been eliminated.

It is at this point that a skeptic can argue that one can never be sure that all the options have been considered, so one can never know that the right explanation has been found. After all, the skeptic can say, the right explanation might not even be in the competition. This fact is sometimes used by conspiracy theorists to cast doubts on an accepted explanation—this explanation might be the best among the known explanations, but not the true explanation. Unfortunately for the conspiracy theorist, this same doubt also applies to the explanation they advance so they need more than this doubt to support their own explanation.

While the skeptic might be right about the impossibility of certainty, it is still possible to hold the competition between the known explanations while always keeping in mind that alternatives have been missed. But the mere fact that there could be missed alternatives does not itself show that a good explanation has not been found. To use an analogy, think of a career. While there might be a better match for a person out there, this does not entail that their current career is not a good one (or even the best). After all, the career can be assessed by various standards and against the known alternatives. The same holds for explanations. So, while the possibility of unknown explanations should be kept in mind, their mere possibility should not be taken as refuting an explanation.

 The second challenge is that of establishing the second premise—eliminating the competition.

To the degree that the elimination of the other explanations is in doubt, the truth of the second premise remains in doubt. This leads to the matter of how explanations compete, which is the subject of the next essay in this series.

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The Logic of Conspiracy Theories III: Argument by Example

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As noted in the previous essays in the series, people who believe in conspiracy theories can use good methods of argumentation to establish their claims. As such, it would be an error to simply dismiss such folks as automatically being irrational or illogical. In this essay I will briefly look at how the argument by example can be used to support a conspiracy theory and how-to asses such reasoning to avoid accepting weak arguments.

An argument by example is, obviously enough, when one tries to support a conclusion by presenting examples. It has the following form, although people generally present it informally:

          Premise 1: Example 1 is an example that supports claim P.

          Premise n: Example n is an example that supports claim P.

          Conclusion: Claim P is true.

In this case n is a variable standing for the number of the premise in question and P is a variable standing for the claim under consideration. To use a non-conspiracy example, a politician might argue that they are competent in foreign policy by giving examples of their success in this area.

There are a variety of ways this argument can be used in the context of conspiracy theories. One is to argue for the existence of conspiracies in general by providing examples that purport to show that conspiracies do occur. For example, a Flat Earther might try to prove that it is reasonable to believe that supposedly proven science can be a hoax or conspiracy by giving examples of such occurrences (such as the Piltdown Man hoax).

While this approach is a legitimate use of the argument, to conclude from establishing the general claim that there have been conspiracies to a specific conspiracy theory being true would be an error in logic. To use an analogy, consider counterfeit art. It is easy to find many examples of counterfeit art and this nicely supports the conclusion that art has been counterfeited. But it would not follow that a specific work of art, such as the Mona Lisa, was thus a counterfeit.

 The second method is to argue for a specific conspiracy theory by presenting examples that support the theory. For example, someone who believes the Illuminati run the world would present examples of what they regard as the Illuminati in action and thus conclude their theory is correct. The question is, of course, whether the examples properly support the conclusion and this concern leads to the standards used to assess this argument.

First, the more examples, the stronger the argument. Second, the more relevant the examples, the stronger the argument. Using the Illuminati example as an illustration, the key concern would be whether the examples really do provide evidence of the illuminati. As should be suspected, this is where the main dispute would occur—the person arguing that the Illuminati is real would be seen by their critics as seeing things that are not there, while the proponent of the theory would think their critics blind.

Third, the examples must be specific and clearly identified. Vague and unidentified examples do not provide much in the way of support. Conspiracy theories are often supported by vague and unidentified examples, but sometimes they are quite precise and clearly identified. For example, the Illuminati theorist might point to a detailed and documented account of UN activities they see as example of the Illuminati influence.

 Fourth, counter-examples must be considered. A counter-example is an example that counts against the claim. One way to look at a counter example is that it is an example that supports the denial of the conclusion being argued for. The more counter-examples and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument. In the case of the Illuminati example, counter-examples could be cases that would tell against Illuminati control. One common failing of conspiracy theories is that such counter-examples are ignored or downplayed. As would be imagined, this can lead to a battle over whether the supposed counter-example is really a counter-example or not. For example, if someone advances the theory that the entire world is ruled by a super-competent Illuminati, counter-examples would include all the things that seem to arise from poor human decision making and ignorance. But, of course, a clever theorist can try to explain away these supposed counter-examples. For example, chaos, wars and economic disasters are not evidence against a global Illuminati, but all prove it does exist.

As such, conspiracy theorists who use the argument by example are not being irrational or illogical—they are using a basic inductive tool. The problem is with how they assess their examples and their failure to give due weight to counter-examples. That said, the battles over the relevance of examples, whether a counter-example is really a counter-example, and the weight given to examples is one that can become very complicated. As such, theorists who are willing to apply the standards and consider criticism should not be simply dismissed.

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The Logic of Conspiracy Theories II: Analogical Argument

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This essay continues the discussion of the logic of conspiracy theories. As noted in the previous essay, conspiracy theorists can make use of effective methods of inductive reasoning when arguing for their theory. While previously looking at the argument from authority, I will now look at the analogical argument.

An analogical argument is an argument in which one concludes that two things are alike in a certain respect because they are alike in other respects. An analogical argument will typically have three premises and a conclusion. The first premise two premises establish the analogy by showing that the things (X and Y) in question are similar in certain respects (properties P, Q, R, etc.).  The third premise establishes that X has an additional quality, Z. The conclusion asserts that Y has property or feature Z as well. The form looks like this:

          Premise 1: X has properties P,Q, and R.

          Premise 2: Y has properties P,Q, and R.

          Premise 3: X has property Z.

          Conclusion: Y has property Z.

While one might wonder how reasoning by analogy could lead to a conspiracy theory, it does make sense. If the property Z is taken as some key feature of a conspiracy theory, such as a company acting in an evil way with the collusion of the state, all that is needed to make the argument for a conspiracy theory is a case in which something is known to have that property. Then it is simply a manner of drawing the analogy.  For example, consider someone who thinks that vaccines are unsafe and that there is a conspiracy to present them as safe. They could make an analogical argument comparing what we know happened with opioids (pharmaceutical companies lying about the danger of opioids, doctors being bribed to prescribe, pharmacies going along with the prescriptions, and the state allowing it all) with what they think is true of vaccines. Looked at this way, inferring that the situation with vaccines is like the situation with opioids seems to be a decent argument. Yet, the theory of a vaccine conspiracy certainly seems wrong (in general). So, how does one sort assess this sort of argument? The answer is that one applies the following three standards.

First, the more properties X and Y have in common, the better the argument. The more two things are alike in other ways, the more likely it is that they will be alike in some other way. In the case of vaccines and opioids, there are many shared similarities; for example, both scenarios involve the same players (companies, doctors, pharmacies and the state).

Second, the more relevant the shared properties are to property Z, the stronger the argument. A specific property, for example P, is relevant to property Z if the presence or absence of P affects the likelihood that Z will be present.  Third, it must be determined whether X and Y have relevant dissimilarities as well as similarities. The more dissimilarities and the more relevant they are, the weaker the argument.

In the case of inferring a conspiracy to sell dangerous vaccines from the real opioid conspiracy one must weigh the similarities and differences. While there are clearly relevant similarities, there are some crucial differences. Most importantly, vaccines have been extensively tested and are known to be relatively safe. In contrast, all the scientific evidence supports what should be common sense: opioids are addictive and potential very dangerous. While the companies and doctors do want to make money off both, this does not entail that vaccines are not safe, even though opioids are quite dangerous.  While the analogy between the opioid conspiracy and the vaccine conspiracy breaks; there is nothing wrong with reasoning by analogy. If the standards are applied and relevant differences are considered, this method of reasoning is quite useful.

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The Crocodile’s Mouth

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“About a Secret Crocodile”, by R.A. Lafferty, is a clever conspiracy theory story. In this tale, Lafferty writes of a secret society called the Crocodile that controls “the attitudes and dispositions of the world.” He goes on to note that the Crocodile has various parts and that “…Powerful among these is a society of 399 persons that manufactures all the catchwords and slogans of the world. This subsociety is not completely secret since several members are mouthy: The code name of this apparatus is the Crocodile’s Mouth.”

In one of those wonderful coincidences, I happened to re-read this classic science fiction story shortly before watching various political pundits tossing out their talking points (“nuclear option”, “ramming it down America‘s throat”, “delay is our enemy”). Seeing them, I had to say “damn, look at those little crocodiles!”

While I am not a conspiracy theorist, it is certainly interesting to survey the various opinion makers, pundits, talking point parrots and others and see the incredible uniformity of ideas and phrases. In the case of politics, there is no need to seek out secret societies shaping attitudes and dispositions. It is largely done right out in the open, our Donkey and our Elephant (with his little buddy, Fox).

Naturally, it can be argued that this is just what political parties do: they use all the means at their disposal to shape the attitudes and dispositions of folks so as to acquire and keep power. “Nothing wrong with this, business as usual”, one might say.

Of course, it does seem reasonable to be concerned about such machinery that exists to shape the attitudes and dispositions of people. After all, while they cannot (as of yet) practice true mind control, they can shape public opinion in ways quite contrary to what is best for the public. This can be said of both the Democrats and the Republicans. While folks do like to think that the fact that there two parties gives us a choice, this is not really much of a choice. True, the Donkey and the Elephant do battle it out, but they do so in a very limited way. At the end of the day,one might say, the same basic sort of politician is always elected.  There is, unfortunately, no real opposition to the overall Crocodile, the beast that defines how politics as a whole is conducted. In fact, there can be no real opposition: a new group would just be another organ of the Crocodile. Right?

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Media Bias & Error Part 2

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Cover of Leviathan (Oxford World's Classics)

As noted in my previous post, a recent Pew Research Center survey found that 29% of Americans believe that news organizations get their facts straight while 63% claim that news stories often are lacking in accuracy.  26% also claim that news organizations are careful to avoid politically biased reporting. 60% of those surveyed claimed that the news organizations are politically biased.

In my previous post, I considered that one explanation for these views is that the media is biased and error prone. Of course, it is also worthwhile exploring alternative (or additional) explanations.

One possible cause of this view is that fact that folks on the right have been claiming that the media is biased since about the time of the Nixon administration. This trend has continued and it is likely that this charge has influenced the views of some people.

Another possible cause is that people are generally poor at critical thinking and hence generally do not consider their own biases. If someone is unaware of his own biases, then they will tend to see the world with an uncorrected distortion-that created by their own biases. As such, even an objective and accurate report will strike them as either inaccurate or biased (or both). To use an analogy, when students come to talk to me about a bad paper grade, they often insist that their papers are quite good. Even when I show the fallacies, grammatical errors, missing material, factual errors and such in their work, they sometimes still insist that the papers are good. In some cases I am sure they are quite sincere they truly think their papers are fine pieces of work, despite the fact that they are not. Likewise, someone who sees the world in a biased way and is not aware of his bias will tend to see anything that disagrees with his view as mistaken.

Interestingly, Thomas Hobbes wrote about this tendency. He notes in his Leviathan that people tend to regard a failure to agree with them as a sign of provocative  disagreement. As such, when folks see a news story that simply fails to agree with their beliefs, they will tend to regard it as biased, inaccurate or both.

Adding to this is the fact that sources outside of the mainstream media are highly polarized, both left and right. This enables folks to easily find sources (often blogs and web pages) that “confirm” and “support” there views. This, in turn, can contribute to their belief that the news media is inaccurate and biased. For example, folks who think that Bush was behind 9/11 can find sites to back them up and “confirm” their conspiracy theory. As another example, folks who think that Obama is not a natural born American can find sites to “support” their views.

While it is a good idea to find outside sources and use them to check on the mainstream media, it is important to make sure that these sources are credible and accurate. That can, of course, be rather challenging.

My view is that it is wise to be critical of the media (or any source). However, it is equally wise to critical of one’s own beliefs. After all, if the media can be biased, so can we.

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