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Abortion debate

Crisis Pregnancy Centers III: Free Speech

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As J.S. Mill and many others have argued, the freedom of expression is a fundamental liberty. As such, it would be reasonable for proponents of crisis pregnancy centers to make use of it. As noted in my previous essays, crisis pregnancy centers purport to offer an alternative to abortion—though they seem to routinely engage in deception rather than honest persuasion. This leads to some interesting moral questions about the freedom of expression.

To get the obvious out of the way, those who work for crisis pregnancy centers have the moral right to express their views on abortion. They also have the moral right to try to persuade others to accept their views and to talk women out of having abortions. After all, a key part of the freedom of expression is the freedom to engage with others who are willing to listen to argue for one’s views or persuade others to accept them. As such, the freedom of expression of these centers (which is just shorthand for the freedom of expression of the people who work for them) is not in dispute. However, there are some matters that are not quite as obvious.

One concern, which was addressed in my previous essay, is the ethics of deceit. While people do have the right to express their views, there is not a moral right to engage in willful deception—the freedom of expression is not a ticket to lie. As I have argued elsewhere, a person can be in error and yet not be lying: lying requires that the person knows they are engaging in an untruth and that they have the right (or, rather, wrong) sort of intention. So, if the folks at the centers really believe the factual untruths they tell women, then they are not lying. However, this does not get them off the moral hook completely—there is also an ethics of epistemology (the theory of knowledge). Just as there is a moral obligation, as per Aquinas, to consider one’s actions before acting, there is also an obligation to confirm one’s beliefs before trying to get others to accept them. The seriousness of this obligation, as with actions, is in proportion to the seriousness of the effects of the belief. So, not being careful about unimportant claims is not a big deal but being careless about claims about birth control’s efficacy or the medical effects of abortion would be morally unacceptable. As with any liberty, there are also associate responsibilities and due diligence and honesty about the claims one makes are part of these responsibilities. That is, freedom of expression is not freedom from truth and research.

A second concern is the matter of values. While people do not have a right to their own facts, they do have the right to their own values (and the responsibility of the consequences of those values). While some folks embrace the self-defeating notion that relativity of values requires tolerance (it self-defeats because claiming tolerance as an objective value contradicts relativism), it would beg the question to assume that values are objective (or subjective). Even if values are objective (that is, some get things right and some get things wrong), there is still the obvious problem of sorting out which values are right. Because of this, it is rather more difficult to show that someone has made an error of values—that they have the wrong values. This, obviously enough, allows of some clear exceptions: those who advocate things like rape and genocide have indisputably gotten things objectively wrong. However, there is a vast territory in dispute and this legitimate dispute helps warrant the freedom of expression: since we do not know what is right in many cases, it would be both foolish and wrong to silence people with differing views.

While the various sides in abortion tend to believe they have the objective truth of the matter; the broad topic of abortion is morally complicated and an area of reasonable moral dispute. Those who think they have the right answer still have an excellent reason to accept this, if only on pragmatic grounds: if they are winning now, they might be on the outs tomorrow and hence need the freedom to make their case. If they are on the outs now, they obviously want the freedom to make their case now. As such, the center folks have the right to present their values as do those who disagree with them.

The final concern I will address is the matter of compelled listening. While there have been some interesting legal cases involving compelled speech, there is also the interesting moral matter of compelled consumption of expression. The easy and obvious view on this matter is that people have no right to expect others to listen to them and they do not, with some notable exceptions, have the right to harass people under the guise of free expression. To use the obvious analogy, you have the right to swing a knife around as much as you wish—as long as you are not slashing away at other people. Likewise, you can express yourself however you wish, provided that the expression is not aimed at harassing, coercing or harming others. I will admit the obvious problem of sorting out what counts as harassment, coercion and harm and note that this is a problem that can be solved by considering specific types of cases and also by developing general guidelines. For example, college students have no legitimate grounds to claim that a speaker who holds a view they dislike is automatically harming them. As another example, a student who is shouting vitriol and drowning out a speaker they disagree with is both violating the speaker’s right to free expression and endeavoring to compel others to listen to them over the speaker, thus they are in the process of trying to violate two distinct rights.

Returning to the centers, they do have every right to try to persuade, but the tactics that are coercive, deceptive or harassing are not protected by the freedom of expression. While they do have the right to express their views, they do not have the right to trick, harass or coerce others into listening or accepting their views. Naturally, the general principles at work here apply generally, especially to the freedoms of people I disagree with.

 

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Pregnancy Crisis Centers II: The Ethics of Deceit

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While I accept that abortion is morally tolerable and should be legal, I also accept that there are competing moral views. I also accept that both proponents and opponents of abortion have the moral right to argue for their views and so influence the behavior of others. As such, I have no moral objection against the idea of a pregnancy crisis center that provides women and girls with accurate information, true information about alternatives to abortion and assistance to women who elect to not have an abortion. Unfortunately, pregnancy crisis centers seem to engage in willful deceit.

As noted in my previous essay on this subject, John Oliver did a show on the deceptive practices of these centers. While Oliver is a comedian, his claims are backed up with evidence: these centers often trick women. One common technique is masquerading as an abortion clinic or health care provider by locating close to such places and using similar names. Such places also tend to use the trapping of professional medicine (forms, scrubs, etc.) to create the illusion they are a clinic or provider despite not being licensed to provide medical care. Another tactic is to make untrue claims about abortion, such as the claim that abortion increases their risk of cancer and infertility.

Oddly enough, such centers are usually legally allowed to give ultrasounds which is concerning, but more worrisome is the fact that they routinely mislead women about the results. This is not just a matter of concern for pro-choice people, pro-life people should also be worried about these misleading results in cases in which the woman plans to have the baby. Weirdly enough, while funding for women’s health is on the decrease, 34 states provide public money to these centers. This should be of concern to people who favor small government and also those who oppose public money being used explicitly to back ideological causes. After all, one of the arguments advanced against public funding of Planned Parenthood is that public money might be used for something some people find morally or religiously unacceptable. The same logic should certainly apply to these centers.

On the face of it, deceit seems morally wrong. As such, the centers that engage in these practices would be engaged in immoral behavior. This is especially ironic given that these centers tend to be affiliated with religious organizations and the bible is rather clear about the ethics of lying. While this seems to be an easy moral argument, there are also some counters to consider.

The first is the factual battle: it could be argued that the claims about deceit are themselves deceits—that the centers are operating honestly and openly, telling women the truth and making it clear that they are not licensed and exist to persuade people to not have abortions. The easy counter is that this is not the case. It is, of course, important not to confuse these deceitful centers with people who are open and honest about what they are trying to do—I am not claiming that all or even most anti-abortion people engage in these deceits.

The second is the moral battle—it can be argued that such deceit is justified on moral grounds; the end justifies the means. The obvious moral theory to use here is utilitarianism: the action that creates the most good and the least harm is the right action. In the case of the centers, they could accept that deceit is generally not a good thing, but that the harm of deceiving the women and girls is exceeded by the good of misleading them so that they do not have an abortion. To use an obvious analogy, lying to a murder to keep them from murdering would be morally right on utilitarian grounds.

Even if one accepts the utilitarian approach, there is still the question of whether the centers are doing their moral calculation right: is the good they claim to do outweighing the harms to the women and girls they deceive? Obviously, pro-choice people would disagree. There is also my usual line: why lie if the truth will suffice? In the case at hand, if abortion is truly as evil as the center folk believe, then telling women the truth should suffice. If they must lie to people, then one would suspect that they must not trust in their own reasons and arguments. They could, of course, reply by doubling down on the utilitarian approach and contend that people are not swayed by good reasons nor are they drawn to the right thing without being guided by deceits.

Accepting utilitarianism does, however, create its own problem: if the ends justify the means in terms of deceiving to prevent abortion, then the same principle also applies to abortion. As such, abortion would be subject to the same utilitarian calculation and could very well turn out to be acceptable. In any case, its wrongness would be conditional.

The centers could reply that they are not utilitarians; they just hold that the end justifies the means when it comes to lying about abortion, but that abortion is inherently worse than lying and it is acceptable to do lesser evils to prevent greater evils. This would be a consistent position but is still morally problematic since there are non-evil ways to reduce the numbers of abortions, such as providing cheap and effective birth control, funding quality sex-education, improving support services for women and girls who have babies, and so on. After all, it is hard to justify doing evil to stop evil when there are viable non-evil alternatives. If someone gladly embraces deceit to advance their cause when morally better alternatives exist, one must question their ethics.

 

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Is Pro-Life a Cover for Misogyny ? I: Preliminaries

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Anti abortion rally in Washington, D.C. Decemb...
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During a recent discussion, I was asked if I believed that a person who holds to the pro-life position must be a misogynist. While there are misogynists who are pro-life, I hold to what should be obvious: there is no necessary connection between being pro-life and being a misogynist. A misogynist hates women, while a person who holds a pro-life position believes that abortion is morally wrong. There is no inconsistency between holding the moral position that abortion is wrong and not being a hater of women. In fact, a pro-life person could have a benevolent view towards all living beings and be morally opposed to harming any of them—thus including zygotes and women.

While misogynists would tend to be anti-choice because of their hatred of women, they need not be pro-life. That is, hating women and wanting to deny them the choice to have an abortion does not entail that a person believes that abortion is morally wrong. For example, a misogynist could be fine with abortion (such as when it is convenient to him) but think that it should be up to the man to decide if or when a pregnancy is terminated. A misogynist might even be pro-choice for various reasons; but almost certainly not because he is a proponent of the rights of women.  As such, there is no necessary connection between the two views.

The discussion then turned to the question of whether or not a pro-choice position is a cover for misogyny. The easy and obvious answer is that sometimes it is and sometimes it is not. Since it has been established that a person can be pro-life without being a misogynist, it follows that being pro-life need not be a cover for misogyny. However, it can obviously provide cover for such a position. It is rather easier to sell the idea of restricting abortion by making a moral case against it than by expressing hatred of women and a desire to restrict their choices and reproductive option. Before progressing with the discussion it is rather important to address two points.

The first point is that even if it is established that a pro-life/anti-abortion person is a misogynist, this does not entail that the person’s position on the issue of abortion is in error. To reject a misogynist’s claims or arguments regarding abortion (or anything) on the grounds that he is a misogynist is to commit a circumstantial ad hominem.

This sort of Circumstantial ad Hominem involves substituting an attack on a person’s circumstances (such as the person’s religion, political affiliation, ethnic background, etc.) for reasons against her claim. This version has the following form:

 

  1. Person A makes claim X.
  2. Person B makes an attack on A’s circumstances.
  3. Therefore X is false.

 

A Circumstantial ad Hominem is a fallacy because a person’s circumstances (religion, political affiliation, etc.) do not affect the truth or falsity of the claim. This is made quite clear by the following example: “Bill claims that 1+1 =2. But he is a Republican, so his claim is false.” As such, to assert that the pro-life position is in error because some misogynist holds that view would be an error in reasoning.

A second important point is that a person’s consistency or lack thereof in regards to her principles or actions has no relevance to the truth of her claims or the strength of her arguments. To think otherwise is to fall victim to the ad hominem tu quoque fallacy. This fallacy is committed when it is concluded that a person’s claim is false because 1) it is inconsistent with something else a person has said or 2) what a person says is inconsistent with her actions. This type of “argument” has the following form:

 

  1. Person A makes claim X.
  2. Person B asserts that A’s actions or past claims are inconsistent with the truth of claim X.
  3. Therefore X is false.

 

The fact that a person makes inconsistent claims does not make any particular claim he makes false (although of any pair of inconsistent claims only one can be true—but both can be false). Also, the fact that a person’s claims are not consistent with his actions might indicate that the person is a hypocrite but this does not prove his claims are false.

A person’s inconsistency also does not show that the person does not believe her avowed principle—she might simply be ignorant of its implications. That said, such inconsistency could be evidence of hypocrisy. While sorting out a person’s actual principles is not relevant to logical assessment of the person’s claims, doing so is clearly relevant to many types of decision making regarding the person. One area where sorting out a person’s principles matters is in voting. In the next essay, this matter will be addressed.

 

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Fetal Pain

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Approximately 6 weeks from conception, i.e. 8 ...
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The state of Nebraska has added a (seemingly) new phrase to the abortion debate, namely “fetal pain.” The gist of the view is that abortions after twenty weeks should not be allowed on the grounds that the fetus might feel what is happening to it.

While it is not known exactly when a fetus can feel pain, the Journal of the American Medical Association asserts that it is unlikely that the fetus feels pain prior to twenty eight weeks. The question of when a fetus has sufficient neurological development that would allow it to experience pain would certainly seem to be an empirical matter. Of course, the situation can be made more complicated by bringing in metaphysical concerns about when the fetus has a mind that can actually experience pain and suffer from such pain (there might be an important distinction between feeling pain and suffering from pain).

Determining when the fetus can feel and suffer from such pain does seem important. After all, many moral arguments are based on the capacity of beings to experience pain. For example, stock arguments in the moral debate over the treatment of animals rest on the fact that many of the ways we treat animals (such as how we raise them as food) causes them pain and suffering.

If the pain and suffering of animals matters morally, then it would certainly seem that the pain and suffering of fetuses would also matter morally. In fact, many of the arguments for not harming or mistreating animals based on their capacity to feel pain could be modified slightly to serve as arguments against harming fetuses that can feel pain.

Of course, this means that objections raised against pain/suffering based arguments in the case of animals could often be modified for use against the pain/suffering based arguments regarding fetuses.

On a logically irrelevant note, this could mean that folks who are pro-choice but against animal suffering might find their own arguments against mistreating animals re-purposed to argue against abortions. Likewise, folks who are anti-abortion but argue for the moral acceptability of (mis)using animals might find their arguments for allowing animal suffering to be re-purposed and used against their anti-abortion views.

Getting back to the main discussion , it does seem that pain and suffering are morally relevant. Intuitively, this makes sense. To steal an approach from Hume, simply think of your own pain and suffering and see if you can regard these as good things. It is also easy enough to take advantage of numerous existing arguments for pain and suffering having negative moral value (Mill is the obvious choice here). Naturally, there are also good arguments against this, but it hardly seem foolish to consider that inflicting pain and suffering tends to be morally wrong.

If this is granted, then abortions that cause pain and suffering to the fetus would certainly seem to have a morally negative element well worth considering. However, this would hardly be a morally decisive point. After all, the mere fact that something causes pain and suffering does not automatically make it wrong or unacceptable. One reason for this is that pain and suffering are typically taken as having relative rather than absolute weight. In other words, pain and suffering on the part of one party is usually weighed against positive value or against the pain and suffering of another party. For example, when arguing about animal testing in the context of medicine, the pain of the animals is typically matched against the gain to be had from the medicine.

In the case of abortion, the pain and suffering of the fetus would be weighed against other factors, such as the pain and suffering of the woman. This is, of course, old moral ground that has been debated extensively. In many cases the suffering the woman (or girl) would undergo would far outweigh the pain and suffering of the fetus, thus allowing the abortion to occur. If someone argued that the fetus has an absolute right not to suffer or feel pain, then the obvious counter is to inquire why the same would not apply to the woman as well and why such a clash between absolutes should be settled in favor of the fetus. After all, the burden of proof would seem to rest on those who claim an unborn and unfinished being has a greater moral status than a person.

I suspect that the main result of the introduction of “fetal pain” into the legal battle will not be a significant change in the ethical debate. Rather, the main impact will be that a (seemingly) new rhetorical tool (or weapon, depending on your view) is now available.

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