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Expand or Suppress Voting?

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Very broadly speaking, the Democrats and Republicans have adopted two fundamentally different strategies to wining elections. I am not claiming that these strategies are used in every race and by every candidate, just that they are the broad approaches of the parties.

Democrats have adopted a general strategy of winning by getting more voters to vote for them. Republicans have adopted a general strategy of reducing the number of votes for the Democrats. This might seem to be distinction without a difference, but these are fundamentally different approaches as I will show.

One part of the Democrat’s strategy is expanding the number of voters who vote by having more registered voters.  They tend to support laws that would make it easier for citizens to register to vote and they tend to encourage people to register. They also tend to support restoring voting rights to felons who have served their time. In contrast, Republicans have done their best to prevent ex-felons from voting—even when they have the right to do so.  Republicans will sometimes accuse Democrats of getting non-citizens (or dead people) to vote. While it is true that non-citizens sometimes do get registered to vote, this seems to usually be an accident. Voter fraud is exceptionally rare and non-citizens voting is a rare form of fraud, despite Republicans claims. Democrats and Republicans both seem to believe that new voters are more likely to vote for Democrats—so this strategy makes sense.

Democrats also tend to favor expanding the opportunities for citizens to vote. This includes such things as having many polling places, having the polls open for extended periods of time, having reliable public or private transport to the polls, and allowing vote-by-mail (sometimes known as absentee ballots).

Republicans, in contrast, have been waging legal battles to limit ballot boxes. They have also adopted a strategy of reducing polling sites and hours.  Trump has waged a war of lies against mail-in-ballots. There are concerns that Trump is encouraging his supporters to engage in voter intimidation. Republicans also oppose making election day a national holiday—while Democrats favor this.

Democrats and Republicans generally believe that Democrats would be more likely to win if it were easier for citizens to vote.  Republicans have traditionally tried to engage in voter suppression under the guise of fighting the almost non-existent voter fraud but Trump has gone so far as to claim that Republicans would never be elected again if it were easier to vote. While Republicans could win in fair elections, the approach of both parties is rational: easier voting does seem to favor Democrats because more people want to vote Democrat. While it is true that voter suppression can also impact those who would vote for Republicans, voter suppression is targeted as much as possible to impact populations who are more likely to vote for Democrats than Republicans.

Before the Southern Strategy, it could be argued that the Democrats did not support minority voting. But this changed and now the Democrats have been trying to get more votes by appealing to minority groups. They generally do this by offering small, but meaningful, benefits in return for votes. While the establishment Democrats serve the interests of the power elites well, they will also support laws that provide some benefits to the working class and minorities. For example, Democrats tend to support anti-discrimination laws, affirmative action, affordable health care and an increase in the minimum wage (but not too much). As another example, the Democrats have opened seats at the tables of power for minorities—with Obama and Harris being but two examples. While the Republicans do have minority members, they lag far behind the Democrats (and the Democrats are only doing so-so).

After losing to Obama twice, the Republicans seriously considered adopting the Democrat’s strategy of expanding their appeal to minorities. However, Trump put a decisive end to this in what amounts to a re-activation of the southern strategy. That is, the Republicans have stepped up their appeals to white fears, racism and xenophobia. White supremacists certainly approve of this approach. This does make sense: the Republicans probably cannot outcompete the Democrats here to win over a majority of the minority voters. They can, of course, recruit some individuals and present them as “proof” they are not racist (or sexist). Trump’s election showed the effectiveness of these strategies—and his re-election in 2020 would help confirm that the Republicans made the “right” choice.

Republicans do criticize the Democrats for allegedly pandering to minorities (and women) asserting both that the Democrats are devoted to political correctness while also claiming they are cynically exploiting minorities they do not care about. While these could be true, there are two main responses. The first is that the Democrats offer minority voters a return on their vote—such as places at the table and legislation they want. This is how politics works—people vote to get a return on that vote. The Democrats can be fairly criticized for providing too little return on that investment—but the Republicans offer minorities in general far less. Second, while motivation matters in terms of assessing a person’s ethics, it has no bearing on whether the action they take, or its consequences are good or bad. I will show this with an analogy.

Imagine that Carl the contractor wants to get your money—that is all he cares about. One option is for Carl to do the right thing and provide good work at a fair price. Another option is to use his tools to break into your house to steal your property. Carl’s motivation is the same in both cases; but how he gets your money matters morally. Likewise, even if the Democrats just want to win, it does matter how they do it. The Democrats are trying to win by getting more voters to vote for them by expanding voting rights and making it easier for citizens to vote—they believe they can win this way because they believe more people want them to win. As such, their strategy is to strengthen and expand democracy.

And this is where the Republicans come in: Republicans are trying to win by keeping more people from voting and try to ensure they target those who are likely to vote for the Democrats. They believe they can win this way because they believe more people do not want them to win—so they need to make sure that fewer people who do not want them to win get to vote. The path to victory is to weaken and restrict democracy. I am not claiming that the Democrats are angels—but they are doing the right thing even if they have the wrong motivations.   It might be true that the Democrats would do what the Republicans are doing if the situation were different—if so, they would be doing wrong in that hypothetical situation.

 

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Religious Freedom and COVID-19

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Lawsuits have been filed by some religious groups because of certain restrictions imposed in response to COVID-19. One obvious concern about these lawsuits is that churches have been among the super spreaders of COVID-19. The spreading, obviously, has nothing to do with religion but with people holding in person gatherings without masks and then going out into the general community. An interesting consideration is that while politicians have made a religious freedom issue out of the COVID restrictions, most Americans (including religious Americans) do not see these restrictions as a threat to religious freedom.  As such, one might be inclined to speculate about the motives behind these lawsuits.

Those who like political conspiracy might suspect that these lawsuits are aimed at helping Trump’s re-election chances by feeding his COVID narrative. Those who like a darker sort of conspiracy might turn to a horror-story style narrative: perhaps a secret sect that believes they have a role in the apocalypse by serving to rouse Pestilence (the horseman of the apocalypse). These conspiracy theories should, perhaps, be seen as crazy as the Plandemic conspiracy theory and dismissed out of hand. The most charitable speculation about motivation would, of course, be that the lawsuits are being brought because of a sincere and honest concern about violations of religious freedom by certain states.

While motivations do matter morally and impact credibility, they have no bearing on the truth of a claim. As such, even if those claiming COVID restrictions violate religious liberty have nefarious motives, this has no relevance to the truth of their claim. To think otherwise would be to fall into an ad hominem fallacy (a fallacy in which some alleged defect in the person making the claim disproves the claim). So, the issue is whether COVID-19 restrictions violate religious freedom. I will focus on the moral issue and leave the legal issue to the courts.

As a starting point, I will make the obvious point that religious freedom is not absolute and can be justly restricted in at least some cases. As a general argument, no freedom can be absolutely unrestricted—this is because unrestricted freedom would restrict (or destroy) itself. To use a silly example, if religious freedom was absolute, then the religious freedom of a religion that wanted to restrict all other religions on religious grounds must be respected. This seems to be a reductio on the idea of absolute freedom (and one I stole from Hobbes). As such, religious freedom requires some restrictions on religious freedom. If so, then what we need to settle is the limit (or the extent) of religious freedom and see where the COVID restrictions fall.

Intuitively, we all probably agree that religious freedom should not allow people the liberty to engage in such things as murder, theft, rape, and genocide. So, if the Church of Murder, Rape and Robbery insisted they had the moral right to rob, rape and murder you on the grounds of religious liberty you would, I assume, disagree. And rightfully so. Sticking within a rights theory of ethics, your right to life and property would override their right to religious liberty. This rests on the notion that there is a hierarchy of rights, with some rights having more moral weight than others (among other factors). One could also use a utilitarian approach of the sort developed by Mill: if restricting a religious liberty would create more positive value than negative value, then doing so would be morally right. While the members of the Church of Murder, Rape and Robbery would be unhappy about not being able to practice their faith on other people, the harm this would inflict outweighs their unhappiness.

I am not claiming that wanting a religious freedom exemption from COVID restrictions is analogous to wanting the freedom to murder, rape and rob. My point is to establish that limiting religious freedom to protect other rights and to prevent harm can be morally acceptable. But this does not settle the specific issue of whether COVID restrictions violate religious freedom. Obviously, this will depend on the specific restrictions and the context.

One relevant factor is the intent of restrictions. If COVID restrictions were created and applied primarily with the intention to infringe on religious liberty, then that would be wrong. But even if the restrictions were created and applied with only benign intent, they could still wrongly violate religious liberty. To use an analogy, one might impose restrictions on high calorie drinks from a benign intent (to reduce obesity) and yet still be wrongly limiting freedom.  But there is no evidence that the restrictions were created to harm religious liberty.

Another relevant factor is consistency in restrictions. To illustrate, if religious gatherings are restricted because of the risk of people gathering, then that standard must be applied consistently, or they would be unfair. For example, if bars, restaurants, and movie theaters could operate and they did so in a manner similar to how churches would operate(size of gatherings, etc.), then there would a moral case that churches are receiving unfair treatment. The conclusion of such moral reasoning might, however, be that the bars, restaurants, and movie theaters should also be restricted rather than that the churches should not be so restricted.

One can also make the essential service argument for churches. Grocery stores, car rental business and many government offices remain open because they are considered essential. The justification here is on utilitarian grounds: there would be more harm in closing them then keeping them open. To use the most obvious illustration, closing grocery stores and food delivery would result in starvation, so keeping these operating is morally acceptable. One cannot Zoom a meal.  But are large, in person, (possibly mask free) gatherings at churches essential?

Religious is obviously important, even essential, to some people. That is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether large, in person gathering (possibly without masks) is essential. That is, can people practice their religion without being able to gather closely in large numbers (perhaps without masks). To use an analogy, running is essential to me, but large road races are restricted. Can I practice my running without these large gatherings?

On the face of it, the answer would seem to be that we can. Religious people can gather online, they can gather outside and space themselves, they can gather inside in small groups wearing masks, and so on. In the case of running, I can still run by myself, I can run with others by maintaining distance, and I can do virtual races. These do involve costs and inconveniences, but they all allow people to continue to practice the group aspects of religion (and running). The fact that most religious people have been doing these things provides considerable evidence that religion (and running) can be practiced while the medical restrictions are in effect. This can, of course, be disputed on theological grounds—something I will leave to the theologians to settle. But on the face of it these restrictions do not interfere with religious liberty in a way that is unfair, inconsistent, or unwarranted relative to other freedoms, like the freedom of running.

If the restrictions are applied consistently based on relevant factors such as gathering size, risk, being essential, and proximity, then the issue would become whether there should be a special religious freedom exemption from these restrictions. That is, the right of religious freedom would allow a special exemption because religious people want to gather indoors, in large groups and perhaps without masks. That is, there should be religious exemption in the case of public health—after all, they are not just putting themselves at risk, they are putting everyone they will contact at risk as well.

Imagine, if you will, that a person infected with Ebola insists on their religious freedom and demands that they be allowed to go to church without restriction. This would clearly be selfish and wrong of them: such a deadly disease could kill the others and then spread out into the community. While COVID-19 is nowhere near as lethal as Ebola, it is meaningfully dangerous—so the argument would be that the risk to themselves and others is acceptable because they wish to exercise their freedom of religion and gather. We do, as some will point out, think that churches have the right to stay open in flu season. But, as just noted, we would probably all agree that people infected with Ebola should not be allowed to freely go to church because they have religious freedom.

To use an analogy, we all probably agree that military grade flamethrowers should not be allowed for in-church use even if a church considers fire an important part of their services. This is because flame throwers would present a danger to the people in the church and could create a fire that would spread to nearby structures or a forest. But imagine a church that wants something less than flamethrowers: they just want their church to be exempt from the fire safety laws and regulations that other people must follow. They argue that their religion values fire, so being forced to have things like smoke alarms, working fire extinguishers and fire exits would violate their religious freedom to practice their faith. They also want to be able to use plenty of fire in their services and want to have a stock of flammable material on hand—stored in loose piles around the church, as their faith demands. They would argue that there is some risk—but it is relatively low compared to flame throwers. But, of course, they could easily set their church on fire and have it spread to all the nearby structures and burn them down (and hurt the people in them). While they could be argued to have a right to burn themselves and their church, their religious freedom would not seem to give them a right to put the nearby buildings (including other churches) and the people in them at such needless risk. They can, of course, have the fire needed for their faith, but it must be kept in a way that does not needlessly risk hurting other people. The same would seem to apply to COVID-19 and churches: they have the right to practice their faith, but they do not have the right to put others at risk while doing so.

Not surprisingly, some making the religious freedom exemption argument also support Trump’s view that COVID-19 is not dangerous. They sometimes cite their own experts when making this claim, although it runs counter to the overwhelming consensus of the medical and scientific communities. While their claims about the danger of COVID-19 are manifestly not true, their general approach is not in error: it does make sense to consider the danger presented by a threat when deciding which liberties to restrict and how to restrict them. This is something that is rarely done rationally and consistently; but it is essential to making a case for or against restricting liberty. The best medical data shows that large gatherings (without masks) are dangerous, so restricting churches is as morally acceptable as restricting marathons and no more wrongly infringes on religious freedom than it does on running freedom.

 

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Mighty Victims 4: Anecdotal Evidence

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Power holders in the United States tend to be white, male, straight, and (profess to be) Christian. Membership in these groups also seems to confer a degree of advantage relative to people outside of these groups. Yet, as been noted in the previous essays, some claim that the people in these groups are the “real victims” today. In this essay I will look at how a version of the fallacy of anecdotal evidence can be used to “argue” about who is “the real victim.”

The fallacy of anecdotal evidence is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on an anecdote (a story) about one or a small number of cases. The fallacy is also committed when someone rejects reasonable statistical data supporting a claim in favor of a single example or small number of examples that go against the claim. The fallacy is considered by some to be a variation of the hasty generalization fallacy (drawing a conclusion from a sample that is too small to adequately support that conclusion). The main difference between hasty generalization and anecdotal evidence is that the fallacy anecdotal evidence involves using a story (anecdote) as the sample.

Here is the form of the anecdotal evidence variation often used to “argue” that an advantaged group is not advantaged:

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that Group A is advantaged relative to Group B

Premise 2: A member of Group A was disadvantaged relative to a member of Group B.

Conclusion: Group A is not advantaged relative to Group B (or Group B is not disadvantaged relative to Group A).

To illustrate:

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that white Americas are advantaged relative to black Americans.

Premise 2: Chad, a white American, was unable to get into his first choice of colleges because affirmative action allowed Anthony, a black American, to displace him.

Conclusion: White Americans are not advantaged relative to black Americans.

 

The problem with the logic is that an anecdote does not suffice to establish a general claim—an adequate sample would be needed to make a strong generalization.

But one must also be on guard against another sort of fallacy:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that Group A is advantaged relative to Group B.

Premise 2: Member M of Group A is disadvantaged relative to Member N of Group B.

Conclusion: The disadvantage of M is morally acceptable, or M is not really disadvantaged.

 

To illustrate:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that men are advantaged relative to women.

Premise 2: Andy was disadvantaged relative to his boss Sally when she used her position to sexually harass him.

Conclusion: The disadvantage of Andy is morally acceptable, or Andy was not really disadvantaged.

 

 

While individual cases do not disprove a body of statistical evidence they should not be dismissed. As in the illustration given above, while men generally have the workplace advantage over women, this does not entail that individual men are never at a disadvantage relative to individual women. It also does not entail that, for example, men cannot be the victims of sexual harassment by women.  As another illustration, while white men dominate academics, business, and politics, this does not entail that there are not injustices against specific white men in such things as admission, hiring and promotions. These sorts of situations can lead to considerable moral debates about harm.

One excellent example is the debate over affirmative action. The oversimplified justification is that groups that have been historically disadvantaged are given a degree of preference in the selection process. For example, a minority woman might be given preference over a white woman in the case of college admission. The usual moral counter is that the white woman is wronged by this: if she is better qualified, then she should be admitted—even if this entails that the college population will remain almost entirely white. The usual counter is that the white woman is most likely better qualified because she has enjoyed the advantages conferred from being white. For example, her ancestors might have built wealth by owning the ancestors of the black woman who was admitted over her and this inherited wealth meant that her family has been attending college for generations, she was able to attend excellent schools and her family could pay for tutoring and test preparation. This can be countered by other arguments, such as how the woman did not own slaves herself, so it is unfair for her to not be admitted on the “merit” arising from her advantages. One can, of course, consider scenarios such as cases in which the black woman is from a wealthy family and the white woman is from a poor family. Such cases can, of course, be considered in terms of economic class—one could argue that this should also be a factor. This obviously all leads to the moral issue of whether it is acceptable to inflict some harms on specific members of advantaged groups to address systematic disadvantages, which goes way beyond the scope of this work. Fortunately, I do not need to settle this issue here. This is because even if such anecdotes are examples of morally wrong actions, they do not disprove the general statistical claims about relative advantage and disadvantage between groups. For example, even if a few white students are wronged by affirmative action when they cannot attend their first pick of schools, these anecdotes do not disprove the statistical evidence of the relative advantage conferred by being white in America. After all, the claim of advantage is not that each white person is always advantaged over everyone else on an individual by individual basis. Rather it is about the overall advantages that appear in statistics such as wealth and treatment by the police. As such, using anecdotes to “refute” statistical data is, as always, a fallacy. But what about cases in which members of an advantaged group do suffer a statistically meaningful disadvantage in one or more areas?

While falling victim to the fallacy of anecdotal evidence is bad logic, it is not an error to consider that members of an advantaged group might face a significant disadvantage (or harm) because of their membership in that advantaged group. As would be expected, any example used here will be controversial—I will use the Fathers’ Rights movement as the example. The central claim behind this movement is that fathers are systematically disadvantaged relative to mothers. While there are liberal and conservative versions, the general claim is that fathers and mothers should have parity in the legal system on this matter. Critics, as would be expected, claim that men tend to already enjoy a relative advantage here. But if the Fathers’ Rights movement is correct about fathers being systematically disadvantaged relative to mothers, then this would not be mere anecdotal reasoning. That is, it would not just be a few cases in which individual fathers were disadvantaged relative to a few individual mothers—it would be systematic injustice. But would this area of relative disadvantage disprove the claim of general advantage? Let us look at the reasoning:

 

Premise 1: It is claimed that statistical evidence shows that Group A is advantaged relative to Group B.

Premise 2: But Group A is disadvantaged relative to Group B in specific area C.

Conclusion: Group A is not advantaged relative to Group B.

 

As presented, this would be an error in reasoning—Group A being disadvantaged in one area would not prove that the group is not advantaged relative to Group B when all areas are considered. To use an analogy, the fact that Team B outscored Team A in the fifth inning of a baseball game does not entail that B is leading. It must be noted that a similar argument with multiple premises like Premise 2 could show that Group A is not advantaged relative to Group B—after all, establishing adequate statistical evidence would obviously be adequate. There are, of course, questions about how to determine relative advantage and these can be debated in good faith. One obvious point of dispute would be the matter of weighting. For example, if fathers are disadvantaged relative to mothers, how would this count relative to the pay gap between men and women? And so on for all areas of comparison. This does show the need to consider each area as well as a need for assessing value—but this is not unique to the situation at hand and one could, as is often done, assign crude dollar values to do the math.

In closing, while individual wrongs and wrongs done to members of advantaged groups as members of that group can occur, they do not automatically disprove the statistical data.

 

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Mighty Victims 3: Mighty, Yet Somehow Victims

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When it is claimed that the “real victims” are white, male, straight or Christian, there is the obvious problems of explaining how this occurs. It cannot be that white, male, straight and Christian people are systematically excluded from power in the United States—these are the people who currently hold the White House, the Senate and so on. But there is certainly a feeling among white, straight, male, and Christian people that they are suffering. This is a reasonable feeling because it is true. But what is the explanation?

A “left” explanation would be that while being white, male, straight or Christian yields relative advantages, the greatest advantages are held by those who possess the greatest wealth and power. That is, class is a dominant factor in the United States. Take, for example, the claim that migrants are stealing jobs. Put this way, white workers are victims of minorities. While there are cases in which jobs are lost to migrants, the job woes of Americans are not caused by migrants stealing jobs. While the causes of job losses and underemployment are complicated, a major factor is that those with the power to make decisions make decisions that result in these harms. As a specific example, my hometown relied on a paper mill as its primary employer. Migrants did not come to Old Town to steal the jobs, ownership of the mill changed and eventually those in charge decided to shut the mill down. My hometown suffered from this and suffers to this day. One could spend endless hours going through similar explanations of the real woes faced by white, male, straight, and Christian Americans. But this sort of explanation is obviously not going to be presented by those who hold power and those who support them. But they still need to provide an explanation for the suffering.

One “non-left” explanation is that the “real victims” are “losing” to the other groups because they are inferior. To use an analogy, back in the day my friends and I placed well in the local road races—we were the ruling class of running. This is no longer the case. The explanation is easy: we are now decades older and are inferior to the new young athletes who rule the racing world. One could argue that the same sort of thing is happening to the groups in question: they once ruled America but are now losing to superior groups because they are inferior. But this explanation would clearly be unacceptable to the conservatives who claim that these groups are the real victims.

One reason for this is the common conservative notion of merit and their claims about pulling oneself up by the bootstraps. If the groups in question are “losing” because they are inferior, then this would be acceptable to a commonly professed aspect of conservative ideology. Conservatives do not typically say that white, straight, Christian men are losing because they are inferior, and this is morally fine.

A second reason conservatives will not accept the inferiority explanation is that it would not be good propaganda or rhetoric. Telling these groups that they are losing because they are inferior will hardly yield the desired results. As such, an explanation is still wanting.

Conservatives do tend to present the “opponents” of these groups as being strong. This allows the “defeat” to be blamed on the strength of the opposing groups rather than on the weak inferiority of the groups who are the “real victims.” An obvious problem is that if these opposing groups are presented as strong, this would entail that their “victims” are weaker and thus inferior. This creates quite a challenge: the “victim” groups must be victims, but they must also be mighty—they must be mighty victims. The reasons given that the groups are might can vary considerably and fall along a vast spectrum.

In the case of being white, the notion of whites being mighty can range from pride in being white to full white supremacy. Moderate examples of this would be people to argue for the superiority of Western (white) culture and point to the accomplishments of white people. Approaching the extreme end would be assertions of fundamental white supremacy and the inferiority of all others. Nazis would be in this area. I must, of course, state the obvious to pre-empt a likely attack: being fine with being white is fine. I’m fine with looking white; but I do not think I am thus superior to others.

In the case of being male, the notion that men are superior to women can range from pride in being a male to complete misogyny. Moderate examples would be those who argue that men and women have different qualities—but men are generally better at most things. Near the extreme end would be full misogyny—the idea that men are vastly superior to women and women are horrible, evil things out to destroy men. One can be fine with being a man; that can be healthy. I am fine with being a man; but I do not think this makes me superior.

In the case of being straight, the notion that being straight is superior to having another sexuality can range from the idea that being straight is  more natural to the notion that non-straight people are abominations that should be destroyed. Moderate examples would be those who say that being straight is generally better than not being straight and non-straight people probably have some minor mental illness. The extreme end would involve regarding those other than straight people as perverted abominations that should be cured, locked away or even killed. One can be fine with being straight—I am. But I do not think that other orientations must be perverted or inferior. I do, of course, recognize that there can be evil connected to one’s sexuality—pedophiles and rapists are morally wrong.

In the case of Christianity, the idea that it is better than other religions can range from the notion that it is somewhat better to the view that other faiths are not only inferior but wicked and horrible. Moderate examples would be people who think their faith is better because of Christ, but who think that other monotheistic faiths are close to being right (if only they would accept Jesus). Extreme examples would include a fanatical loathing and hatred of other faiths, regarding those people as not only wrong but monstrous in their beliefs. This is not to deny that some people are monstrous in their beliefs. Christians should obviously be fine with being Christian—I am fine with my Episcopalian background. But I do not think I am thus superior to others. Once it has been “argued” that these groups are superior, then an explanation must be given as to why they are the “real victims.”

As noted above, the opposing groups that make whites, men, straight people, and Christians into the “real victims” must be strong enough to “win” yet also inferior. These requires that the opposing groups have the traits needed to “win” while also having the traits that make them inferior. The “real victim” groups must have the traits needed to “lose” while also having the traits that make them superior. This seems to create the paradox of the mighty victims: the inferior victimizers must win consistently to explain why these superior groups are the “real victims” but the “victory” must also be somehow unearned.

One way to try to do this is by a sports analogy in which the best athletes are consistently bested by inferior athletes. The inferior athletes could win by cheating or through some conspiracy, thus the inferiors consistently and unfairly best their betters. This would, of course, require that the best athletes can never overcome the cheating or do anything to prevent it—that is, they are powerless to be anything but mighty victims. But this would seem to require that although they are the best athletes, they are lacking in other ways that allow them to be so easily bested. For this analogy to work with the groups in question, it would need to be shown that these groups are cheating in some manner that cannot be addressed by the alleged superiority of the “real victims.” It is not clear how this would work: that the “real victims” would be superior yet still unable to overcome the cheating of the alleged inferiors.

A second way is to use the ally hypothesis—the victimizing groups are aided and abetted by traitors in the victimized groups. On this narrative, the traitors are able to best their betrayed fellows because they are also among the superior and they are aiding the other groups to best their own kind. For example, one might allege that there are white race traitors helping other groups to victimize whites. This would, of course, require that the traitors be superior to those who are loyal—otherwise the group loyalists should be able to “win.” So if whites being the real victims is explained in terms of white traitors, the problem is that this would seem to entail that the “best” whites are the traitors since they are “beating” their inferior fellow whites. So, the ally hypothesis does not work well.

A third way is to use the number hypothesis; the inferior victimizing groups have superior numbers, so the superior victims are “losing.” While it is true that numbers can offset ability, the “real victim” groups are generally not outnumbered. Men and women are roughly equal in numbers, straight people seem to vastly outnumber other orientations, Christians dominate American religion, and white people still have a numerical advantage in America—though they might be a majority minority (that is, not 50+% of the population but still more than any other group). As such, the numbers argument fails. But there is an explanation that does reconcile the fact that these groups are both “superior” and victims.

It is true that white people, men, straight people, and Christians are victims. But it is also true that people from these groups hold the overwhelming power in the United States. Thus, these groups both hold superior power and contain victims. The victims are, ironically, most often victims of their fellows who hold superior power. So how do the powerful few convince the many in these groups that they are the “real victims” of the out groups?

A main strategy seems to involve pointing to losses in relative advantages between groups and convincing people that these losses are both unfair and caused by the other group. For example, men have lost some of their relative advantages over women in both the law and social norms and one might say that nothing stings like losing an undeserved advantage. It is natural to blame women for this.  As another example, whites have lost many relative advantages over the years—to use an extreme example, people who are not white can no longer be owned as property. It is natural to blame people who are not white for this. Straight people have also seen same-sex marriage legalized, which clearly some people see as a loss. It is natural to blame the people with other orientations for this.  Christianity has had to share more space with other religions and this loss of advantage no doubt strikes some as being victimized. It is natural to blame people of other faiths for this.

Another strategy involves getting people in these groups to believe (or at least feel) that most of their woes are the fault of the other groups—even when there is no connection between the two. For example, the poverty and underemployment that white, straight, Christian men face is blamed on minorities—although the economic decisions in the United States are mostly made by a few white, straight, Christian men. White, straight, Christian men who are concerned that men die disproportionately in dangerous jobs might blame the feminists—but it is obviously not the feminist who exclude women from dangerous jobs and it is certainly not the feminists who control working conditions or when we take military action. There are also cases in which the harms are entirely fictional—for example Fox’s eternal make-believe war on Christmas.

We thus have a working explanation of mighty victims. A tiny fraction of the members of the group are mighty in that they hold overwhelming power. The other members of these groups are victims—but they are mostly victimized by members of their own groups. Which makes sense: the idea that those with less power are somehow victimizing the powerful is as absurd as the idea that the poor are victimizing the rich.

 

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Mighty Victims 2: The “Real Victims”

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In my last essay I noted that those who occupy positions of power (broadly defined) in the United States tend to be white, male, straight, and (profess to be) Christian. Given this fact, it might seem odd that some argue that these groups are the real victims in the United States.

Contrary to the evidence, it is often claimed that white people are the real victims of racism. It is true that white Americans have lost certain advantages arising from being white. In 1865 slavery was abolished and in 1870 voting rights were no longer restricted by race. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also resulted in a relative loss of white advantage. As would be imagined, only open racists point to these as examples of whites being the real victims of racism. But most whites believe they are now the real victims of racism.

When pressed for contemporary evidence of how whites are the real victims of racism, people typically point to things like affirmative action, Black Lives Matter, criticism of systematic racism, and the fact that Kamala Harris is the Democrat’s VP candidate. I do not think that most whites are lying when they claim they believe they are the real victims of racism—but I think they are in error. The obvious reason is the overwhelming evidence of systematic racism in the United States—racism whose targets are not white. I do get why white people can honestly believe they are the real victims—there are ongoing efforts to convince white people that criticism of systematic racism and efforts to offset the negative impact of centuries of racism are racist. There is also the “clever” tactic of accusing people of being racist when they acknowledge the role of the racist’s conception of race as a factor in addressing racism. To pre-empt the likely appeal to anecdotal evidence, I will not deny that there can be cases in which an individual white person is the victim of racial discrimination. In addition to condemning that as morally wrong I will also note that my concern here is at the group level—it is consistent with white generally having advantage because they are white that some specific white people face real racial discrimination.

Contrary to most of the evidence, it is claimed that men are the real victims of sexism. It is certainly true that men have lost many advantages relative to women. In 1920 women got the right to vote in the United States. There have also been laws passed to protect women at work and at home. Divorce has changed over the years and men (have mostly) lost the “right” to rape their wives. As would be expected, few would point to these as examples of how men are the real victims of sexism. When pressed, common examples involve references to the Me Too movement, the male bashing of certain feminists, strong female characters in video games, TV shows and movies, changing gender roles, the rights of fathers relative to those of mothers, the charge of toxic masculinity, and Kamala Harris.

It must be acknowledged that there are some real issues with sexism here; a good example being that addressed by the Father’s Rights movement. It is also true that many men do end up being victims because of their sex: as some have argued, men suffer the heaviest casualties in combat and far more men than women are killed or injured in workplace accidents. At this point, you might be thinking that I have refuted myself—I have argued that men can be more likely to suffer or be harmed because they are men.

I must acknowledge that men are thus victims of sexism but they are not generally the victims of the sexism of women—that is, it is not women who are primarily behind the suffering and death of men (because they are men). It is, rather, the sexism of other men. Men are more likely to die and be injured in certain jobs because there are more men working those traditional male jobs. As an example, more men die in commercial fishing accidents than women because more men work in that field. More men die in battle because other men tend to send them rather than women to die in battle.

Rather than engage in a debate over who is being harmed the most by sexism, I am certainly willing to agree that men and women are brutalized by sexism and that these problems need to be addressed. As such, men and women are the real victims here.

Contrary to evidence, it is often claimed that straight people are the real victims of discrimination. It is true that same-sex couples gained the legal right to marry in 2015 and there are some protections in place against discrimination based on sexual orientation. There is still open opposition to these legal rights and protections and opposition is often cast in terms of how they harm straight people. For example, one stock argument against same sex marriage was that allowing it would be harmful to different sex marriages—something that remains unproven.

There are cases in which people are discriminated against because they are straight, which do raise real moral concerns about hiring ethics. I do acknowledge the obvious: individual straight people can suffer discrimination. But this is completely consistent with the social and legal advantages that arise from being straight in the states. As such, while a straight person can be a victim of discrimination, straight people as a class enjoy significant advantages.

While Americans generally recognize that discrimination exists against religious minorities, about 50% of Americans believe that evangelical Christians face discrimination. While the United States has always had freedom of religion and often practices the separation of church and state, Christianity is the dominant religion here. As such, some effort is required to claim religious discrimination against Christians.

As evidence of discrimination against Christians, people often cite Fox News unrelenting absurd war on Christmas propaganda.  It is insane that people even need to try to refute what is obviously untrue—after all, Christmas rules the United States from late October until early January. Most of the other “evidence” of discrimination involves cases in which the separation of church and state is enforced, cases in which religious employers are not allowed to discriminate against employees or customers, and similar things. While these do show that the dominance of Christianity in government, society and business has declined a decline in dominance is not evidence of discrimination.

As in the other cases, I do acknowledge that individual Christians can face religious discrimination. However, this is consistent with Christianity still being the dominant religion in the United States. The same survey in which 50% of those surveyed claimed that evangelicals faced discrimination only 15% claimed that being an evangelical hurt a person’s chances of getting ahead, while 63% agreed that being a Muslim hurt a person’s chances of getting ahead (31% said it hurt chances a lot). I do agree that religious discrimination is real and oppose it but it is not accurate to claim that as a group Christians are the victims here.

In closing, while a person from any group can be a victim, the groups we looked at generally enjoy advantages and are not the real victims. It is, of course, not a contest to be the real victim: we should be morally concerned with human suffering regardless of which group a person belongs to. But we should not be disingenuous when discussing which groups have the advantages. You might be wondering why this series is entitled “Mighty Victims.” This will be answered in the next essay.

 

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Mighty Victims I: Advantages

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The people who occupy positions of power (broadly defined) in the United States tend to be white, male, straight, and (profess to be) Christian. This can be confirmed by even a cursory look at who holds positions in government, business, and academics. Membership in these groups seems to confer a degree of advantage relative to people outside of these groups. Obviously, people can belong to some of these groups rather than all of them. For example, a white woman could be a lesbian atheist. At this point I need to pre-empt some obvious straw man attacks on my claims.

First, I am not claiming that membership in one or more of these groups guarantees that a person will enjoy a position of relative power, such as being among the wealthy or the influential. I understand there are many white, straight, Christian men who are suffering under brutal poverty and struggling to make ends meet. Second, I know that people who are not members of these groups who enjoy great success. Put bluntly, I am aware that Oprah and Beyonce exist.  What I am claiming is modest: membership in one or more of these groups confers relative advantages while being outside of one or more of these groups can confer relative disadvantages. I will illustrate what I mean with an analogy from gaming.

Imagine a basic game rule: to succeed at something (such as getting a job or hitting a monster with a sword), you need to roll a specific number or higher on a die. This represents the apparent role of chance in life. In most games, you can get pluses and minuses to your roll, based on various factors. For example, if your character is related to the king, you might get a plus when rolling to talk the city guard out of arresting you for the bar fight. If your character belongs to an unpopular band of rebels, you might suffer a significant minus when rolling to convince the city guard to not simply kill you and dump your body in the river when they catch you speaking out against the king.

Looking at real life like a game, membership in one or more of these groups would confer a plus on many rolls and not being in these groups might confer a negative on many rolls. To address likely straw man attacks, I am not claiming that being in one of these groups always gives an advantage in every conceivable situation. Nor am I claiming that being outside of these groups confers a disadvantage in every conceivable situation. What I am claiming is that a person gains more advantages from being a member of these groups relative to other groups and this is consistent with there being specific cases where membership in one of these groups might not yield an advantage or even be a disadvantage. For example, a white male would be at a complete disadvantage when trying to secure a literary prize for minority female authors. But that same white male would tend to enjoy numerous and broad advantages relative to minority women.  Pointing out a few examples in which white, straight, Christian men do not have an advantage (or might actually be at a disadvantage) does not refute the general claim that membership in these groups confers general advantages in the United States.

It is important to note that I am taking these advantages and disadvantages to be, as I have said, like pluses and minuses on random rolls rather than factors that always decide the outcome of events. As a made-up example, imagine that getting a good job required rolling a 15+ using a 20-sided die. Imagine that for a variety of reasons race and sex are factors that are relevant to hiring. Put in entirely made up game terms, imagine that being a man and being white each confer a +1 on the roll. A white man would make the roll with a +2, a black man would make it with a +1, a white woman would roll with +1, and a brown woman would make the roll at +0. Any one of them could succeed (0r fail) on the roll. But imagine hundreds, thousands or millions of people trying to get good jobs: these small relative advantages will have a significant impact on the overall results. If the relative advantages are larger, the impact will be even more significant and will result in a noticeable difference when one considers large numbers of people. This is, as I noted above, what our civilization looks like. As such, it makes sense to believe that membership in certain groups confers meaningful advantages in life. Again, these advantages do not guarantee success, nor do they utterly exclude others from succeeding—they just rig the rolls, to go with the gaming analogy.

Interestingly, there are those who claim that the members of the above groups (straight, white, male, Christian) are the real victims today—not the groups who seem to be underrepresented in positions of power. I will turn to this subject in the next essay in this series.

 

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