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Am I an Envious Marxist? V: Marxism

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I promise this is the last in the series. As noted in previous essays, critics of capitalism are often accused of being Marxists and this attack is used to fallaciously justify rejecting their claims. The accusation of Marxism is also used as a signal with certain audiences; it is a way of saying that the target is a bad person and should be disliked. In most cases the target is not a Marxist—they are rather rare in the United Sates, even in higher education.

While some might suspect that philosophy departments would be infested with Marxists, this does not match my own professional experience. Large philosophy departments, such as those at Ohio State or Florida State, do sometimes have one seemingly token Marxist. Most professional philosophers do not embrace Marxism and a common view was best put forth my advisor when I told him I was taking a class on Analytical Marxism: “Analytical Marxism…that would be doubly vacuous.” While I do think that Marx and those who influenced have offered some useful insights into political philosophy, I was not won over by Marxism. Since Marxism is now a vast philosophy with uncounted variants I cannot go through all the points of disagreement I have with Marxism. Instead, I will focus on the main philosophical disagreements I have with classic Marxism.

While not focused on metaphysics, Marxism endorses metaphysical materialism and economic determinism. Materialism, in this context, is the view that reality is entirely composed of physical entities. This is usually contrasted with dualism, which is the view there are two basic types of entities: physical and immaterial. Descartes is a paradigm example of a dualist, since he argues for the distinction between mind and body. Marx’s materialism involves the obvious rejection of God. I’m a Cartesian dualist, so I most certainly part company with Marx here. I also am more of a skeptic regarding religion than an atheist, so I also part company with Marx here.

While economic determinism can be analyzed in a variety of ways, the oversimplified idea is that we are not free and are instead controlled by economic factors. This is not in the everyday sense that people are controlled by their need to work in order to survive, but in a more metaphysical sense. My argument for freedom is weak, but I rather like it. If we are not free, then I am caused to say that I believe we are free. I am wrong but could not do otherwise. If we are free, then I am right. A silly argument but perhaps the best that can be done. In any case, I reject economic determinism.

As part of this determinism, Marx believed that he could predict the future: the bourgeoise would shrink as the proletariat grew, leading to a revolution. This would give rise to socialism (the state owning all the means of production) which would end in communism (the state withers away and utopia is reached at last). While Marx was obviously right that wealth tends to be concentrated and that revolutions occur, I do not agree with his vision of the future—I tend to think that the state will endure as long as humans remain roughly as they are now. I can certainly imagine science-fiction scenarios in which the state no longer exists as a human institution; but these scenarios require far more change than Marx envisioned. In favor of my view is the fact that socialist states do not seem to be progressing towards the state withering away. “Communist” states like China seem to be doing the opposite—the state grows ever stronger.

Marx also believed in the existence of economic classes but this is something so obviously true and widely accepted that believing it would not make one a Marxist. If it did, we’d all be Marxists. Given how my views differ from Marxism, it is safe to conclude that I am not a Marxist.

It could be contended that I secretly hold to Marxism and am engaging in a Marxist form of taqiya: denying my true faith so as to remain hidden. This would require that I have been engaged in systematic lies when doing philosophy and have been living a comfortable middle-class life under capitalism in order to hide the truth. While not impossible, supporting this claim would require strong evidence. Merely being critical of the excesses and harms of current capitalism would not suffice as evidence of Marxism—or most people would be Marxists.

It could also be claimed that while I disagree with the core metaphysics of Marxism, I could still be a Marxist in some manner. While people do tend to be sloppy in their ideologies, this would be like saying that a person is a Christian despite their claims they reject the core metaphysics of that religion. This is not impossible, but would be a bit odd.

In closing, the truth of my claims and the quality of my arguments are unaffected by whether I am an envious Marxist. There is also no evidence of my being either envious or a Marxist—so such a charge seems to be either a set up for ad hominem attacks or simply signaling that I am “bad.”

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Am I an Envious Marxist IV? Accusation of Marxism & Secret/Real Ideology

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UNSPECIFIED – CIRCA 1865: Karl Marx (1818-1883), philosopher and German politician. (Photo by Roger Viollet Collection/Getty Images)

When certain conservatives attack academics a stock tactic is to accuse professors of being Marxists. It is also common for certain conservatives to accuse critics of capitalism of being Marxists (or Marxist-Socialist). In many cases these accusations are a rhetorical tactic—accusing professors and critics of being Marxists is to signal to a specific audience that these are bad people and should be disliked. The tactic is also often used in an ad hominem attack:

Premise 1: Person A makes claim C.

Premise 2: A is a Marxist.

Conclusion: C is false.

I like to use silly math examples to show that a fallacy is a fallacy—if the logic was good, then it could be used to refute basic mathematical truths. This shows that the logic is clearly bad. For example:

Premise 1: Karl claims that 2+2=4.

Premise 2: Karl is a Marxist.

Conclusion: 2+2 does not equal 4.

The power of the ad hominem is clearly not from the logic, but from the dislike the target audience feels towards the subject of the attack. Those who dislike Marxism will tend to let that dislike sway them so that they reject a claim made by someone accused of being a Marxist. Just as a person who loathes conservatives will illogically reject a claim made by a conservative simply because of their dislike of the conservative. As such, even if I were an envious Marxist, this would not refute any claims I have made, nor would it undercut any of my arguments. As always, claims and arguments stand or fall on their own merits.

Since Marxism is an ideology it is certainly fair to raise concerns that a Marxist would have ideological biases. But it would also be fair to point out that a capitalist would also have ideological biases. As would anyone who has an ideology or philosophical commitment. As such, while Marxists can be accused of bias, the same also applies to anyone who has any ideology that impacts their views. This is why such biases need to be considered when assessing a person’s credibility on a matter. For example, you would be wise to be critical of accepting the claim “capitalism must fail” from a famous Marxist just because they said it. Likewise, you would be wise to be critical of accepting the claim “capitalism is the best” from a famous capitalist just because they said it. But, as always, either claim must stand or fall on its own merits. As such, if I were a Marxist, you would be wise to be critical of how my bias might impact my claims—but accusing me of being a Marxist would not refute any claim I have made nor undercut any of my arguments. The same would apply if I were a devout capitalist.

Most people do not identify as Marxists, so the ad hominem attack is often preceded by the accusation that the person’s secret/real ideology is Marxism. If the target denies they are a Marxist, a common tactic is to assert that is just what a secret Marxist would say. Secret Ideology (or Real Ideology) is a rhetorical technique in which a person accuses another of having a secret, typically bad, ideology such as Marxism or fascism.  The accuser often claims a special insight or understanding into the mind of the accused—which is why they somehow know the person’s secret ideology. While primarily a rhetorical device (and hence not an argument) it can also be cast as a fallacy:

Premise 1: Person A asserts that person B has a secret/real ideology.

Conclusion: B has that secret/real ideology.

The error occurs when A fails to provide adequate evidence in support of their claim that the other person has a secret/real ideology. This is not to say that “evidence” will never be provided; but what is offered fails to support their claim. For example, the “evidence” of being a Marxist might be that the person has been critical of the excesses of capitalism while not endorsing any definitive tenets of Marxism. But the accuser somehow “knows” that the accused is secretly a Marxist—apparently through some exceptional epistemic abilities. While the high point of accusations of Marxism was during the Cold War, it has returned to being in vogue—anyone who is critical of capitalism or works in higher education might find themselves accused of being secret Marxists.

The defense against this technique is objectively assess whether adequate evidence exists for the accusation of the secret/real ideology. If not, the claim should not be accepted. It must also be remembered that even if a person has a (bad or good) ideology, this is irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments. In the next essay I will take a brief look at Marxism and show why I am not a Marxist.

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Am I an Envious Marxist? III: Secret Motive

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My plan was to write about Marxism but the subject of envy demanded more attention. So, this essay will continue the discussion of envy and will also cover the tactic of Secret Motive.

As noted in previous essays, one tactic used against those critical of current capitalism is to accuse them of being motivated by envy. As an argument, the Accusation of Envy is a fallacy—it is merely a variant of the classic ad hominem fallacy. However, as was noted in the previous essay, a person’s envy could bias them on a subject and thus impact their credibility on that subject. Even in cases where envy is relevant to credibility, proof of envy has no relevance to the truth of the person’s claims or the quality of their arguments. From a rhetorical standpoint, such attacks can be effective: if someone is convinced another person is motivated by envy, they will often dismiss their claims and arguments for psychological rather than logical reasons. Some people also seem to enjoy attacking those they disagree with and casting them as being corrupted with vices. So, how would one tell if another person is envious?

My rough account of envy is that it involves an improper desire for what someone else has and the feeling includes an unwarranted resentment towards the possessor of the desired thing.  It often includes the desire to unjustly take it from the other person. An envious person would tend to be unable to get what they desire—if they could, they would presumably cease their envy (though they might become jealous). Determining if a person is envious would require assessing that person in terms of these factors in a fair and objective way.

Much of this would be determining if the person had an improper desire for what someone else has. If a person shows no interest in their alleged object of desire, the accusation of envy would seem unwarranted. Even if a person is interested in this thing, it must be shown that there is a defect in their desire and that unwarranted resentment is present. Consider the difference between training hard to be as good a basketball player as Jordan because he is an athlete you respect and sourly begrudging him his ability because you wish you had his talent. Discerning the presence of unwarranted resentment would involve assessing the person’s words and deeds relative t0 the target of the alleged envy. Due caution must be taken to distinguish criticism and even anger from unwarranted resentment. Consider the difference between being justly angry at someone who has stolen from you and being unjustly resentful of someone who has done well in an area where you have failed. If fair and objective assessment shows that the person is suffering from envy, then it would be fair to make that claim. But this would still be utterly irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments.

In some cases, people will make their envy clear: they will express bitter, yet unwarranted, resentment and have a string of failed attempts to acquire what they desire. They might even admit to their envy. In other cases, it will be harder to determine if a person is driven by envy. After all, strong criticism can resemble unwarranted resentment and just anger can arise from a string of unfair failures. For example, a person who tries to start a small business and is repeatedly driven out of business by corporate franchises could be seen as having righteous anger at an unfair system or cast as a failure who is green with envy at their betters. If a person does not show clear signs of envy or denies that they are envious, one tactic that can be used is Secret Motive.

Secret Motive (or Real Motive) is a rhetorical technique in which a person accuses another of having a secret, typically bad, motive for their claims, arguments or actions. That is, they are being accused of having a real motive that is bad. This is often a set up for an ad hominem attack built around the alleged secret/real motive. For example, a critic of current capitalism is accused of envy, but denies it and aside from their criticism there seems to be no grounds for asserting they are corrupted by envy. The simple solution is to insist that their real motivation is envy—despite the utter lack of evidence. The accuser often claims a special insight or understanding into the psychology of the accused—which is why they somehow know the person’s secret motive. While primarily a rhetorical device (and hence not an argument) it can also be cast as a fallacy:

Premise 1: Person A asserts that person B has a secret/real motive.

Conclusion: B has a secret motive.

The error occurs when A fails to provide adequate evidence in support of their claim that the other person has a secret motive. This is not to say that “evidence” will never be provided; but what is offered fails to support their claim. For example, the “evidence” of envy might be that the person has been critical of the rich, though they have never expressed resentment at earned wealth and have never showed much interest in becoming rich. But the accuser somehow “knows” that the accused is secretly envious—apparently through some exceptional epistemic abilities.

The defense against this technique is objectively assess whether adequate evidence exists for the accusation of the secret motive. If not, the claim should not be accepted. It must also be remembered that even if a person has a bad (secret or not) motive, this is irrelevant to the truth of their claims and the quality of their arguments.

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Am I an Envious Marxist? II: Envy

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As noted in the previous essay, critics of the current American capitalism are often accused of being envious and/or Marxists to refute their criticisms. As shown in that essay, even if a critic is envious of the rich, it would be a fallacy to conclude that their criticism is therefore wrong. But it could be argued that a person’s envy can bias them and thus diminish their credibility. I will look at this matter and then turn to an examination of envy. I will then engage in some self-reflection on whether I am envious.

Since envy involves resentment an envious person could have a bias against the target of their envy and see that target in an unwarranted or exaggerated negative light. This might occur for a variety of reasons, such as a desire to explain away their own failures or feel better by attributing negative qualities to their target. For example, a person who envies the rich might be inclined to explain their own lack of wealth in terms of the machinations of the wealthy and “the system” while also attributing to the rich such qualities as greed, dishonesty and corruption. Thus, it is certainly possible that an envious person could be strongly biased against the target of their envy.  If such a bias exists, then the envious person’s credibility would be reduced proportional to their bias. This is because they would be more inclined to accept and make negative claims and reject positive ones about the target of their envy. So, it would certainly be rational to consider the possible influence of bias when assessing claims.

But the mere possibility of bias is not proof of bias—there would need to be evidence that the person 1) is envious and 2) is biased by this envy. If this evidence exists, then there would be grounds for considering the impact of this bias on the person’s claims on this matter. This approach can have merit in the context of the Argument from Authority.

An Argument from Authority occurs when it is argued that a claim should be accepted because the person making it is an authority on the subject. The form is this:

Premise 1: Person A is an authority/expert on subject S.

Premise 2: A says P about S.

Conclusion: P is true.

This inductive argument is assessed in terms of the quality of the expert and this includes considering whether the expert is significantly biased or not. If an expert is biased to a degree that would render them untrustworthy, then accepting a claim they make in this area would be an error of logic. If I were so envious of the rich that I was significantly biased against them, then unsupported claims I make about them should not be accepted as true based on my (alleged) expertise.

But even if it is established that the person is extremely envious and extremely biased, this would still not disprove their claims—the claims stand or fall on their own; to think otherwise would be to fall into the Accusation of Envy fallacy discussed in the previous essay. The logical response to bias is thus not to reject the claims, but to subject them to the proper scrutiny. Even if I was shown to be extremely envious of the rich, it would not follow that my claims about capitalism are false—they would need to be assessed on their own merit.  But am I envious of the rich? To answer this, I need to consider the nature of envy.

At its core, envy involves wanting what someone else has. This can range from a possession to a quality. But merely wanting what someone else has is not the defining feature of envy. You might want to have the artistic skills to match Rembrandt, but this need not make you envious. Envy includes a resentment towards the possessor of the desired thing and usually includes the desire to take it from the other person. But even this does not properly capture envy. Suppose that you enter into business with a trusted friend, but they end up betraying you and fleeing the country with your money. You want the money, you resent that they have it, and you desire that it be taken away from them. But it would be wrong to say that you are envious of them. More must be added to the recipe for envy.

One plausible addition is that the resentment must be unwarranted and that the desire is improper in some relevant way. In the case of the hypothetical friend who betrayed you, your resentment would be warranted and the desire for the money would be proper. Establishing a claim of envy would thus require showing that a person wants what another has, that they unjustly resent that the other person has it, and that there is something improper about their desire for it. Envy also tends to involve an inability on the part of the envious to get what they desire—if they could, they would not be envious.  The envious person thus suffers from a series of moral failings relative to their desire. While this is hardly a necessary and sufficient definition of “envy” it should suffice for sorting out whether I am envious of the rich.

To be envious of the rich, I would need to want to be rich.  I would also need an unjust resentment of the rich, an improper desire to be rich, and perhaps a desire that the rich no longer be rich and an inability to become rich. Let us walk through each of these in turn.  While I do not deny that I want to have money (food and running shoes are not free), I do not have a desire to be one of the rich. As for evidence, my life choices have not been aimed at becoming rich. For example, I earned my doctorate in philosophy and then became a professor.  While I write books, these are in philosophy and gaming—areas that are not particularly known for profitable best-sellers. If I wanted to be one of the rich, I would be going about it in a rather ineffective way. But it could be contended that while I want to be rich, I lack the ability to do so and have been stuck with what I have done.

The easy and obvious reply is that given I had the ability to complete a doctorate, I also had the ability to complete a far more lucrative advanced degree. Given that I was a college athlete and still train regularly despite numerous injuries, I can stick to challenging tasks and persist through difficulties. While it would be immodest to go through my strengths and accomplishments, suffice it to say that I could have certainly succeeded in a career far more profitable than being a professor if I desired to be rich. I am not saying that I would be rich; simply that if I wanted to be rich, I could have put myself on a path far more likely to achieve that result than a career in philosophy. If being rich was my goal, then I would have tried. If I had turned out to be a bitter failure at attempting to get rich, then the charge of envy could have some merit. But to say that I am envious of what I never aimed for would be odd indeed. One could certainly make that charge and claim some secret knowledge of my motives, but that would be mere unsupported speculation.

I certainly do not unjustly resent the rich who have earned their wealth. I do admit that I have a negative view towards those who have acquired wealthy unjustly, who use their wealth to the detriment of others, or who have merely squandered the opportunities their wealth afforded them. I do believe that the current system is unfair, but I do not feel indignation that I have been treated unfairly—rather I feel moral anger at the morally wrong aspects of the economic system we have created and perpetuate.

I do admit that I think that the rich should have less wealth—that they should contribute more to the United States and do more good with their wealth. But I also think that everyone should use more of their resources to do good, myself included. Like most people, I do not always live up to my moral ideals. But I do not want the rich to be stripped of their wealth and left poor—being poor in America is a terrible thing, so I do not want that.  

As such, while I do have a negative view of some rich people and I have serious criticisms of the current economic system, I do not envy the rich. And even if I did, this would be irrelevant to any criticisms I make. In my next essay I will look at the accusation that I am a Marxist and this drives my criticism of the moral defects in capitalism.

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Am I an Envious Marxist? I: Accusation of Envy

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I am, on occasion, critical of certain aspects of capitalism. I am, on occasion, accused of being motivated in these criticisms by two defects of character. The first is being envious. The second is being a Marxist. Or if not red, at least pink. And if not pink, at least a fellow traveler. If these were attacks aimed only at me, they would be of little general interest. However, accusing critics of capitalism of being motivated by envy and/or Marxism is a common tactic and hence worthy of assessment. I will begin with the accusation of envy.

One stock attack of those critical of capitalism is to accuse them of being motivated by envy. While this attack is generally not presented as a developed argument, the idea is to refute the criticism by attacking the critic’s motive. That is, their critical claims are false because they are envious of, one assumes, those who are winners under the existing version of capitalism. As should be obvious, this reasoning is fallacious and can be regarded as an ad homimen.  I have addressed this fallacy in the past and decided it was worth naming it. I ended up with Accusation of Envy or Refutation by Envy. This fallacious argument has the following form:

Premise 1: Person P makes critical claim C about X.

Premise 2: P is accused of envy (typically relating to X).

Conclusion: Therefore, claim C is false.

This is a fallacy because whether a person is envious or not has no bearing on the truth of the claims they make. Even if a person were entirely motivated by envy, it does not follow that the criticisms they make are thus in error. The following example should nicely illustrate that this “reasoning” is flawed:

Sam: “When tyrants oppress their people and commit genocide, they are acting wrongly.”

Sally: “Why you are just envious of tyrants. So, you are wrong. They are acting justly and morally.”

Another, absurd example, involves math:

Cool Joe: “2+2 = 7.”

Mathematician Mary: “That is wrong; 2+2=4.”

Cool Joe: “You are just envious of my being so cool. And rich. And handsome. So, you are wrong. 2+2 =7.”

Cool Cathy: “Oh, Joe, you are so right, and Mary is so wrong. Work through your envy and maybe you’ll get a man someday. Or whatever you are into.”

Even if Mary seethed with envy towards Joe, it would hardly follow that she is wrong about 2+2 adding up to 4. The example is intended to be absurd, because its absurdity lays bare that this reasoning is fallacious.  If this logic was good, it would be easy to “disprove” anything—be it basic truths of math or criticisms of capitalism.

As such, accusing me or anyone of envy does not refute any claims made by the target of the accusation. Since it is a fallacy, it might be wondered why someone would use this tactic.

One possibility is that the fallacy is the best the person has; they have no argument against the claim and are resorting to fallacies because of this. A second possibility is that while fallacies are logically flawed, they can be very powerful persuasive tools. As a practical matter “winning” an argument has nothing to do with truth or the quality of the logic; it is about persuading the target audience that you are right. Whether you are right or not. Ad hominems are very effective psychologically, so this tactic can be a winning one.

It might be wondered whether a person’s envy (or lack of envy) can be relevant. While it is, as shown above, irrelevant to the truth of their claims, it could be a relevant factor is assessing someone’s bias. It must be noted that even if a person is biased, it does not follow that their claim must be false.  It is to the matter of envy and credibility that I will turn in the next essay.

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Accountability for Supporters

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After the Culinary Union expressed criticism of Sander’s Medicare for all plan, members were subject to savage attacks via phone, email and tweets. It was inferred that most of the vitriol was coming from Bernie supporters and the media has been critical of Sanders. To avoid having the discussion fall into the distorting pit of ideology, my goal will be to address the general subject of when candidates are accountable for the actions of their supporters. My intent is to present neutral standards that are applicable across the American political spectrum.

One obvious standard is that before a candidate (or other leader) is blamed for the actions of their supporters (or followers), it must be established that the alleged supporters are (probably) real supporters. After all, anyone from Russian intelligence to Hillary Clinton could be behind twitter handles such as @trumpwhitemasterace8869 and @berniebromaxmarxchronic42069. Anyone can send an email or make a phone call and purport to be supporting a candidate and it makes excellent sense to try to damage a candidate by trying to create the appearance that their supporters are engaging in threats and attacks.  A clever and unscrupulous candidate facing criticism about their supporters will this to their advantage—claiming that the bad behavior attributed to their supporters is the work of nefarious forces posing as supporters. As such, while sorting out who is and who is not a supporter is essential to sorting out responsibility, it will be very difficult to do in this age of technological anonymity and trickery. But suppose that supporters can be identified with reasonable confidence—that is, threats and attacks can be confirmed as originating from supporters of a specific candidate. The challenge is to sort out how accountable the candidate is for such behavior.

Since supporters take cues from candidates the character and behavior of a candidate can influence the behavior of supporters. Various character traits of a candidate can impact their supporters. On the negative side, a candidate who is petty, vindictive, angry, ill-tempered and lacking in impulse control will tend to attract supporters with similar qualities and influence them to emulate the candidate. As such, these traits would tend to increase the accountability of the candidate—they are more likely to have a role in the bad behavior of their supporters. On the positive side, a candidate who is calm, even-tempered, and compassionate will tend to attract supporters with similar temperaments and influence them to imitate the candidate. As such, these traits would tend to lead supporters to be less likely to engage in bad behavior. Thus, a virtuous candidate would seem to less accountable for bad behavior on the part of their followers than a candidate tainted with vices.

An obvious criticism of this standard is that supporters often select candidates that differ from them in character and one can question the influence of the character of a candidate on their supporters. Behavior, however, seems to be a stronger factor.

A candidate’s behavior is likely to attract certain types of supporters who are more or less prone to engage in bad behavior. The candidate’s behavior can also serve to influence their supporters. On the negative side, a candidate who engages in angry attacks, threats, insults and name-calling is likely to attract supporters who will engage in the same behavior and influence supporters to behave badly. On the positive side, a candidate who is respectful, polite, and civil in their behavior will tend to attract followers with similar behavior and influence them to emulate their behavior. As such, a candidate that behaves well is less accountable for bad behavior by their supporters—for they are less likely to influencing these supporters in bad ways.

This view can certainly be challenged, and one might argue that the behavior of a candidate has little drawing power or influence—this would be to make a partial case against candidates being accountable for their supporters.

The content of a candidate’s message, ideology and policies can also impact the behavior of their supporters. This content will attract certain sorts of supporters and influence them. On the negative side, a candidate who embraces a content rife with racism, sexism, xenophobia, fear, hate and anger will tend to attract supporters inclined to bad behavior and influence them to behave badly.  A candidate who is a sincere racist, sexist, etc. will be engaged in their own attacks and threats—thus encouraging their supporters. On the positive side, a candidate who embraces content opposing racism, sexism, and xenophobia while encouraging courage, love and compassion will tend to attract supporters who behave better and influence their behavior. A candidate who is sincere in opposing racism, sexism and such will generally not engage in threats and attacks; they will tend to be addressing such things. Thus, a candidate with virtuous content will be less accountable than one with vicious content—virtue generally does not inspire bad behavior, while vicious content certainly can.

One could argue that content does not influence supporters, though this seems implausible. One could also argue that a person could truly embrace racism, sexism and such and still be well-behaved and have well-behaved followers; this is not impossible but seems unlikely. One could also argue that a candidate who sincerely opposes racism, sexism and such can be badly behaved and lead their supporters to engage in savage, unwarranted attacks. While this is not impossible, this seems more like propaganda rather than an accurate description of how such people would behave.

A final, and critical, standard is the extent to which the candidate controls their supporters and is able to cause them to act or not act. To the degree that a candidate controls their supporters they can be held accountable for the actions of those supporters.

The degree of control will obviously vary greatly—some supporters are tepid in their support and unlikely to be controlled by the candidate. On the other extreme are fanatically devoted supporters who will obey the candidate. In general, American voters tend to be closer to the tepid side and far from the fanatical side. However, people can still be causally impacted by candidates. Assigning blame requires sorting out the power of the candidate over the badly behaving supporters and determining if they are acting in accord with the wishes of the candidate. This is a critical point as well. To use an obvious analogy, John Hinckley tried to kill President Reagan because of his obsession with Jodie Foster. But she had neither knowledge of her effect on him nor a desire to have him kill Reagan. As such, while Jodie Foster was a causal factor in the attempted assassination, she bears no moral accountability. The same can obviously hold true for followers of candidates.

While this is not an exact method, sorting out accountability for the bad behavior of supporters requires assessing the influence of the candidate’s character and behavior, the influence of the content of their views, the extent to which they control their supporters and their intent relative to the bad behavior of their supporters.

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