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Blasey & Kavanaugh V: Parity of Reasoning, Bias & Politics

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An argument advanced by some defenders of Judge Kavanaugh is that Dr. Blasey’s claim that he assaulted her should be rejected because the Democrats stand to gain from it. In reply, some defenders of Dr. Blasey contend that Kavanaugh’s claim is untrue because the Republicans stand to gain if he is telling the truth. This provides an important real-world context in which to discuss the philosophical method of parity of reasoning as well as the relevance of bias in assessing claims.

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The basic idea between the method of parity of reasoning is that if the structure of logic of one argument is good (or bad), then an argument with the same logical structure will thus (by analogy) be good (or bad). In the case of deductive logic, if an argument is valid (such that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true), then any argument of the same form is also valid. Likewise, if a deductive argument is invalid (such that all the premises could be true while the conclusion is false), then any argument of the same form is also invalid. To illustrate, consider the following valid argument:

 

Premise 1: If today is Thursday, then tomorrow is Friday.

Premise 2: Today is Thursday.

Conclusion: Tomorrow is Friday.

 

Since the argument is valid, any argument using the same reasoning will also be valid—regardless of the content. This argument is, obviously enough, modus ponens (also known as affirming the antecedent). It has the following form:

 

Premise 1: If P, then Q.

Premise 2: P

Conclusion: Q

 

Thus, deductive arguments are ideal for using the method of parity of reasoning—in fact, this method of analogy is a standard tool for assessing whether an argument is valid or invalid. The main downside is that using this method does require already knowing the relevant valid and invalid argument forms.

In the case of inductive logic (arguments in which true premises are supposed to make it likely that the conclusion is true), the matter is more complicated. This is because two inductive arguments could have the same logical form, yet one could be strong and the other weak. This is because the strength of an inductive argument is not just a matter of the logical structure, but also a matter of the specific standards used to assess inductive reasoning. Consider, for example, an argument by analogy:

 

Premise 1: X has properties P, Q, R.

Premise 2: Y has properties P, Q, R.

Premise 3: X has property Z.

Conclusion: Y has property Z.

 

Strong and weak arguments of this sort have the same form; they differ in the strength of the reasoning based on how similar X and Y are in relevant ways. As such, the strength of an inductive argument cannot be assessed just by considering the structure of the reasoning. I now turn to one of the arguments used to argue against the claim made by Dr. Blasey.

One of the arguments being deployed against the Democrats is this one:

 

Premise 1: The Democrats claim that Blasey’s claim (that she was assaulted by Kavanaugh) is true.

Premise 2: The Democrats have a political interest in blocking Kavanaugh.

Conclusion: Blasey’s claim is false.

 

While this reasoning will probably appeal to those who oppose the Democrats, it is important to consider the form of the argument and not just whether the claims are appealing to one’s ideology. Put in the abstract, the argument has the following form:

 

Premise 1: Party P claims C about subject S.

Premise 2: Party P has a political interest in subject S.

Conclusion: Claim C is false.

 

If this logic is good, then the following argument against the Republicans would, by parity of reasoning, also be good logic:

 

Premise 1: The Republicans claim that Blasey’s claim is false.

Premise 2: The Republicans have a political interest in getting Kavanaugh through.

Conclusion: It is false that Blasey’s claim is false (that is, it is true).

 

While those who dislike the Republicans might find this argument appealing, Republicans would certainly reject it. But, if the logic works against Democrats, then it should also work just as well against Republicans. Logic is, after all, without partisan bias.

Fortunately for both parties, this inductive argument is rather weak. Even if a party has an interest in a claim being false it does not follow that it is false.  To conclude that interest in a claim (that is, having a stake in the matter) disproves a person’s claim is a classic ad hominem fallacy. The specific version is often called the circumstantial ad hominin, because the claim is discredited because of the source’s circumstances (in this case, having a stake in the matter). To illustrate, imagine that Sam owns a small bookstore and argues that a tax break for small business owners would be good for the economy. While it is sensible to consider his bias, it does not follow that these tax breaks would not be good for the economy.

Interest (having a stake in a matter) is, however, relevant to assessing the credibility of a source. If a party has an interest in a claim, then they have less credibility in this matter than a similar source that is not impacted by this biasing factor. Disproving a claim requires more than just showing interest or bias in the matter, it requires directly assessing the claim. As such, the fact that the Democrats would benefit from Blasey’s accusation being true does not prove it is not true. Likewise, the fact that the Republicans would benefit from it being true that Kavanaugh is innocent does not prove he assaulted Blasey.

 

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Blasey & Kavanaugh IV: Sins of the Past

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As this is being written, Dr. Blasey has yet to testify before the Senate. At this point, the most critical issue is whether the accusation is true. If it is, this raises the matter of morally assessing a person today for what they did in the past. Obviously enough, a person is not morally accountable for misdeeds they did not commit.

When consider present accountability for past misdeeds, one obvious concern is whether the person was morally accountable when they did the misdeed. If they were morally accountable, there arises the question of the degree of accountability. As discussed in previous essays, factors such as age and intoxication can have an impact on a person’s moral agency and thus on their accountability. The first accusation against Kavanaugh is from when he was a minor and it is alleged that he was drunk. Both factors could be taken to mitigate a person’s moral accountability, but it would be unreasonable to accept that they would eliminate all moral accountability. The second accusation against Kavanaugh is that he engaged in sexual misconduct at a party while drunk. If the accusation is true, Kavanaugh would have been an adult at the time—albeit a young adult and this would be relevant to considering the degree of agency and accountability. Naturally, it could be argued that at that age he would have full agency and accountability. If he was drunk at the time, this could also be taken as a mitigating factor because of the impact on his agency. However, as argued in an earlier essay, the drunk defense is not a very effective defense. As such, if Kavanaugh committed these alleged misdeeds, then it is reasonable to hold him morally accountable—while factoring in his age and intoxication.
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A second matter of concern when assessing the impact of past misdeeds is whether the person was punished for these misdeeds. To use the obvious analogy, if the punishment was just and proportional, then it would be like paying off a debt. It is not that the punishment would erase the misdeed, but the person would have paid for their misdeed. If the punishment was inadequate, then this would be analogous to only partially paying off a debt.  If Kavanaugh committed the alleged misdeeds, he was not punished for them, hence they would remain on his moral ledger. There is also the concern that a person could be punished for a misdeed yet remain unchanged—which leads to the matter of repentance.

In general terms, true repentance involves the person recognizing that their action was wrong, that they feel remorse for what they did, and that they are unlikely to do the misdeed again because of a change in their character (which can be as simple as learning that something is wrong). From a moral standpoint, if a person repents a misdeed, then this would impact the current moral assessment of the person they are. After all, while a repentant person acknowledges they have done wrong, they have taken steps to address their misdeed. Since it is not known (to those other than the people involved) whether Kavanaugh committed the alleged misdeeds, it is also not known whether he repented (or if he needed to do so).

A final area of assessment is, obviously enough, the person’s current character relative to their past character. If a person who committed a misdeed has changed in appositive manner regarding their virtues and vices, then the weight of the judgment should be on their current character. To use a sports analogy, while a person’s past athletic performances remain in place historically, what matters more now is their current abilities. As an illustration, while I once ran a 2:45 marathon, I can no longer do that, and my athletic ability should not be assessed on what I did then, but what I can do now. In the case of being a better person, what wrongs a person did in the past matter, but what matters more in assessing them now is the sort of person they are today.

Assessing a person does, obviously, include assessing their history. So, if a person committed a misdeed, has not done serious wrongs since then and has improved meaningfully as a person, then their past misdeeds should not completely define how they are assessed today. While some might not be inclined to apply this approach to Kavanaugh (if he committed the alleged misdeeds), as with all principles there is a moral and logical requirement to be consistent in its application.

If Kavanaugh did not commit the alleged misdeeds, then they cannot be used to assess him morally. If he did, then they would be relevant. However, the current assessment would need to consider his current character. Naturally enough, if he is lying about the events in question, then this would make the assessment a matter of current misdeeds rather than the alleged sins of the past.

 

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Blasey & Kavanaugh III: The Drunk Defense

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According to Blasey, Kavanaugh was drunk when he assaulted her. While people sometimes try the drunk defense, it is usually not particularly effective. It is, however, a matter of philosophical interest, if only because John Locke considered the subject in his discussion of personal identity.

Locke argued, at length, that a person is their consciousness. Roughly put, memory is the basis of personal identity. Locke carefully distinguishes being the same person from being the same man. Being the same man for Locke involves being a collection of matter bound together by the same life; this could be looked at as biological rather than personal identity. When Locke considers the drunk defense, he notes that drunkenness could result in a person being unable to remember what was done. And if the person did not remember, then there would be no continuity of personal identity—thus, they would not be that person. Locke does note that human law, which must rely on the available facts, does not accept the drunk defense. After all, there is currently no way to establish or disprove a claim of metaphysical identity. As a practical matter, guilt goes along with being the same man (or woman) and this is not changed by a person being drunk. Since God is omniscient, He knows whether it was truly the same person or not and punishes accordingly. As such, unless God does a full memory restore on Judgment Day, people would not be morally accountable for what they permanently cannot remember because they would not be the person who did those actions. From a practical standpoint, Locke does note that the metaphysics of personal identity is not relevant—so the moral drunk defense would not work until Judgment Day (or until there is a means of determining metaphysical identity). Laying aside the metaphysics of personal identity, there are also important questions about moral agency and intoxication.   

Intoxication, by its nature, impairs a person’s capacity to make judgments. As such, it is reasonable to consider that intoxication would impact a person’s agency. One controversial subject regarding agency is, of course, the matter of consent. The extreme end of the spectrum admits an easy and obvious answer to the question of consent: a person who is unconscious or almost completely incapacitated due to intoxication is incapable of granting consent. At the other end of the spectrum, a completely sober person (who is otherwise competent) can give consent. Between these two extremes lies a realm of controversy because it is not clear at what point exactly a person can no longer grant consent. It would, because of the line drawing fallacy (to reason that because one cannot draw an exact line between X and Y it follows there no way to distinguish between X and Y), be unreasonable to insist that precise boundary be drawn. Rather, we must settle on a somewhat fuzzy boundary and accept that their will be controversial cases. Fortunately, I do not even need to sketch the boundaries here, for the discussion will focus on cases in which one or more of the people involved are too intoxicated to consent.

If a person is too intoxicated to consent (and has not given prior permission), then engaging in sexual activity on them would be sexual assault (or rape). This is because the person’s intoxication has deprived them of the agency needed to grant consent. If it is agreed that intoxication can impair agency to a degree that consent is not possible, then it must be asked whether intoxication can impair agency to a degree that a person who engages in assault is not morally accountable for their actions.

One obvious point that might be brought up here is that a person incapacitated by intoxication would not be physically able to engage in assault while a person incapacitated by intoxication could still be assaulted. This is obviously true, so the matter hinges on whether there is a level at which a person is so intoxicated they cannot give consent, yet still capable of physically engaging in assault. If not, then the matter is settled. However, this does not seem to be the case—it does seem that there are levels of intoxication at which a person’s agency is so impaired that they cannot give consent, yet they are still physically capable of engaging in assault or rape. One can imagine someone who is stumbling drunk, cannot form complete sentences or thoughts and is yet capable of groping or engaging in sexual activity. As such, there does seem to be a matter to settle here.

If it is accepted that there is a level of intoxication at which a person lacks the agency to grant consent, yet is still physically capable of sexual assault, then the question is whether this lack of agency extends to accountability for sexual assault (or other evil actions). On the face of it, if a person lacks the agency to make judgments that allow them to consent, they also lack the agency to make judgments that would make them accountable for their actions. One way to look at the matter is that a lack of agency transforms a person into an object. While an object, like a falling tree, can do a lot of damage, it cannot be held accountable because it lacks the agency that grounds accountability. The obvious problem with this view is that while sufficiently intoxicated people cannot grant consent, it entails that sufficiently intoxicated people cannot be accountable for sexual assault.

One way to counter this view is to argue that an intoxicated person has their agency impaired rather than eliminated, so that an adult becomes analogous to a child (or animal). On this view, an impaired victim cannot grant consent because they lack the agency to do so. An attacker would, however, still retain enough agency to be accountable. To use an analogy, they would be like a dog that bites someone: the dog does not grasp concepts like consent but is still expected to know not to attack humans. As such, an intoxicated person would not be capable of granting consent but would still be accountable for attacking someone. The challenge here would be to argue that a person intoxicated to the degree that they cannot consent still retains enough agency to be accountable for engaging in non-consensual sexual activities.

A plausible approach is to argue that consent requires more agency and mental competence than recognizing assault and knowing that it is wrong. To use an analogy, an intoxicated person would be hard pressed to operate a complicated machine or solve a challenging logic or math problem, but they can still engage in basic tasks like opening another beer or working a remote control. So, expecting an intoxicated person to make judgments about giving their consent would be unreasonable, but expecting an intoxicated person to know better than to assault someone would be quite sensible.

 

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Blasey & Kavanaugh II: Accountability of Youth

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While the Kavanaugh hearings are about a specific political battle, the accusation by Blasey raises important questions about moral accountability. The legal aspects, of course, are a matter for lawmakers and judges.

According to Blasey, she was sexually assaulted by a drunken Kavanaugh when she was 15 and he was 17. While it is evident that sexual assault is wrong, there is the question about the extent to which a 17-year-old attacker is morally accountable. As scientific research shows, the brains of teenagers are significantly different from adults in ways that would seem to make them less accountable for their actions. There is also the fact that children have less experience than adults and are learning how to operate as human beings within legal, social and moral norms. This is not to say that children are devoid of moral agency; it is just to point out the obvious: children are less morally accountable than adults, a fact which is generally enshrined in law.

Since the alleged incident involves sexual assault, it is relevant to bring up the matter of consent. As a general rule children lack the competence to consent and this provides part of the foundation for laws regarding statutory rape. If children lack the competence to consent, then one must consider whether they lack the competence to understand a refusal of consent. If the inability to given consent is based on an inability to understand the concept, then this would seem to also apply to understanding a lack of consent. This view would seem to have an awful entailment about sexual assaults conducted by children: since they cannot understand consent, they cannot be held morally accountable for acting without the consent of others. So, a 17-year-old who assaults a 15-year-old could use the excuse that children lack an understanding of consent, which seems monstrous.

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This could be countered by arguing that while children do not understand the concept of consent enough to give consent, they do understand it enough to be accountable for acting against someone without consent. So, while a 15-year-old could not give consent to a 17-year-old, the 17-year-old is competent enough to understand that such acting without (or even with) consent would be harmful and hence wrong.

Another approach is to argue that it is not a matter of understanding. So, even if a child understood the concept of consent, they could still not give consent because they lack the other qualities needed to give consent. As such, children could understand consent and that acting without it is wrong, yet remain unable to give consent. This does raise the question of whether a person who cannot give consent would thus also have a moral status such that they could not violate consent. To use a legal analogy, a person who cannot legally enter a contract could also not be held accountable for breaking a contract. This, obviously enough, is problematic.

One approach is to insist, with righteous indignation, that while children cannot give consent, they can still act in ways that violate the consent they cannot give. So, while a 15-year-old cannot consent to a 17-year-old, if the 17-year-old assaults the 15-year-old, they are still morally accountable—even though the 17-year-old also lacks the moral status needed to grant consent.  Since children still have some moral agency and can be expected to realize that it is wrong to assault other people, this makes sense. As such, while children cannot consent (perhaps even to other children), they (in general) would have sufficient moral agency to be accountable for sexual assault. Naturally, the moral (and legal) assessment should consider the impact of being a child has on a person’s decision making and, in general, a child should not be held to the same moral standards as an adult. This is not to say that the children should have a free pass on their misdeeds, simply that they should not be evaluated as adults. This does not, obviously enough, address the current accountability of an adult who engaged in sexual assault or other evil acts as a child. This will be addressed in an upcoming essay.

 

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Blasey & Kavanaugh I: Assessing the Claim

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While the Democrats did their feeble best to slow down the process, it looked like Brett Kavanaugh would sail through quickly and smoothly. Then an accusation by Dr. Christine Blasey Ford came to light. Blasey claimed that Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her when they were both teenagers. Kavanaugh has denied the accusation. While the incident is alleged to have taken place over thirty years ago, his recent denial makes the event immediately relevant. After all, if it did occur, then Kavanaugh’s denial would be a lie (assuming he remembered the incident; if he did not, then his denial would merely be untrue). As such, the fundamental question is whether the claim is true.

While it is common for such accusations to be met with attacks on the accuser, the Republicans have decided to focus on attacking the Democrats rather than Blasey. This is, of course, after some efforts to attack the alleged victim.  From a pragmatic standpoint, this is a smart approach. After all, the #MeToo movement has (at least temporarily) made it so that attacking purported victims tends to be either ineffective or counterproductive. Once the #MeToo movement fades, this might change, and the old tactics might become the standard once again.

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As would be expected, one of the main responses to the accusation by Blasey is that the Democrats are using her accusation as a political tool to slow down the process. As of this writing, Blasey has stated that she wants the FBI to investigate the matter before she testifies. This could be a reasonable request: Blasey does not want to go before congress in a mere “he said, she said” situation. An FBI investigation would provide much more in the way of facts, thus allowing the accusation to be supported or countered. Blasey’s supporters have claimed that this desire to have the FBI investigate is additional evidence that she is telling the truth. If she were lying, she would not want the FBI to investigate the matter and show that her claim is untrue.

Those who are critical of Blasey can contend that she runs no risk by asking the FBI to investigate the incident even if they find nothing to support her claim (or even evidence against it). They can also point out that this investigation would delay the confirmation process and argue that the Democrats are trying to slow down matters until the upcoming election. While these points are relevant in terms of showing that the Democrats have an interest in the matter (which biases them), they obviously do not prove that Blasey is lying. After all, the accusation can both be true and be used by the Democrats to slow down the process. As such, the fact that the Democrats are benefiting from the accusation does not disprove the claim. What is needed is, of course, evidence for or against the claim.

While Blasey claims that Kavanaugh assaulted her, he denies it. Blasey also alleges that Mark Judge was present at the incident. Both men deny the event occurred and even deny being at the party. Since Blasey claims that only Kavanaugh and Judge were present, the only available evidence at this time is their assertions, thus making this a “he said, she said” scenario. However, since Judge and Kavanaugh deny attending the party, there would be witnesses for that claim. There is, however, the obvious problem that people would be asked to recall who attended a party over thirty years ago (assuming there is no other evidence, such as photos).

Supporters of Blasey do point to 2012 notes from a therapist in which Blasey mentions being attacked and that she told her husband one of the men was Kavanaugh. While this does provide some support for her claim, an objective analysis does reveal some problems. One point of concern is that the 2012 therapist notes are based on what she said—so if her claim is in doubt now, pointing out that she also made it earlier would not address that doubt. A second point of concern is that her husband is, one would infer, biased in her favor. This does not mean that he is not telling the truth, but it does impact his credibility. What the notes do, however, is provide evidence that she did not suddenly make up an incident in 2018 to use against Kavanaugh. However, this does not prove that her claim about Kavanaugh is true.

One point raised against Blasey is the fact that she waited until now to bring this matter to light. This does lend some apparent credence to the claim that the accusation is being made simply to slow down the process until the elections. However, there are some plausible replies to this delay. As has often been noted, women who bring forth such accusations against powerful men (or men in general) tend to be subject to doubt, abuse and attacks. Even when the accusations are credible, it is often the victim who is shamed and blamed. As such, it is not surprising that Blasey would have been reluctant to come forward in the past. In terms of being willing to do so now, her supporters could point to the fact that the #MeToo movement has made coming forward less awful (although Blasey claims she is getting death threats). There is also the fact that there is a great deal at stake, since Kavanaugh is being nominated for the Supreme Court. Naturally, her detractors will focus on the fact that so much is at stake that a person might be willing to lie to achieve a political end. While deceit has always been a political tactic, the Trump administration has made it an everyday tool—so it is natural that the Republicans would suspect deceit.

Unless additional evidence is forthcoming, the assessment of the claim comes down to a matter of assessing the plausibility of the claim itself and the relative credibility of the witnesses. That a drunk young man would assault a young woman at a party has considerable plausibility. However, the plausibility of this general claim does not prove that Kavanaugh engaged in the alleged assault. Assessing this is a matter of assessing the relative credibility of those allegedly involved. Naturally, people will tend to be influenced by their political views and values. Democrats, obviously enough, will tend to believe Blasey and Republicans will tend to favor Kavanaugh.

 

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Women, Sports & Anger

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Tennis is a game of conflicting stereotypes. On the one hand, one envisions a genteel game of polite, impeccably dressed athletes. On the other hand, one also pictures raging players smashing their rackets and the audience’s eardrums with harsh language. It, like most things, is also fraught with gender issues—women are supposed to dress and behave certain ways, while men are given far more leeway.

Serena Williams recently brought tennis back into the news after her heated exchange with an umpire at the U.S. Open. Some see Williams as calling out sexism in tennis, while others dispute this. There has also been an interesting discussion about gender and anger, which is certainly a matter worth considering from a philosophical perspective.

While I am obviously not a world class athlete, I did compete in high school and college—and still race (if what I do now is worthy of that description. Even among athletes who are not professionals, there is still an expected standard of behavior that is part of being an athlete. This includes, obviously enough, behaving with a certain level of decorum. Of course, these are social norms and hence there is a need to consider if there is anything substantial behind them.

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One obvious place to look is in Plato’s Republic. Plato argues that art is dangerous because it can corrupt people thus causing them to lose control over their emotions and thus behave in ways that should, morally, be condemned. One example he gives is that of tragedy and how it can cause people to give in to feelings of sadness. He notes that the higher principle enjoins us to “take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl.” He notes that “the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly.” Plato takes an analogous view of other emotions, such as anger, and contends that the proper course is for the rational part of the soul to rule over what he regards as the lesser parts.  This, on his view, is how the soul should be properly ordered and not out of whack.

It is also well worth considering Plato’s most famous student, Aristotle. Aristotle endorsed virtue theory; the view that what a person should do is develop their virtues. Aristotle, and most other virtue theorists, contended that virtue is a mean between two extremes. As he saw it, “fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.” Aristotle also applied this approach to actions. On this view, anger and acting (or not) on that anger is not itself bad (or good). Rather, it is good or bad (morally) based on the context. As such, an athlete who expresses anger on the field of play could be acting in a virtuous manner. This would require that they are angry in the right way, towards the right person and act in the proper way. As such, on Aristotle’s theory, Williams could have acted in a virtuous manner. The debate would, of course, focus on whether her anger and actions meet the conditions for virtue—which is a matter of considerable controversy.

As Aristotle notes, sorting out the right way to be angry and acting rightly is difficult: “anyone can get angry- that is easy- or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.”   To help us in this matter, Aristotle does offer some practical advice. On his view, the ideal is the mean between two extremes and “for of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as people say, take the least of the evils…” My view is that the greater error lies in being too angry rather than not angry enough (though this is a possibility for Aristotle). After all, when one considers the troubles arising from anger, rarely do people say that a problem arose from a dearth of anger. While I would not have done as Williams did, I am not her—and what might be wrong for me to do because of my circumstances might have been right for her. I am not embracing moral relativism here—I am not claiming that good and bad are not objective, but rather that what could be righteous anger for one person might be unreasonable for another. After all, as an unknown white guy I have not had to endure what Williams has had to face. To use a sports analogy, what might be objectively a brutal, unendurable workout for one person, might be easy for another.

The reader might have noticed that I have said little about women and anger; this is intentional. My view is that while the virtue or vice of anger is determined by the facts of the matter, the same moral standards apply to males and females. As such, women should not be assessed differently simply because they are women. In terms of how angry outbursts and actions should be handled in sports, the general principle is that this should be done in a consistent manner across the sport. As such, Williams should receive the same treatment as male players who acted in comparable ways. While it could be argued that there is a relevant difference between men and women that warrants a difference in standards (after all, men and women do not compete against each other in professional tennis), the burden of proof rests on the person who makes this claim. After all, there does not seem to be a relevant difference between what should count as professional behavior on the court for men and women.

 

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