Last year Terry Jones gained international attention by threatening to burn the Koran. The situation seemed to have been resolved with Jones’ decision not to burn any books. However, he and some of his fellows went through with the burning on March 20, 2011. While most of the world did not react to this event, some people in Afghanistan and Pakistan reacted quite strongly. In the case of Afghanistan, the burning led to riots. The first of these resulted in the deaths of seven U.N. workers (none of whom were Americans) and four demonstrators. More deaths have followed and it seems likely that even more people will die before the event plays out.
One aspect of this incident is that some of the rioters are obviously willing to murder people who have no connection whatsoever to the burning of the Koran. As such, it seems rather difficult for them to claim that they are acting on the basis of any meaningful concept of justice. After all, justice seems to require distinguishing between those who are accountable and those who are not accountable. There is, of course, also the rather important matter of whether or not the burning of a book warrants death.
Interestingly enough, an unwillingness (or inability) to distinguish between people is something that is often seen among Americans who are hostile to Islam and regard all Muslims as terrorists (or potential terrorists). This unwillingness to make such distinctions seems to be a significant factor in the mindsets of such people. Whether this is an effect of their hatred or a contributory cause (or both) is something that remains to be determined.
Rather than focus on this matter, however, I will instead focus on the American reaction to the incidents and its repercussions.
On view, put forth by Democratic Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois, is that while the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, assembly and religion, Americans should exercise these rights responsibly.
This view seems to be quite reasonable. After all, the constitution is rather clear about the legal rights presented in the First Amendment and the rulings of the Supreme Court have been consistently in favor of free speech, even when such speech does have negative consequences.
An obvious response to this view is that not all speech is protected nor should it be. To use the classic example, people do not have the legal (or moral) right to yell “fire” in a crowded theater when there is no fire. This is because their speech would cause direct harm under reasonable legal and moral views of causation (sine qua non and proximate causation).
In the case of Jones’ burning the Koran, his expression seems to have caused Afghans to attack and kill people. Given this sort of harm, Jones’ actions should not be considered legally protected and should also be regarded as morally unacceptable. After all, his actions would seem to have caused needless and wrongful harm to others.
The easy and obvious reply to this is that there is a relevant difference between the theater example and the Koran burning. In the case of the person yelling fire, the action is a deceit (there is no fire) and it is reasonable to expect people to try to escape a building that is supposed to be on fire. It is also reasonable to expect that people could be injured during the escape attempt. As such, there seems to be a rather direct link between the yelling of “fire”and the harm that would result.
In the case of burning the Koran, the link seems to be more indirect. The book is burned, people learn about it, they become angry, they riot, they go looking for Americans to kill, they do not find Americans so they attack U.N. workers and kill them. In this scenario, the causal link seems to be such that Jones’ moral and legal culpability is very limited. In fact, he seems to have no legal culpability whatsoever.
To use an analogy, if I were to criticize the views of a British colleague in a spiteful manner and burn their book and they responded by going and punching a Canadian philosopher, then I would hardly be responsible for those actions. Even if I knew that they were hot tempered and likely to do this, I cannot be held accountable for their lack of self control.
It might be replied that if someone knows that other people will do harmful things if provoked by such words or deeds, then they should not take that action. However, this makes free expression a hostage to whoever is willing to respond with violent or destructive actions when they hear of things they do not like. This will clearly not do.
Naturally, there can be pragmatic grounds for engaging in some common sense restraint and moral arguments can be made as to why, on the basis of the consequences, people should not say or do certain things that might provoke people to irrational acts of murder and destruction. As a friend of mine has said, “it is sometimes best not to provoke the crazy people.”
A second view is that although the constitution is rather clear about the matter of freedom of expression, exceptions can be made in times of war. This view was put forth by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who spoke on Face the Nation.
“I wish we could find some way to hold people accountable. Free speech is a great idea, but we are in a war. During World War II, you had limits on what you could say if it would inspire the enemy. So, burning the Quran is a terrible thing, but it doesn’t justify killing someone. Burning a Bible would be a terrible thing, but it doesn’t justify murder.”
I will begin by agreeing with the second part of Graham’s remarks: burning a religious book does not justify killing people. However, I do have some concerns about the first part of his remarks.
He begins by noting that while free speech is a great idea (something people always say before going on to say that it needs to be limited), the fact that we are at war justifies restricting it. He notes that this was practiced in WWII and he presumably thinks that a similar approach should be taken today.
On the one hand, I can see the appeal of this approach. After all, in times of war it does make sense to limit what people can say. For example, it seems acceptable to prevent citizens from freely talking about secret military plans or revealing the names and locations of agents in enemy territory. However, these sorts of things seem to be already covered by existing laws and it seems easy enough to make moral arguments against acts that would seem to be cases of potential treason.
On the other hand, this approach does have some problems. First, we now seem to always be at war with no clear end (or even a clear definition of what would count as an end) in sight. As such, it seems like a less than great idea to use the war justification. After all, since being always at war is the new normal, this would seem to mean that such limits would be in place for the foreseeable future. Second, while we are at war, the war (three of them, actually) seem to be rather different from WWII in ways that might have justified restrictions in WWII but do not justify them now. Third, there is also the obvious question as to whether such limits were justified during WWII. After all, if they are being used to justify limits now, it must be shown that they justified limits then. Fourth, there seems to be the rather obvious problem that restricting expression that provokes “the enemy” would seem to justify imposing a broad range of restrictions. Under this approach, if the announcement that the United States was going to take an action in the Middle East led to a violent response, then the persons or persons making the announcement (perhaps the president or his press secretary) would have to be held accountable. Or, to use another example, if some people rioted in Afghanistan and said it was because American women are allowed to express opinions in public, then American women would need to be held accountable.
In light of the above, while I believe that Jones’ should not have burned the Koran, I also hold that there should be no legal restrictions placed on such actions. In any case, if God did not want the Koran burned, He surely would have prevented it from happening. As such, that seems to be a sign that God is okay with it.
I suspect it would have been fine to burn a German flag in WWII, or a copy of Mein Kampf.
What would be the analogous action? Is there one?
“What would be the analogous action? Is there one?”
Analogous in the sense that the actions were propelled by nationalistic or religious fervor? Intranationally we had our flag burnings, perhaps —in the sense that the actors employed a religious symbol to generate fear and uncontrolled anger? Cross-burning by dudes in white carrying Bibles. . .and the lynchings and beatings that sometimes followed? And abortion-doctor slayings by nutbags who, on their own, or through the urgings of others, chose to kill in the name of God.
“smoke” on metafilter 4/2 writes “All fundamentalist idiots in both countries proved is that idiocy is a transnational, trans-religion phenomenon.”
Well, the analogy would be to burn a bible (for the Germans and Italians) and some Shinto and Buddhist texts (for the Japanese). After all, the German flag would be specific to the Germans and we were at war with the German state. In the case of the Koran, we are presumably not engaged in a war with all Muslims. After all, there are plenty of Muslim Americans and we have many Muslim allies.
And why do we respect the sensitivities of various religions so much, anyway?
In my view, preaching that someone deserves to roast in Hell for eternity is far more offensive than burning a book.
Would you agree that great respect for all religions is a necessary foundation for our First Amendment “establishment of religion” clause?
I don’t think we need to respect them, merely tolerate them (within limits).
“In any case, if God did not want the Koran burned, He surely would have prevented it from happening. As such, that seems to be a sign that God is okay with it.” Amen to the assumed irony seeping from that sentence.
That would render your 17+ paragraphs devoted to an event that, apparently, only God and Allah had any say in suprefluous. And does that put paid to the whole free will idea? Terry Jones knew the likely consequences of his act. . . . If he didn’t he’s a fool. He burned the book anyway. God said it must be so. Allah said it must be so. The Great Gloves of God are off.
God is ready to throw down with Himself.
He’s penciled that in on His schedule— right after “Lift that rock that I can’t lift”
Pursuing this train even further on this sidetrack:
http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5160
Mr. Kouki places the rock alongside the square circle and says they’re both ” logically contradictory, and therefore contrary to God’s rational nature.” But, if God had chosen to create man with different logical processes, might not squares be circles and “a morally free creature” NOTt be free to ” choose evil”? Is God capable of creating a being who is weaker than Him in every way, yet incapable of creating one for whom “morality–good or evil–is irrelevant? Isn’t that what it’s like in “Heaven” The whole moral/immoral issue is settled there? Or does God have a time-out corner for slackers? Am I presuming any less or more about “God’s rational nature” than Mr. Kouki is? Is his point valid or just desperate excuse-making? Is Mr. Kouki just kooky?
Kouki has taken the intellectualist position: God’s intellect limits his will, so that God must operate within the laws of logic (no square circles). On this view God’s omnipotence amounts to God being able to do anything that is possible. The opposing viewpoint is voluntarism. On this view, God’s will is taken to be supreme over his intellect. This entails that God is not constrained by logic, etc. and hence He can do anything, even the impossible. On this view, God could make square circles. It is not that we would call squares by the name “circle” it is that they would be square circles. How is this possible? It is not, but God could make it so.
Leibniz and Aquinas are examples of intellectualists while Dun Scotus is an example of a voluntarist.
Question for the intellectualist: “God’s intellect” as understood by whom? Who has decided that God must operate by Man’s “laws of logic”?
Question for the voluntarist: How do we reach the basic premise that “God’s will is taken to be supreme over his intellect”? Coin flip?
And believers, whose stance depends on the superiority of belief over reason, begin with the premise that Man’s intellect is modest indeed and that intellect prevents both intellectualists and voluntarists from assessing the true limits of God’s intellect or will. There’s no point in questioning the believer.
Is it any wonder, then, that some recognize the limits of Man’s intellect but refuse to set it aside while seeking a path? That “not all who wander are lost” carries with it no implied guarantee that all will find their way. But after all, “The journey not the arrival matters.” – T. S. Eliot
Might as well toss Spinoza in there as an example of the 3rd position, that God’s intellect and will are one and the same.
On this view, God is immanent within everything, hence it makes no sense to ask what He can and cannot do, since there is nothing outside of Himself to act on and everything within Him is simply a necessary expression of His nature.
Spinoza, I think, saw the implications of taking God to be an infinite, necessary substance quite clearly.
That view answers all the questions and, perhaps more importantly, it allows us to get on with more important considerations in our lives.
You make some important points here. My thoughts about this whole Koran burning/free speech issue took me right back to the recent Supreme Court decision concerning Westboro Baptist Church and their right to protest funerals, which the Court (rightly, I think) upheld.
Mr. Graham’s comments are frightening . . . does he also want us to imagine the Islamofascist terrorists as rats that need to be exterminated, as American people, during World War II, once thought of the Japanese people? Propaganda, not thinking, is the order of the day, apparently, especially during war.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30376995/Propaganda-and-the-People
If we indiscriminately lump American Muslims with “Islamofascists” in “The War Against Terrorism”, once there’s no way for them to escape the “all followers of the Koran are evil ;all Muslims are Islamofascists” fallacy, no American Muslim will be able to exist outside a nasty little box of “Islamofascists” in the seething American psyche. It’s bumper-sticker thinking writ horrifyingly large.
Quite so. To cast all Muslims as terrorists is on par with casting all Americans as Koran burners.
Not a pretty picture. You, me, and Terry Jones. . .Hey TJ! I noticed that you may have more in common with Lambchop Jones than either Mike or I do. Would you prefer to have your onscreen name associated with Terry Jones or Thomas Jefferson?
If someone wants to burn a piece of his private property in accord with all the relevant fire regulations it is fine by me.
I don’t think because some belief system is designated as a “religion” it deserves any special respect.
I have even less respect for belief systems that mandate eternal damnation for non believers.
So I take it that’s a firm stand for Deist Jefferson and against Terry Jones . May I call you TommyJ? I have a big orange tabby cat named Tommy.
How should I read your ‘designated as a “religion”‘ statement? Are you referring to Islam? Mormonism? Scientology? Any or all of the above? How do the courts deal with these religions? Could recognition as a religion by the courts be viewed as a an understanding by the court of the special place religion holds among our constitutional rights. . .and thus as a clear sign of “special respect” for any religion the court recognizes as a religion?
Two defs. for respect from dictionary.com:
“10.to show regard or consideration for: to respect someone’s rights.
11.to refrain from intruding upon or interfering with: to respect a person’s privacy.”
And three for tolerance:
1. a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, practices, race, religion, nationality, etc., differ from one’s own; freedom from bigotry.
2. a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward opinions and practices that differ from one’s own.
3.interest in and concern for ideas, opinions, practices, etc., foreign to one’s own; a liberal, undogmatic viewpoint.
I actually find myself in complete agreement with TJ on this one.
Extremist Islam is a mad dog; everyone knows my thoughts on that. I just saw little good in intentionally irritating the mad dog so that it attacks more innocent, unarmed people. Better to let our military take care of the the extremists the right way: with Hellfire missiles and black-ops temas.
An article I wrote about this has been accepted for publication in the Jerusalem Post. It’s titled: Blessed Are the Peacemakers. Should be out soon in the Op-ed section.
Magus
Congratulations!
It’s been printed by the Gainesville Sun, too.
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20110406/NEWS/110409713/1123/opinion?Title=Douglas-Moore-Terry-Jones-failed-his-country-
Congratulations, Magus! I looked in the JP for the last couple of days, but did not see it–has it appeared yet?
TJ,
It has not appeared in the JP yet. I’m wondering if copyright issues will cause problems with the Sun. In my experience, when papers want to publish something, they email me and verify my identity etc. The JP sent me an email the day after I sent them the article saying they wanted to publish my article.
Since papers that don’t want to publish your stuff many times will not contact you, if you send your article to only one paper it may be weeks before you realize nothing is happening and the story has passed by. So I sent it to about 4 different papers, the Sun being one, since Gainesville is where Terry Jones is.
But the Sun never sent me a response; I Googled the title of the article and my name and found that they’d published it–with a misspelling of the word “analyst” at the end. There were no misspellings in my original by the way….
I’m still waiting….
Exactly what crime did Terry Jones commit to land him in jail?
A judge late Friday sent two Florida pastors to jail for refusing to post a $1 bond and barred them from visiting a Dearborn mosque or its adjacent property for three years unless the mosque’s leadership says otherwise. After a short time in jail they left on $1 bond each.
The stunning developments came after a Dearborn jury sided with prosecutors, ruling that Terry Jones and Wayne Sapp would breach the peace if they rallied at the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn. Critics slammed the decision to jail them, the court proceedings, and Wayne County prosecutors, saying they violated the men’s Constitutional rights.
Prosecutors asked Judge Mark Somers for $45,000 bond. Somers then set bond at $1 each for the two pastors. They refused to pay. And Somers ordered them remanded to jail.
http://www.freep.com/article/20110422/NEWS02/110422014/Dearborn-jury-Terry-Jones-rally-would-breach-peace?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE
As long as they did not trespass or create a danger to public safety, then they should be free to protest. Using breach of peace against protesters seems to be a questionable application of the law-at least morally.
I may have to re-join the ACLU. They are all over this case:
“It is a basic principle of First Amendment jurisprudence that one may not be
charged a price to engage in expressive activity because others may react negatively to
that expressive activity.”
http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/TerryJonesACLUAmicus.pdf
Top class web-site yours sincerely, Chantelle Harper